Communication or Confrontation Heidegger and Philosophical Method

2009 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vincent Blok

In this essay, we consider the philosophical method of reading and writing, of communication. Normally, we interpret the works of the great philosophers and explain them in papers and presentations. The thinking of Martin Heidegger has given us an indication of an entirely different method of philosophical thinking. In the 1930s, he gave a series of lectures on Nietzsche. In them, he calls his own way of reading and writing a confrontation (Auseinandersetzung) with Nietzsche. We consider the specific character of confrontation, and in what ways it is different from communication. First, we develop an answer to the question of how Heidegger reads Nietzsche. Does he give a charitable or a violent interpretation of Nietzsche and, if neither, how can his confrontation with Nietzsche be characterized? With this, we obtain an indication of the way we have to read Heidegger, indeed, of philosophical reading and writing as such.

Author(s):  
Saitya Brata Das

This book rigorously examines the theologico-political works of Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, setting his thought against Hegel's and showing how he prepared the way for the post-metaphysical philosophy of Martin Heidegger, Franz Rosenzweig and Jacques Derrida.


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2020 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 98-113
Author(s):  
Michael Syrotinski

Barbara Cassin's Jacques the Sophist: Lacan, Logos, and Psychoanalysis, recently translated into English, constitutes an important rereading of Lacan, and a sustained commentary not only on his interpretation of Greek philosophers, notably the Sophists, but more broadly the relationship between psychoanalysis and sophistry. In her study, Cassin draws out the sophistic elements of Lacan's own language, or the way that Lacan ‘philosophistizes’, as she puts it. This article focuses on the relation between Cassin's text and her better-known Dictionary of Untranslatables, and aims to show how and why both ‘untranslatability’ and ‘performativity’ become keys to understanding what this book is not only saying, but also doing. It ends with a series of reflections on machine translation, and how the intersubjective dynamic as theorized by Lacan might open up the possibility of what is here termed a ‘translatorly’ mode of reading and writing.


2008 ◽  
Vol 2 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 293-315
Author(s):  
Diana Walsh Pasulka

A contemporary movement in Christian religious thought advocates for the recovery of pre-modern exegetical practices. Wesley Kort, Paul Griffiths, and Catherine Pickstock are among several theorists who support a return to pre-modern reading and writing practices as an answer to the crisis of modernity. In the context of scripture studies, the works of Kort, Griffiths, and Pickstock can be understood as examples of analyses that focus on the performative elements of scripture. Their stress on memorization, recitation, and reading reflect the influence of studies of the performative function of scriptures by Wilfred Cantwell Smith and William Graham. Kort, Griffiths, and Pickstock take this line of argument even further, by arguing that is it the very loss of scripture as performance that has inaugurated a loss of the sacred in modernity. This development thus tackles the philosophical issues at stake between secularism and theology and moves beyond the localized analysis of the meaning of specific scriptures. The following analysis places this development in an historical and philosophical context by revealing the theoretical precedents that each scholar draws upon, specifically the later writings of Martin Heidegger.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wolfram Hogrebe

In this book, Wolfram Hogrebe deals with the realm of the intermediate – an ancient philosophical tradition according to which philosophical thinking is concerned with a kind of intermediate space that holds the orders of concepts and ideas in a remarkable limbo. The in-between is, as it were, a medium sustaining both thoughts and languages and is thus likely to disclose uncharted areas where thinking itself changes. Hogrebe shows how frequently this in-between, which has also been known to surface in experiences of nature, is the subject theme of a host of different philosophers and poets such as Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Martin Heidegger, Henry David Thoreau and Peter Handke.


2019 ◽  
Vol 53 ◽  
pp. 105-117
Author(s):  
Richard Colledge ◽  

If Martin Heidegger is a thinker of Being par excellence, he is also one of the west’s key thinkers concerning the nothing. This paper has two main aims. The first is to highlight the continuity of the way in which Heidegger develops the theme of the nothing, in its close kinship with Being, throughout the long arc of his thought: from Sein und Zeit (1927) and his summer 1928 lecture course on Leibniz, through his famous treatment in the inaugural lecture “Was ist Metaphysik?” (1929), his subsequent “Nachwort” (1943) and “Einleitung” (1949) to that work, to his extended letter to Ernst Jünger, published as “Zur Seinsfrage” (1955). However, the second aim of the paper is to bring this extensive thematic thread into close association with Heidegger’s reading of Anaximander, especially his summer 1932 and winter 1941 lecture courses. What emerges is a striking account of the nothing as the Seinsvergessenheit, but also as the “the unlimited” origin of all beings in their “stepping forth” into appearance, and that to which they return. Thus, τὸ ἄπειρον effectively becomes for Heidegger another name for the nothing, or Being in its lethic or “hidden essence”: i.e., the hyperbolic or abyssal excess that is the ἀρχή of the appearance of beings. I conclude with some brief reflections on the sense in which Heidegger considers the vocation of “courageously” and “thankfully” thinking this nothing as perhaps the fullest expression of human freedom.


2011 ◽  
Vol 32 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 80-99 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dietmar H. Heidemann

In the Encyclopaedia Logic, Hegel states that ‘philosophy … contains the sceptical as a moment within itself — specifically as the dialectical moment’ (§81, Addition 2), and that ‘scepticism’ as ‘the dialectical moment itself is an essential one in the affirmative Science’ (§78). On the one hand, the connection between scepticism and dialectic is obvious. Hegel claims that scepticism is a problem that cannot be just removed from the philosophical agenda by knock-down anti-sceptical arguments. Scepticism intrinsically belongs to philosophical thinking; that is to say, it plays a constructive role in philosophical thinking. On the other hand, scepticism has to be construed as the view according to which we cannot know whether our beliefs are true, i.e., scepticism plays a destructive role in philosophy no matter what. It is particularly this role that clashes with Hegel's claim of having established a philosophical system of true cognition of the entirety of reality. In the following I argue that for Hegel the constructive and the destructive role of scepticism are reconcilable. I specifically argue that it is dialectic that makes both consistent since scepticism is a constitutive element of dialectic.In order to show in what sense scepticism is an intrinsic feature of dialectic I begin by sketching Hegel's early view of scepticism specifically with respect to logic and metaphysics. The young Hegel construes logic as a philosophical method of human cognition that inevitably results in ‘sceptical’ consequences in that it illustrates the finiteness of human understanding. By doing so, logic not only nullifies finite understanding but also introduces to metaphysics, i.e., the true philosophical science of the absolute.


Author(s):  
Peter Joseph Fritz

Martin Heidegger provides positive impetus for fresh thinking on divine revelation. Objections could immediately be raised. While it is contested whether Heidegger observes some sort of ‘methodological atheism’, at the very least he demotes theology—serious thinking based on belief in God—as ‘ontic’ (occasional, region-specific), whereas philosophy enjoys ‘ontological’ status. Heidegger refuses the revealed idea of creation as a distortive axiom for Western thinking that prepares the way for the world’s modern, technological framing. And of course there is Heidegger’s political bias, a concern that has reignited with the publication of his Schwarze Hefte. Nevertheless, this chapter’s primary thesis holds that Heidegger can help to reinvigorate Christian understanding of divine revelation in at least three respects: (1) by centring the theology of revelation on the allied themes of fundamental truth and freedom, (2) by encouraging theologians to continue pursuing renewed interest in apocalyptic, and (3) by bringing to light the revelatory character of inconspicuous, everyday phenomena.


Author(s):  
Gregory N. Siplivii ◽  

This article is devoted to the analysis of the phenomenology “Nothingness” by Martin Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre. Through research of existential phe­nomenology, the article also touches on the topic of “mood” as philosophical in­tentionality. Various kinds of “moods”, such as faintness (Verstimmung), ennui (Langeweile), burden (Geworden), inquisitiveness (Neugier), care (Sorge) and conscience (Gewissen), by Martin Heidegger’s and nausea (la nausée), anxiety (l’anxiété), dizziness (le vertige) by Jean-Paul Sartre, is considered in the context of what they may matter in an ontological sense. The phenomenologically under­stood “mood” as a general intentionality towards something is connected with the way in which the existing is able to ask about its own self. In addition, the ar­ticle forms the concept of the original ontological and phenomenological “in­completeness” of any existential experience. It is this incompleteness, this “al­ways-still-not” that provides an existential opportunity to realize oneself not only thrown into the world, but also different from the general flow of being. This “elusive emptiness” is interpreted in the article in accordance with the psychoan­alytic category of “real” (Jacques Lacan).


2019 ◽  
pp. 333-354
Author(s):  
Christine Berthin

This chapter considers pieces by Victor Burgin that stage and foreground the acts of reading and writing to explore the recursive and self-reflexive elements of making found in Burgin's projection pieces. Starting with the metaphor of the palimpsest, this paper traces the way the pieces explore specific forms of language and of telling aimed at 'spatializing the temporal flow'. The chapter explores how the image of the palimpsest or "overlay" allows the viewer to see in the projection pieces a gesture that complements the coalescence of different times. Seeing the palimpsest as haunted space, the paper uncovers melancholy stories of loss and exile echoing from A Place to Read to Belledonne. The critical power of the projection pieces lies in the way they disrupt traditional categories of chronology and spatial compartmentalisation, allowing story and history, present and past, collective and individual experiences to reflect one another.


Author(s):  
Roland Végső

The chapter examines Hannah Arendt’s critique of martin Heidegger and concentrates on the way Arendt tries to subvert the Heideggerian paradigm of worldlessness. While for Heidegger, the ontological paradigm of worldlessness was the lifeless stone, in Arendt’s book biological life itself emerges as the worldless condition of the political world of publicity. The theoretical challenge bequeathed to us by Arendt is to draw the consequences of the simple fact that life is worldless. The worldlessness of life, therefore, becomes a genuine condition of impossibility for politics: it makes politics possible, but at the same time it threatens the very existence of politics. The chapter traces the development of this argument in three of Arendt’s major works: The Origins of Totalitarianism, The Human Condition, and The Life of the Mind.


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