Unfiltered Market Access and Liquidity: Evidence from the SEC Rule 15c3-5

Author(s):  
Bidisha Chakrabarty ◽  
Pankaj K. Jain ◽  
Andriy Shkilko ◽  
Konstantin Sokolov

In November 2011, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission implemented the final provision of Rule 15c3-5 curbing unfiltered market access. The provision mandated that brokers verify their clients’ order flow for compliance with credit and capital thresholds before routing to market centers. We find that the new checks introduce latency to order flow and force some latency-sensitive strategies out of the market. As a result, liquidity providers are better able to revise their quotes in response to new information, adverse selection declines, and liquidity improves. Consistent with the notion that the market for liquidity provision is competitive, our results show that the benefit of lower adverse selection is transferred entirely to liquidity demanders in the form of lower trading costs. This paper was accepted by Karl Diether, finance.

2007 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen A. Zeff

In 1959, the Accounting Principles Board (APB) replaced the Committee on Accounting Procedure because the latter was unable to deal forthrightly with a series of important issues. But during the APB's first half-dozen years, its record of achievement was no more impressive than its predecessor's. The chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Manuel F. Cohen, criticized the APB's slow pace and unwillingness to tackle difficult issues. This article discusses the circumstances attending the SEC's issuance of an Accounting Series Release in late 1965 to demonstrate forcefully to the APB that, when it is unable to carry out its responsibility to “narrow the areas of difference” in accounting practice, the SEC is prepared to step in and do so itself. In this sense, the article deals with the tensions between the private and public sectors in the establishment of accounting principles in the U.S. during the mid-1960s. The article makes extensive use of primary resource materials in the author's personal archive, which have not been used previously in published work.


Author(s):  
Juliane B. Wutzler

This study aims to shed light on the determinants and consequences of the revolving door at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). While revolvers may be good monitors due to their SEC experience and, thus, continuously create benefits for the economy ("schooling"), it is possible that they exploit their insights into the enforcement process and private connections to undermine enforcement ("regulatory capture"). Using a newly created dataset of revolvers who moved from the SEC to company boards, this study shows that not all revolvers are appointed for the same reasons and create the same benefits for their new employers. I demonstrate that those revolvers most closely involved in the enforcement process are associated with fewer future enforcement actions while accounting quality does not improve. Contrarily, external revolvers seem to use their monitoring and advising duties to improve accounting quality.


2005 ◽  
Vol 8 (06) ◽  
pp. 520-527 ◽  
Author(s):  
D.R. Harrell ◽  
Thomas L. Gardner

Summary A casual reading of the SPE/WPC (World Petroleum Congresses) Petroleum Reserves Definitions (1997) and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission(SEC) definitions (1978) would suggest very little, if any, difference in the quantities of proved hydrocarbon reserves estimated under those two classification systems. The differences in many circumstances for both volumetric and performance-based estimates may be small. In 1999, the SEC began to increase its review process, seeking greater understanding and compliance with its oil and gas reserves reporting requirements. The agency's definitions had been promulgated in 1978 in connection with the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 and at a time when most publicly owned oil and gas companies and their reserves were located in the United States. Oil and gas prices were relatively stable, and virtually all natural gas was marketed through long-term contracts at fixed or determinable prices. Development drilling was subject to well-spacing regulations as established through field rules set by state agencies. Reservoir-evaluation technology has advanced far beyond that used in 1978;production-sharing contracts were uncommon then, and probabilistic reserves assessment was not widely recognized or appreciated in the U.S. These changes in industry practice plus many other considerations have created problems in adapting the 1978 vintage definitions to the technical and commercial realities of the 21st century. This paper presents several real-world examples of how the SEC engineering staff has updated its approach to reserves assessment as well as numerous remaining unresolved areas of concern. These remaining issues are important, can lead to significant differences in reported quantities and values, and may result in questions about the "full disclosure" obligations to the SEC. Introduction For virtually all oil and gas producers, their company assets are the hydrocarbon reserves that they own through various forms of mineral interests, licensing agreements, or other contracts and that produce revenues from production and sale. Reserves are almost always reported as static quantities as of a specific date and classified into one or more categories to describe the uncertainty and production status associated with each category. The economic value of these reserves is a direct function of how the quantities are to be produced and sold over the physical or contract lives of the properties. Reserves owned by private and publicly owned companies are always assumed to be those quantities of oil and gas that can be produced and sold at a profit under assumed future prices and costs. Reserves under the control of state-owned or national oil companies may reflect quantities that exceed those deemed profitable under the commercial terms typically imposed on private or publicly owned companies.


2015 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
pp. 623-646 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andriy Bodnaruk ◽  
Tim Loughran ◽  
Bill McDonald

AbstractMeasuring the extent to which a firm is financially constrained is critical in assessing capital structure. Extant measures of financial constraints focus on macro firm characteristics such as age and size, variables highly correlated with other firm attributes. We parse 10-K disclosures filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) using a unique lexicon based on constraining words. We find that the frequency of constraining words exhibits very low correlation with traditional measures of financial constraints and predicts subsequent liquidity events, such as dividend omissions or increases, equity recycling, and underfunded pensions, better than widely used financial constraint indexes.


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