Free-Rider Problems in the Production of Collective Goods

1987 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 245-273 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean Hampton
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Collective Good ◽  
Free Rider Problem ◽  
Collective Goods ◽  
Partial Analysis ◽  
Collective Action Problems ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Willingness To Contribute

There has been a persistent tendency to identify what is called “the freerider problem” in the production of collective (or public) goods with the prisoner's dilemma. However, in this article I want to challenge that identification by presenting an analysis of what are in fact a variety of collective action problems in the production of collective goods. My strategy is not to consult any intuitions about what the free-rider problem is; rather I will be looking at the problematic game-theoretic structures of various situations associated with the production of different types of collective goods, thereby showing what sorts of difficulties a community concerned with their voluntary production would face. I call all of these dilemmas free-rider problems because in all of them certain individuals find it rational to take advantage of others' willingness to contribute to the good in a way that threatens its production. Some readers may feel that the term ‘free-rider problem’ is so identified with the prisoner's dilemma that my extension of the term in this way “jars”; if so, I invite them to coin another word for the larger phenomenon. My aim is not to engage in linguistic analysis but to attempt at least a partial analysis of the complicated structure of collective good production.

DISCUSSION: HAMPTON ON FREE RIDING

2003 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 311-320
Author(s):  
Gordon G. Sollars
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Good Reason ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Important Case ◽  
Collective Good ◽  
Free Rider Problem ◽  
Battle Of The Sexes ◽  
Single Production

Jean Hampton has argued that an important case of the free-rider problem has the structure of a battle-of-the-sexes game, rather than the Prisoner's Dilemma, as is often assumed. This case occurs when the collective good to be produced is a ‘step’ or ‘lumpy’ good, one that is produced in a single production step. Battle of the Sexes is a coordination game, with stronger equilibria than games such as the Prisoner's Dilemma or Chicken. Hampton argues that, because of this difference, there is good reason to think that players facing a battle-of-the-sexes game can more easily reach mutually desirable outcomes than players facing these other games. An examination of Hampton's argument, however, shows that she has failed to specify a condition that would clearly distinguish her examples of battle-of-the-sexes games from chicken games. Consequently, Hampton's claim that free riding in the provision of step goods is less tempting than other analyses have suggested because of the presence of coordination equilibria is incorrect as it stands.

scholarly journals Games of Two Halves: Non-Experimental Evidence on Cooperation, Defection and the Prisoner’s Dilemma

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 285-312
Author(s):  
Stephen Dobson ◽  
John Goddard
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Cooperative Behaviour ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Early Stages ◽  
Soccer Teams ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model

We develop a stylized two-period game-theoretic model of the strategic choices made by soccer teams when selecting between defensive and attacking team formations, and between non-violent and violent styles of play. Cooperative behaviour during the early stages of matches is typically superseded by non-cooperation during the latter stages. The propensity for violent play to take place in the latter stages of soccer matches is interpreted as novel non-experimental evidence that players typically resort to mutually detrimental non-cooperative forms of behaviour when the payoffs assume a prisoner’s dilemma structure.

The Political Economy of the Free Rider, the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Constitutional Contract

1991 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 107-115
Author(s):  
C. Andrea Bollino ◽  
Alberto di Pierro
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
The Political

Abstract In questo scritto il problema del «free rider» viene presentato in relazione al concetto di beni pubblici, nell’ambito di una prospettiva di economia costituzionale.Si dimostra che il fenomeno del free rider non richiede la non escludibilità dal consume Il free riding è possibile, quindi, anche quando vige il principio di esclusione. Esso si ha, infatti, in tutti i casi in cui il comportamento non cooperativo non può essere oggetto di immediata sanzione.Il tema trattato costituisce un aspetto di una più ampia indagine su problemi di comportamenti cooperativi e non cooperativi all’interno di un’impostazione costituzionale. La tappa successiva dovrebbe approfondire la relazione tra l’ipotesi di free rider ed il cosiddetto problema «principale-agente».Infine, dopo aver esaminato il problema della cooperazione all’interno di una struttura di efficienza, l’analisi sarà estesa nella ancor più ampia area della cooperazione collettiva e della scelta tra criteri di equità e giustizia, affrontati nelle opere di scienza delle finanze e di etica.

Why Hobbes' State of Nature is Best Modeled by an Assurance Game

Utilitas ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 297-326 ◽  
Author(s):  
MICHAEL MOEHLER
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
The State ◽  
The Third ◽  
Law Of Nature ◽  
State Of Nature ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Assurance Game ◽  
Third Law

In this article, I argue that if one closely follows Hobbes' line of reasoning in Leviathan, in particular his distinction between the second and the third law of nature, and the logic of his contractarian theory, then Hobbes' state of nature is best translated into the language of game theory by an assurance game, and not by a one-shot or iterated prisoner's dilemma game, nor by an assurance dilemma game. Further, I support Hobbes' conclusion that the sovereign must always punish the Foole, and even exclude her from the cooperative framework or take her life, if she defects once society is established, which is best expressed in the language of game theory by a grim strategy. That is, compared to existing game-theoretic interpretations of Hobbes, I argue that the sovereign plays a grim strategy with the citizens once society is established, and not the individuals with one another in the state of nature.

scholarly journals Decentralized Job Scheduling in the Cloud Based on a Spatially Generalized Prisoner’s Dilemma Game

2015 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
pp. 737-751 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jakub Gąsior ◽  
Franciszek Seredyński
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Job Scheduling ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Global Scheduling ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Job Scheduling Problem ◽  
Selfish Agents ◽  
Specific Number ◽  
Spatial Prisoner’S Dilemma

Abstract We present in this paper a novel distributed solution to a security-aware job scheduling problem in cloud computing infrastructures. We assume that the assignment of the available resources is governed exclusively by the specialized brokers assigned to individual users submitting their jobs to the system. The goal of this scheme is allocating a limited quantity of resources to a specific number of jobs minimizing their execution failure probability and total completion time. Our approach is based on the Pareto dominance relationship and implemented at an individual user level. To select the best scheduling strategies from the resulting Pareto frontiers and construct a global scheduling solution, we developed a decision-making mechanism based on the game-theoretic model of Spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma, realized by selfish agents operating in the two-dimensional cellular automata space. Their behavior is conditioned by the objectives of the various entities involved in the scheduling process and driven towards a Nash equilibrium solution by the employed social welfare criteria. The performance of the scheduler applied is verified by a number of numerical experiments. The related results show the effectiveness and scalability of the scheme in the presence of a large number of jobs and resources involved in the scheduling process.

The Measles and Free Riders

2016 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 472-478 ◽  
Author(s):  
KATHARINE BROWNE
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Collective Action Problem ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
Free Rider Problem ◽  
Free Ride ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Parental Decisions

Abstract:This article takes up a game-theoretic perspective on California’s recently passed bill (SB 277) that closes all nonmedical exemptions for school-mandated vaccination. Such a perspective characterizes parental decisions to vaccinate their children as a collective action problem and reveals the presence of an incentive to free ride—to enjoy the benefits of others’ efforts to vaccinate their children without vaccinating one’s own. This article defends California’s legislation as a reasonable means of overcoming the free rider problem and of ensuring that the burdens of vaccination are shared equally.

The Structural Embeddedness of Collective Goods: Connection and Coalitions in Exchange Networks

2005 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 386-407 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brent Simpson ◽  
David Willer
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Strong Support ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Collective Good ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Exchange Networks ◽  
Structural Embeddedness ◽  
Network Connection ◽  
Collective Goods ◽  
Connection Type

The growing body of literature on coalitions in exchange networks has addressed issues such as the kind of social dilemmas posed and how structurally disadvantaged actors overcome free-rider problems. We add to this stream of research by focusing explicitly on what low-power actors can gain from collective action. We offer theory that predicts whether actors can gain a collective good by forming coalitions and, if so, the size of that good, for all types of network connection. The results from new experiments yield strong support for the predictions. Results show that (1) collective goods are latent in some, but not all, types of exchange structures; (2) when present, collective good size is determined by connection type; and (3) these goods are made manifest through collective action. Among other phenomena, the theory explains why networks that generate identical exchange ratios when participants act independently can produce different size collective goods when they act collectively. This article concludes with a discussion of implications, limitations, and directions for future research.

Dilemmas of Interaction

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Vanderschraaf
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Mathematical Theory ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Noncooperative Game ◽  
Noncooperative Game Theory ◽  
Free Rider Problem ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Principles Of Justice

Problems of interaction, which give rise to justice, are structurally problems of game theory, the mathematical theory of interactive decisions. Five problems of interaction are introduced that are all intrinsically important and that help motivate important parts of the discussions in subsequent chapters: the Farmer’s Dilemma, impure coordination, the Stag Hunt, the free-rider problem, and the choice for a powerless party to acquiesce or resist. Elements of noncooperative game theory essential to analyzing problems of justice are reviewed, including especially games in the strategic and extensive forms, the Nash equilibrium, the Prisoner’s Dilemma, and games of incomplete information. Each of the five motivating problems is reformulated game-theoretically. These game-theoretic reformulations reveal precisely why the agents involved would have difficulty arriving at mutually satisfactory resolutions, and why “solutions” for these problems call for principles of justice to guide the agents’ conduct.

Universalizing and the we: endogenous game theoretic deontology

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Paul Studtmann ◽  
Shyam Gouri Suresh
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Autonomous Agents ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
The Other ◽  
Pareto Improvement ◽  
Moral Framework ◽  
Interacting Agents ◽  
Game Theoretic

Abstract The Nash counterfactual considers the question: what would happen were I to change my behaviour assuming no one else does. By contrast, the Kantian counterfactual considers the question: what would happen were everyone to deviate from some behaviour. We present a model that endogenizes the decision to engage in this type of Kantian reasoning. Autonomous agents using this moral framework receive psychic payoffs equivalent to the cooperate-cooperate payoff in Prisoner’s Dilemma regardless of the other player’s action. Moreover, if both interacting agents play Prisoner’s Dilemma using this moral framework, their material outcomes are a Pareto improvement over the Nash equilibrium.

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