The Political Economy of the Free Rider, the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Constitutional Contract

1991 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 107-115
Author(s):  
C. Andrea Bollino ◽  
Alberto di Pierro
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
The Political

Abstract In questo scritto il problema del «free rider» viene presentato in relazione al concetto di beni pubblici, nell’ambito di una prospettiva di economia costituzionale.Si dimostra che il fenomeno del free rider non richiede la non escludibilità dal consume Il free riding è possibile, quindi, anche quando vige il principio di esclusione. Esso si ha, infatti, in tutti i casi in cui il comportamento non cooperativo non può essere oggetto di immediata sanzione.Il tema trattato costituisce un aspetto di una più ampia indagine su problemi di comportamenti cooperativi e non cooperativi all’interno di un’impostazione costituzionale. La tappa successiva dovrebbe approfondire la relazione tra l’ipotesi di free rider ed il cosiddetto problema «principale-agente».Infine, dopo aver esaminato il problema della cooperazione all’interno di una struttura di efficienza, l’analisi sarà estesa nella ancor più ampia area della cooperazione collettiva e della scelta tra criteri di equità e giustizia, affrontati nelle opere di scienza delle finanze e di etica.

DISCUSSION: HAMPTON ON FREE RIDING

2003 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 311-320
Author(s):  
Gordon G. Sollars
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Good Reason ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Important Case ◽  
Collective Good ◽  
Free Rider Problem ◽  
Battle Of The Sexes ◽  
Single Production

Jean Hampton has argued that an important case of the free-rider problem has the structure of a battle-of-the-sexes game, rather than the Prisoner's Dilemma, as is often assumed. This case occurs when the collective good to be produced is a ‘step’ or ‘lumpy’ good, one that is produced in a single production step. Battle of the Sexes is a coordination game, with stronger equilibria than games such as the Prisoner's Dilemma or Chicken. Hampton argues that, because of this difference, there is good reason to think that players facing a battle-of-the-sexes game can more easily reach mutually desirable outcomes than players facing these other games. An examination of Hampton's argument, however, shows that she has failed to specify a condition that would clearly distinguish her examples of battle-of-the-sexes games from chicken games. Consequently, Hampton's claim that free riding in the provision of step goods is less tempting than other analyses have suggested because of the presence of coordination equilibria is incorrect as it stands.

Free-Rider Problems in the Production of Collective Goods

1987 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 245-273 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean Hampton
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Collective Good ◽  
Free Rider Problem ◽  
Collective Goods ◽  
Partial Analysis ◽  
Collective Action Problems ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Willingness To Contribute

There has been a persistent tendency to identify what is called “the freerider problem” in the production of collective (or public) goods with the prisoner's dilemma. However, in this article I want to challenge that identification by presenting an analysis of what are in fact a variety of collective action problems in the production of collective goods. My strategy is not to consult any intuitions about what the free-rider problem is; rather I will be looking at the problematic game-theoretic structures of various situations associated with the production of different types of collective goods, thereby showing what sorts of difficulties a community concerned with their voluntary production would face. I call all of these dilemmas free-rider problems because in all of them certain individuals find it rational to take advantage of others' willingness to contribute to the good in a way that threatens its production. Some readers may feel that the term ‘free-rider problem’ is so identified with the prisoner's dilemma that my extension of the term in this way “jars”; if so, I invite them to coin another word for the larger phenomenon. My aim is not to engage in linguistic analysis but to attempt at least a partial analysis of the complicated structure of collective good production.

Applying Game Theory to the Balance Between Academic and Administrative Power in Universities

2014 ◽  
Vol 42 (6) ◽  
pp. 913-920 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qian Meng ◽  
Liu Xu ◽  
Xiaodong Xu
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Theoretical Interpretation ◽  
The Political ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Academic Power ◽  
Administrative Power ◽  
Market Needs ◽  
The Relationship

Academic power and administrative power are the 2 basic types of authority in a university. While closely related to each other, they are at the same time opposed to each other. Whether a university is dominated by academic power or administrative power, they are all influenced by the political and market needs of the country. Game theory is an effective tool to analyze the relationship between academic power and administrative power. In this study we analyzed the game relationships between these 2 types of authority in universities with the help of a prisoner's dilemma game model, to achieve a new theoretical interpretation of the balance between academic power and administrative power.

Governance of Renewable Resources

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas J. Valone ◽  
Zoltán Barta ◽  
Jan Börner ◽  
Juan-Camilo Cardenas ◽  
Luc-Alain Giraldeau ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Renewable Resources ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
The Cost

Renewable resources have the potential to be used sustainably but typically are not, often due to the existence of exploiters or free riders. This chapter analyzes free-riding behavior using the prisoner’s dilemma-based public goods model and the producer–scrounger model. Overuse of renewable resources is examined under four investor–exploiter scenarios, derived from modifications of the classic producer–scrounger model, and which vary in the degree of excludability of a discovered resource and in the cost of adopting each strategy. Two important factors reduce overuse: when a finder’s advantage can be created for investors, and when the costs of playing exploiter are increased relative to the costs of playing investor. Applying the investor–exploiter model to a fisheries scenario, discussion follows on how interventions designed to reduce overuse may be consistent with the existence of a finder’s advantage. A variety of existing interventions can be seen as increasing the costs of adopting the exploiter strategy.

Free Riding and the Prisoner's Dilemma

1988 ◽  
Vol 85 (8) ◽  
pp. 421 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raimo Tuomela
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Free Riding
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