Empire: The Rise and Decline of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power (review)

2004 ◽  
Vol 68 (1) ◽  
pp. 305-306
Author(s):  
William Anthony Hay
Keyword(s):  
2011 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
Randall L. Schweller ◽  
Xiaoyu Pu

The emerging transition from unipolarity to a more multipolar distribution of global power presents a unique and unappreciated problem that largely explains why, contrary to the expectations of balance of power theory, a counterbalancing reaction to U.S. primacy has not yet taken place. The problem is that, under unipolarity and only unipolarity, balancing is a revisionist, not a status quo, behavior: its purpose is to replace the existing unbalanced unipolar structure with a balance of power system. Thus, any state that seeks to restore a global balance of power will be labeled a revisionist aggressor. To overcome this ideational hurdle to balancing behavior, a rising power must delegitimize the unipole's global authority and order through discursive and cost-imposing practices of resistance that pave the way for the next phase of full-fledged balancing and global contestation. The type of international order that emerges on the other side of the transition out of unipolarity depends on whether the emerging powers assume the role of supporters, spoilers, or shirkers. As the most viable peer competitor to U.S. power, China will play an especially important role in determining the future shape of international politics. At this relatively early stage in its development, however, China does not yet have a fixed blueprint for a new world order. Instead, competing Chinese visions of order map on to various delegitimation strategies and scenarios about how the transition from unipolarity to a restored global balance of power will develop.


Author(s):  
Maria Adele Carrai

One objective of the emerging global history of international law is to broaden its scope in an attempt to overcome Eurocentrism. In this context, China, not only as an emerging global power that can influence the creation of the normative principles grounding the future world order, but also with its history of international law, offers a counter-teleology to the classic progress narrative of international law understood as a science. This article presents a critical summary and analysis of the approaches of a selection of Chinese scholars to the history of international law. The current debates seem to be closely linked to a new conception of modernity that does not correspond with the Western conception. The Chinese perspective, in this sense, can help broaden the history of international law, especially when that history claims to be global.


2004 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 267-271 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. L. WESSELING

Words can be confusing and titles can be misleading, particularly if titles consist of one simple word. Two titles suffice to illustrate this phenomenon. In 2000, a book appeared with the title Empire and in 2002 another book appeared with exactly the same title. In the first Empire, Michael Hardt, an American literary theorist, and Antonio Negri, an Italian political philosopher, argued that although classical imperialism is over, Empire is alive and well, albeit in a new form. For them ‘Empire’ means the following: ‘Our basic hypothesis is that sovereignty has taken a new form, composed of a series of national and supranational organisms united under a single logic of rule. This new global form of sovereignty is what we call Empire.’ This is a rather special definition of Empire because what one usually has in mind when using that word is something very different. It is the Empire that the other book, written by the British historian Niall Ferguson, is about. This book describes, as the subtitle indicates, The Rise and Demise of the British World Order. But it is also about something more, as is apparent from the rest of the subtitle: and the Lessons for Global Power. These lessons are intended for the rulers of the Empire of today, the Americans. While the first Empire is the Bible for anti-globalists, Ferguson's book can be considered as the New Testament of the advocates of America's imperial ambitions.


2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 162-179
Author(s):  
Shweta Karki ◽  
Sarashree Dhungana

The study of power has been one of the main features of IR. While hard power remained at the forefront of the academic discourse for a long time, soft power emerged as an alternative to understand the complex interactions between states and how states employ different sources of non-coercive means to persuade global actors. Nye, in the late twentieth century, perpetrated the idea to indicate the shift from assertion to attraction. This research has focused on why soft power has been a more relevant device for certain states in the system that lack military might. The research has largely analyzed and described the various ways in which small states around the world have resorted to soft power in the face of the interdependent world order. It then has looked into the different ways through which Nepal as a small state can effectively examine its soft power sources, to garner influence in the global power structure and obtain its foreign policy objectives, keeping in mind that the soft power of any state is dependent of the resources that it has and is also able to mobilize.


2003 ◽  
Vol 82 (5) ◽  
pp. 178
Author(s):  
Stanley Hoffmann ◽  
Niall Ferguson
Keyword(s):  

2009 ◽  
pp. 243-248 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Gulick

What a difference a year makes. While Giovanni Arrighi’s Adam Smith in Beijing is a complicated tapestry, threaded with multiple strands and sub-themes, if it offers any single master thesis, it is this: over the last four or so decades, the fading of US primacy and China’s precipitous ascent are dialectically interconnected, structured processes abetting one another. And, for good measure: China’s ascent just might culminate in the formation of a qualitatively novel, world community of market-linked states orbiting around East Asia, but without a dominant center (pp. 7-9). Were I putting together this review in mid-2008, I would express profound skepticism about both theses. Certainly, such skepticism would issue not from the conviction that US global power is invincible, but rather from an evidence-based belief that Arrighi habitually underestimates the extent to which China’s ongoing rise in the world order will be traumatically disrupted by the inevitable wipeout of highly leveraged paper assets on Wall Street (and the City of London, for that matter). Well, in the wake of the planetary financial crisis and economic slump, the early returns on China’s coping capacity are in. The ways in which China is responding to and weathering the storm vindicate more than a few of the claims and insights Arrighi advances in Adam Smith in Beijing, including some that I would have regarded with raised eyebrows a year ago. The thrust of this review is a critical assessment of Adam Smith in Beijing from the standpoint of how well or poorly its theoretical maneuvers and key arguments allow us to make sense of the current shake-up in the global system, with a focus on the interdigitated destinies of China and the US. In this evaluation I will take a page out of Arrighi’s own playbook and try to bear in mind the crucial distinction between geo-economic and geopolitical ebbs and flows of the moment and longer-term hegemonic ruptures and transformations.


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