scholarly journals O Congresso dos Estados Unidos e os impasses na aprovação do NAFTA | The Congress of the United States and the impasses in the approval of NAFTA

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
pp. e57624
Author(s):  
Angelo Raphael Mattos

A partir das competências constitucionais do Congresso dos Estados Unidos em política externa, das plataformas dos partidos Democrata e Republicano de 1992, bem como dos argumentos a favor e contra a implementação do North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), o artigo objetiva compreender e discutir as razões da dificuldade enfrentada por Bill Clinton para aprovar o NAFTA no Congresso dos EUA em 1993. Os resultados das análises dos diferentes grupos domésticos, incluindo os atores Executivo e Legislativo, indicam que posições ideológicas, sobretudo presentes no Partido Democrata, como questões trabalhistas e ambientais, representaram o principal fator de resistência ao NAFTA no Capitólio.Palavras-chave: Congresso; Estados Unidos; NAFTA.ABSTRACTBased on the constitutional powers of the United States Congress in foreign policy, the platforms of the Democratic and Republican parties of 1992, as well as the arguments for and against the implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the article aimed to understand and discuss the reasons for Bill Clinton's difficulty in passing NAFTA to the US Congress in 1993. The results of the analyzes of different domestic groups, including the Executive and Legislative actors, indicate that ideological positions, especially present in the Democratic Party, as labor and environmental issues, represented the main factor of resistance to NAFTA in the Capitol. Keywords: Congress; United States; NAFTA. Recebido em: 08 fev. 2021 | Aceito em: 20 set. 2021.

Author(s):  
Richard D. Mahoney

How did the U.S.-Colombia free trade agreement come about? The officially named “U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement” was the stepchild of a rancorous hemispheric divorce between the United States and five Latin American governments over the proposal to extend the North American Free Trade Agreement...


1994 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-71 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward B. DeBellevue ◽  
Eric Hitzel ◽  
Kenneth Cline ◽  
Jorge A. Benitez ◽  
Julia Ramos-Miranda ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
John P. McCray

The dramatic growth in trade between the United States and Mexico from $12.39 billion to $56.8 billion of U.S. exports and $17.56 billion to $73 billion of U.S. imports between 1977 and 1996 and the implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) have focused attention on the impact that the truck-transported portion of this trade has on U.S. highways. State and federal highway administrators are concerned with the planning implications this additional unexpected traffic may have on the transportation infrastructure. Public advocacy groups want additional highway funds to promote one NAFTA highway corridor over others in an effort to stimulate additional economic development. Most of these groups advocate a north-south route through the United States between Canada and Mexico that follows the alignment of an existing federal highway number. Research conducted by the U.S. government under the 1991 Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act has failed to define NAFTA highway corridors adequately, leaving policy makers with little concrete information with which to combat the rhetoric of the trade highway corridor advocacy groups. A report is provided on research critical to the needs of both highway administrators and corridor advocacy groups, namely, the location of U.S.-Mexican trade highway corridors and the trade truck density along these corridors.


PMLA ◽  
1999 ◽  
Vol 114 (3) ◽  
pp. 311-317 ◽  
Author(s):  
Linda Hutcheon

In 1988, in the midst of the often acrimonious debates about the North American Free Trade Agreement, a button began to appear on Canadian lapels. It featured a section of the Stars and Stripes with a red maple leaf in the place of one star, and a caption read, “No, eh.” Through this image, the anti-free-trade side offered parodic resistance to what it saw as the assimilation—not to say wholesale economic engulfing—of Canada by the United States. Typically self-deprecatory, Canadian humor demanded that the rejection be couched in a gentle mocking of the national verbal tic: eh? is the terser but less elegant Canadian version of the French n'est-ce pas? and the German nicht wahr? In some ways the intellectual equivalent of NAFTA, the MLA is much older than the economic institution and somewhat less controversial. Nevertheless, it too is not unproblematic for Canadians, and to see why and how, one needs to understand something of the political and cultural relations between a very small and a very large nation when they adjoin.


2020 ◽  
Vol 114 (4) ◽  
pp. 772-775

On November 30, 2018, Canada, Mexico, and the United States signed an agreement renegotiating the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). By the spring of 2020, all three countries had approved this agreement—known in the United States as the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA)—through their respective domestic ratification processes. The USMCA entered into force on July 1, 2020, amid extended U.S.-Mexico and U.S.-Canada border restrictions due to the COVID-19 pandemic. On August 6, 2020, President Trump imposed tariffs on Canadian aluminum—tariffs that his administration had previously put in place in 2018 but had removed in 2019 in order to smooth the USMCA's path to ratification.


1992 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 29-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sidney Weintraub

The Moment of Truth has come for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The US Congress will have to stop talking and vote to accept or reject the agreement negotiated among Canada, Mexico, and the United States. The disagreement on NAFTA in the United States is about free trade with Mexico, not with Canada. A US-Canada free trade agreement (FTA) already exists.This controversy over NAFTA has been fierce in the United States, much more so than in Mexico. This comparison speaks volumes about changing attitudes. It was almost unthinkable a decade ago that Mexico would so drastically alter its traditional position of maintaining economic and political distance from the United States. This change would not have been possible but for la decena trágica, the years of the 1980s. Beyond that, Mexico has more at stake in a free trade agreement. It has the smaller economy (about 1/27th that of the United States) so that changes, for better or worse, are magnified.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document