Freedom under Paramountcy: Đa gi năng Traders as Active Moral Agents in Late-socialist Vietnam

2021 ◽  
Vol 94 (3) ◽  
pp. 473-504
Author(s):  
Minh Chau Lam
Keyword(s):  
Moral Agents

Conclusion

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Krista K. Thomason
Keyword(s):  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Negative Emotions ◽  
Moral Maturity ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
The People ◽  
Positive Feelings ◽  
Negative Feelings

The conclusion summarizes the main aims of the book. Even though shame can be a painful and damaging emotion, we would still not be better off without it. A continued liability to shame shows that we accept that we are not always the people we think we are, but accepting this fact is a sign of moral maturity. Additionally, this conclusion raises questions about moral philosophy’s commitment to positive moral psychology. Although some philosophers have defended negative emotions, the field as a whole still treats positive feelings as better and more desirable than negative feelings. But it is reasonable to ask whether moral agents should try to be “emotional saints.”

Minimal Morality

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Moehler
Keyword(s):  
Social Contract ◽  
Moral Pluralism ◽  
Moral Diversity ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Restricted Form ◽  
Pluralistic Societies ◽  
The Social ◽  
History Of ◽  
Just Society

This book develops a novel multilevel social contract theory that, in contrast to existing theories in the liberal tradition, does not merely assume a restricted form of reasonable moral pluralism, but is tailored to the conditions of deeply morally pluralistic societies that may be populated by liberal moral agents, nonliberal moral agents, and, according to the traditional understanding of morality, nonmoral agents alike. To develop this theory, the book draws on the history of the social contract tradition, especially the work of Hobbes, Hume, Kant, Rawls, and Gauthier, as well as on the work of some of the critics of this tradition, such as Sen and Gaus. The two-level contractarian theory holds that morality in its best contractarian version for the conditions of deeply morally pluralistic societies entails Humean, Hobbesian, and Kantian moral features. The theory defines the minimal behavioral restrictions that are necessary to ensure, compared to violent conflict resolution, mutually beneficial peaceful long-term cooperation in deeply morally pluralistic societies. The theory minimizes the problem of compliance by maximally respecting the interests of all members of society. Despite its ideal nature, the theory is, in principle, applicable to the real world and, for the conditions described, most promising for securing mutually beneficial peaceful long-term cooperation in a world in which a fully just society, due to moral diversity, is unattainable. If Rawls’ intention was to carry the traditional social contract argument to a higher level of abstraction, then the two-level contractarian theory brings it back down to earth.

Noncompliers’ Duties

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anja Karnein
Keyword(s):  
Climate Justice ◽  
Imperfect Duty ◽  
Moral Agents

This chapter examines in what sorts of situation noncompliers, of which there are many in the climate justice context, can be thought to have duties—apart from the duty to comply—and how these duties ought best be described. It problematizes the unclear status of a duty that tells an agent what to do in cases where she is not doing what she ought to and reviews four possible ways to circumvent this “status problem” when explaining the presence of duties for noncompliers. Only one of these positions can show that noncompliers have duties because they failed to comply and not simply because they are moral agents. This position considers all duties to be accompanied by the imperfect duty of beneficence. When the former are not complied with, the latter remains but changes in significance. It is this position, or so this chapter maintains, that most plausibly captures our intuitions.

Theological Ethics through a Multispecies Lens

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Celia E. Deane-Drummond
Keyword(s):  
Animal Rights ◽  
Future Orientation ◽  
Individual Responsibility ◽  
Theological Ethics ◽  
Individual Decision ◽  
Community Based ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Nature And Culture ◽  
Different Levels ◽  
Radical Approach

There are two driving questions informing this book. The first is where does our moral life come from? The presupposition is that considering morality broadly is inadequate. Instead, different aspects need to be teased apart. It is not sufficient to assume that different virtues are bolted onto a vicious animality, red in tooth and claw. Nature and culture have interlaced histories. By weaving in evolutionary theories and debates on the evolution of compassion, justice, and wisdom, the book shows a richer account of who we are as moral agents. The second driving question concerns our relationships with animals. There is dissatisfaction with animal rights frameworks and an argument instead for a more complex community-based multispecies approach. Hence, rather than extending rights, a more radical approach is a holistic multispecies framework for moral action. This need not weaken individual responsibility. The intention is not to develop a manual of practice, but rather to build towards an alternative philosophically informed approach to theological ethics, including animal ethics. The theological thread weaving through this account is wisdom. Wisdom has many different levels, and in the broadest sense is connected with the flow of life understood in its interconnectedness and sociality. It is profoundly theological and practical. In naming the project the evolution of wisdom a statement is being made about where wisdom may have come from and its future orientation. But justice, compassion, and conscience are not far behind, especially in so far as they are relevant to both individual decision-making and institutions.

scholarly journals Group Agency and Artificial Intelligence

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian List
Keyword(s):  
Artificial Intelligence ◽  
Moral Status ◽  
Intelligent Systems ◽  
Group Agency ◽  
High Stakes ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Legal Personhood ◽  
The Social ◽  
Intentional Agents ◽  
Regulatory Challenges

AbstractThe aim of this exploratory paper is to review an under-appreciated parallel between group agency and artificial intelligence. As both phenomena involve non-human goal-directed agents that can make a difference to the social world, they raise some similar moral and regulatory challenges, which require us to rethink some of our anthropocentric moral assumptions. Are humans always responsible for those entities’ actions, or could the entities bear responsibility themselves? Could the entities engage in normative reasoning? Could they even have rights and a moral status? I will tentatively defend the (increasingly widely held) view that, under certain conditions, artificial intelligent systems, like corporate entities, might qualify as responsible moral agents and as holders of limited rights and legal personhood. I will further suggest that regulators should permit the use of autonomous artificial systems in high-stakes settings only if they are engineered to function as moral (not just intentional) agents and/or there is some liability-transfer arrangement in place. I will finally raise the possibility that if artificial systems ever became phenomenally conscious, there might be a case for extending a stronger moral status to them, but argue that, as of now, this remains very hypothetical.

scholarly journals Does False Consciousness Necessarily Preclude Moral Blameworthiness?: The Refusal of the Women Antisuffragists

Hypatia ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Lee Wilson
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Epistemic Injustice ◽  
Victim Blaming ◽  
False Consciousness ◽  
Group Level ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Knowledge Practices ◽  
Structural Distortions ◽  
In Virtue Of

Abstract Social philosophers often invoke the concept of false consciousness in their analyses, referring to a set of evidence-resistant, ignorant attitudes held by otherwise sound epistemic agents, systematically occurring in virtue of, and motivating them to perpetuate, structural oppression. But there is a worry that appealing to the notion in questions of responsibility for the harm suffered by members of oppressed groups is victim-blaming. Individuals under false consciousness allegedly systematically fail the relevant rationality and epistemic conditions due to structural distortions of reasoning or knowledge practices, undermining their status as responsible moral agents. But attending to the constitutive mechanisms and heterogeneity of false consciousness enables us to see how having it does not in itself render someone an inappropriate target of blame. I focus here on the 1889 antisuffragist manifesto “An Appeal against Female Suffrage,” arguing that its signatories, despite false consciousness, satisfy both conditions for ordinary blameworthiness. I consider three prominent signatories, observing that the irrationality characterization is unsustainable beyond group-level diagnoses, and that their capacity to respond appropriately to reasons was not compromised. Following recent work on epistemic injustice, I also argue that culpable mechanisms constituted their false consciousness, rendering them blameworthy for the Appeal.

scholarly journals Relationships, Authority, and Reasons: A Second-Personal Account of Corporate Moral Agency

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
Alan D. Morrison ◽  
Rita Mota ◽  
William J. Wilhelm
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Culture ◽  
Moral Agency ◽  
Building Blocks ◽  
Moral Reasons ◽  
Corporate Communications ◽  
Personal Account ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Corporate Moral Agency ◽  
Fresh Perspective ◽  
Corporate Punishment

We present a second-personal account of corporate moral agency. This approach is in contrast to the first-personal approach adopted in much of the existing literature, which concentrates on the corporation’s ability to identify moral reasons for itself. Our account treats relationships and communications as the fundamental building blocks of moral agency. The second-personal account rests on a framework developed by Darwall. Its central requirement is that corporations be capable of recognizing the authority relations that they have with other moral agents. We discuss the relevance of corporate affect, corporate communications, and corporate culture to the second-personal account. The second-personal account yields a new way to specify first-personal criteria for moral agency, and it generates fresh insights into the reasons those criteria matter. In addition, a second-personal analysis implies that moral agency is partly a matter of policy, and it provides a fresh perspective on corporate punishment.

scholarly journals Corporations and Human Rights Obligations

2016 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 255-275 ◽  
Author(s):  
Denis G ARNOLD
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Transnational Corporations ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
The Third ◽  
Three Stages ◽  
Argument Proceeds ◽  
Policies And Practices

AbstractThe claim that corporations have human rights obligations remains contentious and can be fraught with confusion. This article synthesizes existing corporate human rights theory and responds to objections to the idea that transnational corporations (TNCs) have human rights obligations. The argument proceeds in three stages. The first section describes the different forms TNCs take and explains why TNCs are properly understood as moral agents responsible for their policies and practices. The second section reviews and explains different philosophical theories of corporate human rights obligations. The third section articulates and responds to objections to the idea that corporations have human rights obligations. The main conclusion of this article is that there are multiple, compelling and overlapping justifications of corporate human rights obligations.

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