A Monge Sequence-Based Approach to Characterize the Competitive Newsvendor Problem

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Saurabh Bansal ◽  
Mahesh Nagarajan
Keyword(s):  
Structural Properties ◽  
Transportation Problem ◽  
Cash Flows ◽  
Newsvendor Problem ◽  
Multiple Agents ◽  
Optimization Framework ◽  
Unmet Demand ◽  
Game Theoretic

Replicating cash flows of multiple agents in game-theoretic settings tends to be a challenging task. In this paper, we consider the competitive newsvendor game where multiple newsvendors choose inventory levels before demand arrival and the unmet demand of each newsvendor spills over to multiple other newsvendors. We show that this spillover behavior and the resulting cash flows of each newsvendor can be replicated within a transportation problem after assigning artificial costs on spillover behavior. This replication provides an opportunity to study structural properties of the problem, as well as determine the equilibrium of the game. This paradigm of using artificial costs within an optimization framework to replicate agents’ cash flows can be used in many other games as well.

scholarly journals Multiple agents managing a harmful species population should either work together to control it or split their duties to eradicate it

2020 ◽  
Vol 117 (19) ◽  
pp. 10210-10217 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Lampert
Keyword(s):  
General Theorem ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Multiple Agents ◽  
Severe Damage ◽  
Global Challenge ◽  
Species Population ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Harmful Species

The management of harmful species, including invasive species, pests, parasites, and diseases, is a major global challenge. Harmful species cause severe damage to ecosystems, biodiversity, agriculture, and human health. In particular, managing harmful species often requires cooperation among multiple agents, such as landowners, agencies, and countries. Each agent may have incentives to contribute less to the treatment, leaving more work for other agents, which may result in inefficient treatment. A central question is, therefore, how should a policymaker allocate treatment duties among the agents? Specifically, should the agents work together in the same area, or should each agent work only in a smaller area designated just for her/him? We consider a dynamic game-theoretic model, where a Nash equilibrium corresponds to a possible set of contributions that the agents could adopt over time. In turn, the allocation by the policymaker determines which of the Nash equilibria could be adopted, which allows us to compare the outcome of various allocations. Our results show that fewer agents can abate the harmful species population faster, but more agents can better control the population to keep its density lower. We prove this result in a general theorem and demonstrate it numerically for two case studies. Therefore, following an outbreak, the better policy would be to split and assign one or a few agents to treat the species in a given location, but if controlling the harmful species population at some low density is needed, the agents should work together in all of the locations.

A survey of incentive engineering for crowdsourcing

2018 ◽  
Vol 33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Conor Muldoon ◽  
Michael J. O’Grady ◽  
Gregory M. P. O’Hare
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Direct Control ◽  
Multiple Agents ◽  
System Designer ◽  
Incentive Theory ◽  
Incentive Engineering ◽  
Incentive Structures ◽  
Game Theoretic

AbstractWith the growth of the Internet, crowdsourcing has become a popular way to perform intelligence tasks that hitherto would be either performed internally within an organization or not undertaken due to prohibitive costs and the lack of an appropriate communications infrastructure. In crowdsourcing systems, whereby multiple agents are not under the direct control of a system designer, it cannot be assumed that agents will act in a manner that is consistent with the objectives of the system designer or principal agent. In situations whereby agents’ goals are to maximize their return in crowdsourcing systems that offer financial or other rewards, strategies will be adopted by agents to game the system if appropriate mitigating measures are not put in place. The motivational and incentivization research space is quite large; it incorporates diverse techniques from a variety of different disciplines including behavioural economics, incentive theory, and game theory. This paper specifically focusses on game theoretic approaches to the problem in the crowdsourcing domain and places it in the context of the wider research landscape. It provides a survey of incentive engineering techniques that enable the creation of apt incentive structures in a range of different scenarios.

Time minimizing solid transportation problem

Optimization ◽  
1976 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 395-403
Author(s):  
H.L. Bhatia ◽  
Kanti Swarup ◽  
M.C. Puri
Keyword(s):  
Transportation Problem ◽  
Solid Transportation Problem

Newborn's Preference for Faces

1996 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 200-205 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlo Umiltà ◽  
Francesca Simion ◽  
Eloisa Valenza
Keyword(s):  
Visual System ◽  
Structural Properties ◽  
Sensory Properties ◽  
Human Face ◽  
System Experiment ◽  
Face Experiment

Four experiments were aimed at elucidating some aspects of the preference for facelike patterns in newborns. Experiment 1 showed a preference for a stimulus whose components were located in the correct arrangement for a human face. Experiment 2 showed a preference for stimuli that had optimal sensory properties for the newborn visual system. Experiment 3 showed that babies directed their attention to a facelike pattern even when it was presented simultaneously with a non-facelike stimulus with optimal sensory properties. Experiment 4 showed the preference for facelike patterns in the temporal hemifield but not in the nasal hemifield. It was concluded that newborns' preference for facelike patterns reflects the activity of a subcortical system which is sensitive to the structural properties of the stimulus.

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