Hedge Fund Activism and Corporate M&A Decisions

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Szu-Yin (Jennifer) Wu ◽  
Kee H. Chung
Keyword(s):  
Mergers And Acquisitions ◽  
Selection Bias ◽  
Hedge Funds ◽  
Operating Performance ◽  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Corporate Control ◽  
Market For Corporate Control ◽  
Target Firms ◽  
Governance Practices ◽  
Hedge Fund Activism

This paper shows that hedge fund activism is associated with a decrease in mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and offer premiums and an increase in stock and operating performance. Activist hedge funds improve target firms’ M&A performance by reducing poor M&A, diversifying M&A, and the M&A of firms with multiple business segments. Activist hedge funds improve target firms’ M&A decisions by influencing their governance practices. We show that our results are unlikely driven by selection bias. Overall, activist hedge funds play an important role in the market for corporate control by increasing the efficiency of target firms’ M&A activities through interventions. This paper was accepted by Gustavo Manso, finance.

scholarly journals Institutional Investors and Hedge Fund Activism

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simi Kedia ◽  
Laura Starks ◽  
Xianjue Wang
Keyword(s):  
Stock Returns ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Operating Performance ◽  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Target Firms ◽  
Hedge Fund Activism ◽  
Institutional Shareholders

Abstract Hedge fund activists have ambiguous relationships with the institutional shareholders in their target firms. While some support their activities, others counter their actions. Due to their relatively small holdings in target firms, activists typically need the cooperation of other institutional shareholders that are willing to influence the activists’ campaign success. We find the presence of “activism-friendly” institutions as owners is associated with an increased probability of being a target, higher long-term stock returns, and higher operating performance. Overall, we provide evidence suggesting the composition of a firm’s ownership has significant effects on hedge fund activists’ decisions and outcomes.

Hedge Fund Activism vs Other Activist Investors

2021 ◽  
pp. 252-282
Author(s):  
Ulf von Lilienfeld-Toal ◽  
Jan Schnitzler
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Analysis ◽  
Hedge Funds ◽  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Empirical Literature ◽  
Comparative Approach ◽  
Large Sample ◽  
Shareholder Proposals ◽  
Target Firms ◽  
Hedge Fund Activism ◽  
The Impact

This chapter reviews the growing empirical literature on shareholder activism by hedge funds. The aim is a comparative approach contrasting the impact of hedge fund activism on target firms with outcomes for other types of activist investors. Following recent research, the chapter provides an empirical analysis based on the disclosure of equity blockholdings by activist investors in a large sample of all US listed companies. In addition, it summarizes which types of investors engage in other events linked to activism, such as takeovers, proxy contests, or shareholder proposals. Overall, there is evidence that not only hedge funds but also other types of investors can be effective monitors, but there are nuanced differences with respect to targeting decisions and payout policies.

A Review of Hedge Fund Activism: Impact on Shareholders vs. Stakeholders

2021 ◽  
pp. 282-317
Author(s):  
Hadiye Aslan
Keyword(s):  
Hedge Funds ◽  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Spillover Effects ◽  
Empirical Literature ◽  
Target Firm ◽  
Market Strategy ◽  
Target Firms ◽  
Product Market Strategy ◽  
Hedge Fund Activism ◽  
Rival Firms

This chapter reviews the growing empirical literature on shareholder activism by hedge funds, summarizing the sources and nature of the activist data and examining the evidence on target firm outcomes. Target firms do not exist in a vacuum, however; they have industry competitors, suppliers, customers, debtholders, and employees. Hedge fund activists often demand a reformulation of the target firm’s product market strategy to enhance its ability to earn inframarginal profits. This positive strategic effect may be especially significant for target firms that are economically distressed and facing predatory moves from deep-pocketed rival firms to induce exit. The putative significant effects of hedge fund activism on targets should generate spillover effects on their stakeholders. The chapter considers these spillover effects in a number of well-defined categories: industry rivals, customers, suppliers, debtholders, and employees.

Gone Global: The International Diffusion of Hedge Fund Activism

2021 ◽  
pp. 317-367
Author(s):  
Ruth V. Aguilera ◽  
Ryan Federo ◽  
Yuliya Ponomareva
Keyword(s):  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Research Gaps ◽  
Global Context ◽  
International Diffusion ◽  
Target Firms ◽  
The Us ◽  
Research Questions ◽  
Country Differences ◽  
Cross Country ◽  
Hedge Fund Activism

After decades of being primarily a US-based phenomenon, the globalization of hedge fund (HF) activism is increasing at an unprecedented speed. This chapter reviews the empirical research on HF activism by systematically comparing studies conducted in the US and outside the US context. The nascent body of work on HF activism is categorized and discussed within four research sub-streams: the antecedents of HF activism; HF activists’ tactics; the responses of target firms to HF activist campaigns, and the outcomes of the latter for HF activists, target firms, and other stakeholders. Six select cases of interventions by a prominent HF activist illustrate the cross-country differences in hedge fund activist practices outlined in the literature review. The chapter concludes by outlining current research gaps and formulating research questions that could advance our knowledge on hedge fund activism in a global context.

scholarly journals The impact of hedge fund activism on target firm performance, executive compensation and executive wealth

2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 14-28 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Carrothers
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Share Price ◽  
Target Firm ◽  
Increased Risk ◽  
Target Firms ◽  
Hedge Fund Activism ◽  
The Impact

This paper examines the relationship between hedge fund activism and target firm performance, executive compensation, and executive wealth. It introduces a theoretical framework that describes the activism process as a sequence of discrete decisions. The methodology uses regression analysis on a matched sample based on firm size, industry, and market-to-book ratio. All regressions control for industry and year fixed effects. Schedule 13D Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings are the source for the statistical sample of hedge fund target firms. I supplement that data with target firm financial, operating, and share price information from the CRSP-COMPUSTAT merged database. Activist hedge funds target undervalued or underperforming firms with high profitability and cash flows. They do not avoid firms with powerful CEOs. Leverage, executive compensation, pay for performance and CEO turnover increase at target firms after the arrival of the activist hedge fund. Target firm executives’ wealth is more sensitive to changes in share price after hedge fund activism events suggesting that the executive team experiences changes to their compensation structure that provides incentive to take action to improve returns to shareholders. The top executives reap rewards for increasing firm value but not for increased risk taking.

scholarly journals Towards an Indian Market for Corporate Control

1993 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-38 ◽  
Author(s):  
N Venkiteswaran
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Mergers And Acquisitions ◽  
Corporate Control ◽  
Wide Area ◽  
Market Forces ◽  
Indian Market ◽  
Indian Economy ◽  
Significant Growth ◽  
Indian Industry ◽  
Market For Corporate Control

As the Indian economy is being modernized through dismantling of rigid controls and greater reliance on market forces, the Indian industry is likely to witness major restructuring through a spate of mergers and acquisitions. This paper by N Venkiteswaran examines the historical impediments against corporate restructuring through mergers and takeovers in India. The author is of the view that given the economic compulsions, India is also about to witness significant growth in mergers and acquisitions in the coming years. In this emerging scenario, the importance of regulatory reforms covering a wide area such as competition, investor protection, taxation, corporate governance, etc. is underscored so that the Indian market for corporate control is developed along orderly lines.

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