scholarly journals Multiple agents managing a harmful species population should either work together to control it or split their duties to eradicate it

2020 ◽  
Vol 117 (19) ◽  
pp. 10210-10217 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Lampert
Keyword(s):  
General Theorem ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Multiple Agents ◽  
Severe Damage ◽  
Global Challenge ◽  
Species Population ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Harmful Species

The management of harmful species, including invasive species, pests, parasites, and diseases, is a major global challenge. Harmful species cause severe damage to ecosystems, biodiversity, agriculture, and human health. In particular, managing harmful species often requires cooperation among multiple agents, such as landowners, agencies, and countries. Each agent may have incentives to contribute less to the treatment, leaving more work for other agents, which may result in inefficient treatment. A central question is, therefore, how should a policymaker allocate treatment duties among the agents? Specifically, should the agents work together in the same area, or should each agent work only in a smaller area designated just for her/him? We consider a dynamic game-theoretic model, where a Nash equilibrium corresponds to a possible set of contributions that the agents could adopt over time. In turn, the allocation by the policymaker determines which of the Nash equilibria could be adopted, which allows us to compare the outcome of various allocations. Our results show that fewer agents can abate the harmful species population faster, but more agents can better control the population to keep its density lower. We prove this result in a general theorem and demonstrate it numerically for two case studies. Therefore, following an outbreak, the better policy would be to split and assign one or a few agents to treat the species in a given location, but if controlling the harmful species population at some low density is needed, the agents should work together in all of the locations.

Dynamic Game Theoretic Model of Multi-Layer Infrastructure Networks

2005 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-178 ◽  
Author(s):  
PENGCHENG ZHANG ◽  
SRINIVAS PEETA ◽  
TERRY FRIESZ
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Infrastructure Networks ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model

scholarly journals A game theoretic analysis of resource mining in blockchain

2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 2035-2046 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rajani Singh ◽  
Ashutosh Dhar Dwivedi ◽  
Gautam Srivastava ◽  
Agnieszka Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel ◽  
Xiaochun Cheng
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Social Optimum ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Mining System ◽  
Game Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Digital World ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Dynamic Game Model

Abstract Blockchain and cryptocurrency are a hot topic in today’s digital world. In this paper, we create a game theoretic model in continuous time. We consider a dynamic game model of the bitcoin market, where miners or players use mining systems to mine bitcoin by investing electricity into the mining system. Although this work is motivated by BTC, the work presented can be applicable to other mining systems similar to BTC. We propose three concepts of dynamic game theoretic solutions to the model: Social optimum, Nash equilibrium and myopic Nash equilibrium. Using the model that a player represents a single “miner” or a “mining pool”, we develop novel and interesting results for the cryptocurrency world.

scholarly journals In-queue priority purchase: a dynamic game approach

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhongbin Wang ◽  
Luyi Yang ◽  
Shiliang Cui ◽  
Jinting Wang
Keyword(s):  
Pure Strategy ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Purchasing Behavior ◽  
Light Traffic ◽  
Sequential Rule ◽  
Classical Models ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Do So

AbstractPay-for-priority is a common practice in congestion-prone service systems. The extant literature on this topic restricts attention to the case where the only epoch for customers to purchase priority is upon arrival, and if customers choose not to upgrade when they arrive, they cannot do so later during their wait. A natural alternative is to let customers pay and upgrade to priority at any time during their stay in the queue, even if they choose not to do so initially. This paper builds a queueing-game-theoretic model that explicitly captures self-interested customers’ dynamic in-queue priority-purchasing behavior. When all customers (who have not upgraded yet) simultaneously decide whether to upgrade, we find in our model that pure-strategy equilibria do not exist under some intuitive criteria, contrasting the findings in classical models where customers can only purchase priority upon arrival. However, when customers sequentially decide whether to upgrade, threshold-type pure-strategy equilibria may exist. In particular, under sufficiently light traffic, if the number of ordinary customers accumulates to a certain threshold, then it is always the second last customer who upgrades, but in general, it could be a customer from another position, and the queue-length threshold that triggers an upgrade can also vary with the traffic intensity. Finally, we find that in-queue priority purchase subject to the sequential rule yields less revenue than upon-arrival priority purchase in systems with small buffers.

scholarly journals A Game Theoretic Model of Iranian Labor Market

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (6) ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Younes Brumand ◽  
Masoomeh Salary
Keyword(s):  
Labor Market ◽  
Government Intervention ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Factors Affecting ◽  
Static Game ◽  
The Status ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
The Government

In this paper, we analyze the interactions among workers, employers, and the government in the Iranian labor market using game theory. For this purpose, different games among the factors affecting the labor market are analyzed in both static and dynamic situations. In each case, intervention and non-intervention of the government are also examined. Thus, four different types of games are studied, including a static game between worker and employer, without government intervention; a static game among workers, employers, and the government; a dynamic game between worker and employer, without government intervention; and a dynamic game among workers, employers, and the government. In the first three games, Nash equilibrium implies low productivity of worker, low employer’s profits, and high unemployment rate in which players want to maintain the status quo. However, in the dynamic game among workers, employers, and the government, the sub-game perfect equilibrium of the game can provide some conditions in which the labor market gets away from the low productivity situation

Study on the promotion of natural gas-fired electricity with energy market reform in China using a dynamic game-theoretic model

2017 ◽  
Vol 185 ◽  
pp. 1832-1839 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruijie Tian ◽  
Qi Zhang ◽  
Ge Wang ◽  
Hailong Li ◽  
Siyuan Chen ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Natural Gas ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Market Reform ◽  
Energy Market ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model

scholarly journals Game-theoretic modeling of market participants' behavior: case of Russian Adjustable-Rate Bonds with Puts

2020 ◽  
Vol 13 ◽  
pp. 347-359
Author(s):  
Vitaly L. Okulov ◽  
◽  
Polina S. Zhilina ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Data ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Market Participants ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Adjustable Rate ◽  
The Right

Adjustable-Rate Bonds with Puts (ARBP), frequently issued by the Russian companies, give the issuer the right to arbitrarily change the coupon payments on the bonds at certain moments. But at these moments, the investor has the right to force the issuer to redeem the bonds at a face value. These reciprocal actions of the issuer and investors can be considered as a dynamic game. We suggest a game-theoretic model that allow to determine the optimal decisions of the players. These decisions are compared with empirical data.

A Dynamic Game-theoretic Model of Parental Care

2000 ◽  
Vol 205 (4) ◽  
pp. 605-623 ◽  
Author(s):  
JOHN M MCNAMARA ◽  
TAMÁS SZÉKELY ◽  
JAMES N WEBB ◽  
ALASDAIR I HOUSTON
Keyword(s):  
Parental Care ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model

Stability in the informal value transfer systems: norms of trust or institutions of control?

2017 ◽  
pp. 120-130
Author(s):  
A. Lyasko
Keyword(s):  
Social Control ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Transfer System ◽  
Value Transfer ◽  
Partner Interaction ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Informal Value Transfer System

Informal financial operations exist in the shadow of official regulation and cannot be protected by the formal legal instruments, therefore raising concerns about the enforcement of obligations taken by their participants. This paper analyzes two alternative types of auxiliary institutions, which can coordinate expectations of the members of informal value transfer systems, namely attitudes of trust and norms of social control. It offers some preliminary approaches to creating a game-theoretic model of partner interaction in the informal value transfer system. It also sheds light on the perspectives of further studies in this area of institutional economics.

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