Does Privatisation Reduce Public Deficits?

2019 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 287-308
Author(s):  
Beatriz Cuadrado-Ballesteros ◽  
Noemí Peña-Miguel

This paper provides the first ever analysis of the two-way relationship between the privatisation of government services and fiscal balance. It uses data from 22 European countries between 1995 and 2013 to examine the factors that promote privatisation policies and the effects that privatisation then has on public finances. This is important because privatisation has been promoted by both the European Union and the International Monetary Fund as a way of responding to financial crises, and in an era of austerity it is important to have robust empirical evidence about the extent to which privatisation has achieved this. Our analysis demonstrates that governments often adopt privatisation policies in the hope of improving their fiscal balances, but that political ideology is important since left-wing administrations are more likely to see it as a means of also restructuring government services.

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (166) ◽  
Author(s):  

The International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s Statistics Department (STA) conducted a technical assistance (TA) mission to support the Central Bank of Montenegro (CBM) for the compilation of external sector statistics (ESS) in Montenegro during January 20–31, 2020. The mission was funded by Eurostat to meet the European Union (EU)’s acquis1 from the ESS perspective. The CBM has already met most of the EU requirements in ESS. The main outstanding issue is a production of international investment position (IIP) quarterly.


2016 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 171-185
Author(s):  
Marcello Barison

Starting from Michel Foucault?s considerations dedicated to economic knowledge (especially in Il faut d?fendre la soci?t? and Naissance de la biopolitique), this paper is about setting up a possible theoretical framework in which to situate the relationship between political power and neoliberalism as they appear in their modern articulation, analyzing in depth how international governmental organizations - such as, for example, the European Central Bank, the European Union and the International Monetary Fund - are involved in this process.


2017 ◽  
Vol 67 (3) ◽  
pp. 311-332 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gurgen Ohanyan ◽  
Armenia Androniceanu

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has undergone notable changes by starting collaboration with the European Union (EU). Hence, this paper seeks to estimate the effects of IMF programmes on employment, with data from the EU-28 between 1993 and 2013. In order to control for selection on observable and unobservable variables, the study employs Propensity Score Matching in combination with the Differences-in-Difference estimator. Next, the robustness of the findings is checked by applying four different matching algorithms. Our paper concludes that employment decreases once a country resorts to the IMF, and this impact is still measurable after two years of programme initiation.


Author(s):  
C. Randall Henning

The regime complex for crisis finance in the euro area included the European Council, Council of the European Union, and Eurogroup in addition to the three institutions of the troika. As the member states acted largely, though not exclusively, through the council system, these bodies stood at the center of the institutional mix. This chapter reviews the institutions as a prelude to examining the dilemmas that confronted them over the course of the crises. It presents a brief review of some of the basic facts about their origins, membership, and organization. Each section then delves more deeply into these institutions’ governance and principles to understand their capabilities and strategic challenges. As a consequence of different mandates and design, the European Commission, European Central Bank, and International Monetary Fund diverged with respect to their approach to financing, adjustment, conditionality, and debt sustainability. This divergence set the stage for institutional conflict in the country programs.


2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 163
Author(s):  
Celeste Perrucchini ◽  
Hiroshi Ito

Empirical evidence suggests an overall convergence in terms of GDP and per capita income occurring among the European Union (EU) Member States. Nevertheless, economic inequalities have been increasing at the regional level within European Union countries. Through the review of relevant literature, this study analyzes the increasing inequalities from an economical point of view, focusing on Italy and the UK as examples. First, a general overlook of the empirical evidence of the GDP and per capita income at national and sub-national levels will be presented. Second, an explanation of the possible causes of the results will be proposed through the use of economical and sociological theories. The findings of this research might uncover the relative inefficacy of EU Cohesion policies and point towards the necessity for deeper and more thoughtful measures to continue the convergence of Member States while preserving internal equilibria. This paper ends with discussions for the future directions of the EU.


2003 ◽  
Vol 36 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 41-74 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Hug

The interplay among intergovernmental and supranational actors is a defining feature of the institutional life of the European Union (EU). Too often, however, these actors are considered independent of each other, and their autonomy is assessed in a vacuum. This is problematic because if there is such a thing as "endogenous preferences" in the EU, it appears exactly through this interdependence of intergovernmental and supranational actors. None of the institutionalist approaches to the EU has come to grips with this fact yet. Based on some very simple gametheoretic ideas, I offer in this article a rationale for "endogenous preferences" and discuss their impact on issues of delegations. Some cursory empirical evidence supports the claims that the preferences of supranational actors are related to those of the actors who select or appoint them. Similarly, the analyses presented here suggest that preferences over delegation to supranational actors are influenced by differences in policy views between principals and agents.


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