The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Planners and Instigators or Foot Soldiers?

2009 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 345-357
Author(s):  
Philip Caine

The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg prosecuted the most infamous criminals of the Nazi regime whereas the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has brought to trial only two of the ‘big guns' of the Balkans conflicts. The aim of this study is to assess the effectiveness of the ICTY in fulfilling its mandate to prosecute those most responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed during the conflicts of the Former Yugoslavia. The research combines a literature-based assessment of the ICTY together with focused interviews of the main decision-makers in the Office of the Prosecutor, and seeks to assess the factors involved in the initiation of investigations and the selection of individuals for indictment. The independence and autonomy of the Prosecutor is identified as one of the most significant factors in the selection of indictees, but whilst the highest ranking individuals were always the main targets for indictment by the Office of the Prosecutor, the findings suggest that a weak mandate, inadequate resources and indifference by the international community forced the hand of the Prosecutor into indicting lower level suspects. Further ad hoc tribunals are planned by the United Nations and the lessons learned from the experience of the ICTY are essential if they are to administer international justice effectively.

2001 ◽  
Vol 95 (4) ◽  
pp. 934-952 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daryl A. Mundis

The international criminal court (ICC) will serve as a permanent institution dedicated to the enforcement of international humanitarian law sixty days after the sixtieth state has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession to the Treaty of Rome with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.1 Pursuant to Article 11 of the ICC Statute, however, the ICC will have jurisdiction only with respect to crimes committed after the treaty comes into force.2 Consequently, when faced with allegations of violations of international humanitarian law in the period prior to the establishment of the ICC, the international community has five options if criminal prosecutions are desired.3 First, additional ad hoc international tribunals, similar to those established for the former Yugoslavia (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, ICTY) and Rwanda (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, ICTR) could be established.4 Second, "mixed" international criminal tribunals, which would share certain attributes with the ad hoc Tribunals, could be created.5 Third, the international community could leave the prosecution of alleged offenders to national authorities, provided that the domestic courts are functioning and able to conduct such trials. Fourth, in those instances where the national infrastructure has collapsed, international resources could be made available to assist with the prosecution of the alleged offenders in domestic courts. Finally, the international community could simply do nothing in the face of alleged violations of international humanitarian law.


1997 ◽  
Vol 37 (321) ◽  
pp. 651-664
Author(s):  
Marie-Claude Roberge

The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) were established on 11 February 1993 and 8 November 1994 respectively by the Security Council to prosecute persons responsible for flagrant violations of international humanitarian law. The aim of the Security Council was to put an end to such violations and to contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace, and the establishment of the ad hoc tribunals undoubtedly represents a major step in that direction. Moreover, it sends a clear signal to the perpetrators and to the victims that such conduct will not be tolerated.


2005 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 804
Author(s):  
JAMES UPCHER

<div class="page" title="Page 1"><div class="layoutArea"><div class="column"><p><span>T</span><span>HE </span><span>I</span><span>NTERNATIONAL </span><span>C</span><span>RIMINAL </span><span>T</span><span>RIBUNAL FOR THE </span><span>F</span><span>ORMER </span><span>Y</span><span>UGOSLAVIA</span><span>: A</span><span>N </span><span>E</span><span>XERCISE IN </span><span>L</span><span>AW</span><span>, P</span><span>OLITICS AND </span><span>D</span><span>IPLOMACY </span><span>BY </span><span>R</span><span>ACHEL </span><span>K</span><span>ERR </span><span>(O</span><span>XFORD</span><span>: O</span><span>XFORD </span><span>U</span><span>NIVERSITY </span><span>P</span><span>RESS</span><span>, 2004) 239 P</span><span>AGES</span><span>. P</span><span>RICE </span><span>AUD$180.00 (</span><span>HARDCOVER</span><span>). ISBN 0 19 926305 1 </span></p><p><span><br /></span></p><div class="page" title="Page 1"><div class="layoutArea"><div class="column"><p><span>When the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was established in 1993, the fabric uniting the Balkans was ripping apart. How could an ad hoc Tribunal, thousands of kilometres from the conflict with no enforcement apparatus, ameliorate the anarchy and destruction sweeping the region? In its early years it languished almost unused, its courtrooms empty. In 2005, as the ICTY moves slowly towards the completion of its mandate, increased international pres- sure has led to a series of surrenders of indicted suspects.</span><span>1 </span><span>It is a significant achievement that Slobodan Milosevic, the alleged architect of so much of the car- nage in the Balkans, now sits in the dock of the ICTY, defending charges of geno- cide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. His favoured approach is to play the martyr. </span></p></div></div></div><p><span><br /></span></p></div></div></div>


2012 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-70 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barbara Goy

For more than 15 years the two ad hoc Tribunals, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), have interpreted the requirements of different forms of individual criminal responsibility. It is thus helpful to look at whether and to what extent the jurisprudence of the ICTY/ICTR may provide guidance to the International Criminal Court (ICC). To this end, this article compares the requirements of individual criminal responsibility at the ICTY/ICTR and the ICC. The article concludes that, applied with caution, the jurisprudence of the ICTY/ICTR – as an expression of international law – can assist in interpreting the modes of liability under the ICC Statute. ICTY/ICTR case law seems to be most helpful with regard to accessorial forms of liability, in particular their objective elements. Moreover, it may assist in interpreting the subjective requirements set out in Article 30 ICC Statute.


2021 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
pp. 209-226
Author(s):  
Małgorzata Szwejkowska

In the last decade of the 20th century, a war in the former Yugoslavia broke out, once again making Europe a witness to an armed conflict. Almost at the same time, another local ethnic bloodshed started, but this time in distant Africa — in Rwanda. Both these events included the most horrifying international crimes against humanity: genocide and war crimes. To prosecute the most important commanding figures involved in these conflicts and hold them criminally responsible, two ad hoc United Nations tribunals were created: International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in Hague and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in Arusha. They finished their operation in 2017 and 2015, respectively. The tasks of conducting and completing all ongoing proceedings, including law enforcement, after the completion of their mandates have been entrusted to the UN International Residual Mechanism. One of the crucial assignments of the tribunals and later the Redisual Mechanism was to deal with the request on behalf of the convicted for granting them early release. Although none of the statutes of the aforementioned courts provided any ground for early release, soon it was accepted that both tribunals, as well as their successor, were entitled to proceed despite this issue. As soon as in 2001, the first convict was granted early release, but with no conditions. It is estimated that, to date, more than 2/3 of all convicted by the Tribunals have been released before the termination of their sentence. This should raise the question of how to rehabilitate that kind of offender, convicted of genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity, to ensure they do not pose a threat to society anymore. Especially since the offenders serve their punishment outside the country of their origin — meaning, different rules apply according to the domestic law regulation of the state that voluntarily agreed to enforce the sentence. This article analyzes the juridical approach of the tribunals and the Residual Mechanism on the issue of early release of the convicts involved in the armed conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.


2005 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 827-840
Author(s):  
John Philpot

On November 8,1994, the Security Council of the United Nations adopted Resolution 955 creating an ad hoc international criminal tribunal to judge individuals responsible for violations of international humanitarian law committed in Rwanda between January 1, 1994 and December 31, 1994. In its form and structure, the Tribunal does not respect basic legal requirements required of a tribunal set up in international law. Us mandate - limited in time, in scope of potential indictment, and in jurisdiction to violations of international humanitarian law - mil prevent any light from being shed on the real issue raised by the Rwandan conflict, namely that of armed military intervention in Rwanda from Uganda. It will likely lead to the reinforcement of a one-sided view of the crisis in Rwanda and legitimate further unilateral interventionist policies in Africa and elsewhere. The Tribunal will institutionalize the de facto impunity for the members and supporters of the present government of Rwanda who undoubtedly committed many serious crimes between October 1, 1990 and the present.


2019 ◽  
Vol 58 (3) ◽  
pp. 664-667

On March 20, 2019, the Appeals Chamber of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals set aside Radovan Karadžić's prior sentence of forty years and imposed a life sentence. Karadžić was convicted of genocide, crimes against humanity, and violations of the laws or customs of war in March 2016 by a Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and sentenced to forty years in prison. His crimes relate to war crimes he committed during the 1990s conflicts in the Balkans, in particular the 1995 Srebrenica massacre of 8,000 Bosnian Serbs and the three-year long siege of Sarajevo. The Appeals Chamber reversed part of Karadžić's convictions related to the Overarching JCE and dismissed the rest of his appeal, while also dismissing most of the Prosecution's appeal, aside from the sentence. The Appeals Chamber judges found that the Trial Chamber “committed a discernible error and abused its discretion in imposing a sentence of only 40 years of imprisonment,” and consequently imposed a life sentence.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 110 ◽  
pp. 245-250
Author(s):  
Bing Bing Jia

Legacy is a matter that may become topical when its creator finally stops producing. Normally, the silent years would be many before the thought of legacy enters into open, formal discourse among lawyers and decision-makers. This comment treats the meaning of the word as relative to the circumstances in which it is invoked. The more closely it is used in relation to the present, the more distant it drifts from its literal meaning, to the extent that it denotes what the word “impact” signifies. This essay questions whether the word “legacy” is apt in describing the footprint of the work of the two ad hoctribunals in China, where its influence has, as a matter of fact, been waning ever since the adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in 1998 (“Rome Statute” ). The Chinese example suggests that the work of the tribunals is (at least so far) no more significant to international criminal law than the illustrious Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials of the 1940s. The most major impact (a more apposite term than legacy) of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) for China may be that China’s policy with regard to the tribunals, manifested mostly in the United Nations, has determined its approach to the International Criminal Court (“ICC” ). For that, the work of the tribunals could be considered as having left China something in the nature of an indirect legacy.


2019 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 801-818
Author(s):  
Amanda Alexander

AbstractThis article looks at the development of the concept of crimes against humanity at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). It contends that the ICTR’s interpretation of crimes against humanity is generally seen by international lawyers as a commendable, but unsurprising, step in the historical development of this category. In much the same way, the ICTR’s historical account is considered to be a standard attempt by a war crimes court to relate a liberal history of crimes against humanity in a way that upholds civilized values. Yet, although the historical and legal work of the ICTR appear unexceptional, this article will argue that they do demonstrate a particular conceptual approach towards warfare, history, humanity, and the nature of international law. Moreover, this is a conceptual approach that is quite different to that taken by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. The article suggests that these differences, and the invisibility of the change, are due to the ICTR’s reliance on familiar narrative tropes. These narratives were established through poststructuralist theory but could be expressed in a variety of more or (often) less theoretical forms. By exploring the influence of these narratives on the Tribunal, it is possible to examine some of the ways in which conceptual change is facilitated and knowledge is created in international law. In particular, it shows how theories that are often considered marginal to international law have had a significant impact on some of the central provisions of international humanitarian law.


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