scholarly journals The Questioned Legality of Foreign Military Intervention in Members’ state in the Economic Community of West African States!

2020 ◽  
pp. 3-13
Author(s):  
Emmanuel Saffa Abdulai

A military coup in the Republic of Mali, a West African nation, leading to the resignation, arrest and detention of the democratically elected sitting president in August, 2020. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) sent an envoy demanding for restoration of constitutionally order and democracy. It was in the same direction that, on the 19th January 2017, ECOWAS, launched operation ‘Restore Democracy in Gambia’ and mobilized a standby force - from six nations - to militarily intervene in a member state, if diplomacy failed to persuade former President Yayah Jammeh to step down and accept presidential elections result. This is not the first time that ECOWAS has intervened in a member country to restore democracy and provide humanitarian protection for civilians. In 1999, led by Nigeria, ECOWAS restored the democratically elected government of ex-President Tejan Kabbah of Sierra Leone, who had been illegally toppled by his military. This article looks at whether there is any legal basis in international law for such military intervention. Is ECOWAS acting in accordance with the African Union (AU) Treaty and its Peace and Security Protocol to restore peace and avoid grave consequences? If not, is then ECOWAS undertaking pre-emptive self-defense to avoid a spill of conflict in the region? Or yet, is ECOWAS tired of waiting for the United Nations’ (UN) permission and intervention, taking its own business seriously by enforcing democratic change of government? This article points out the very convoluted maize of international law on military intervention, rights to self-defense, humanitarian interventions and the principles of sovereignty in the wake of enforcement of the rules of jus cogens.

1989 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 233-250 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sunday Babalola Ajulo

The Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) was established by the Treaty signed in Lagos on 25 May 1975 by the Heads of State and Government (or their representatives) from Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. They were joined a few months later by Cape Verde, thereby increasing the number of member-states to 16. Following the post-World War II convention whereby international organisations formally insert in their constitutive instruments a declaratory statement concerning their status, it is not surprising that Article 60(1) stipulated that the Community ‘shall enjoy legal personality’. Although such organisations may be similar they are never identical, and this is why the nature and scope of the legal personality of each needs to be ascertained and discussed.


Significance For over a month, Jammeh rebuffed diplomatic efforts by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to accept Adama Barrow's victory in the December 1 presidential poll. An ECOWAS military intervention into The Gambia -- accompanied by last-minute diplomatic efforts and purported financial and security guarantees -- finally forced Jammeh to accept defeat. Impacts A truth commission offering amnesty for military officials and the outgoing government could prompt discord within the new ruling alliance. Military restructuring will be a priority for Barrow's government. International assistance will likely flow in support of the new president. The Gambia's tourism sector -- which makes up nearly 20% of the country's GDP -- will struggle to recover in the short-term. The ECOWAS intervention could prove unpopular among members' domestic constituencies if a lengthy, costly mission emerges.


2021 ◽  
pp. 36-53
Author(s):  
Enoch Ndem OKON ◽  

"This paper highlights the Economic Community of West African States [ECOWAS] mode of response to the Malian conflict between 2012 and 2021 and identifies various gaps therein. It seeks to explain why ECOWAS has found it difficult to resolve the Malian conflict in spite of its commitment and experience in conflict resolution in the subregion. Secondary data are used for the study and presented qualitatively. The study reveals that the towering interest of Algeria and other neighbors in the chaotic northern Mali, as well as French interest in its former colony hindered ECOWAS initiative and its effectiveness in resolving the conflict. The paper recommends ECOWAS’ involvement in negotiations at the next peace agreement, and the drawing up of a roadmap for implementing such agreement. Besides, ECOWAS needs to address governance deficits in Mali and elsewhere in the subregion through peer review mechanism and increase its capacity to respond to violent conflicts beyond microstates and Anglophone enclaves in the region. Keywords: ECOWAS, Malian conflict, military coup, Tuareg, Jihad."


Author(s):  
Dan Kuwali

Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations (UN) obliges States to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the UN. The formulation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter gives room to argue that military intervention for purposes of protecting human rights is not covered in the prohibition if it does not threaten the territorial integrity or political independence of a State, especially since promotion of human rights is one of the purposes of the UN under Article 1(3) of the Charter. However, the majority of commentators argue that the Charter prohibits any unilateral use of force and the travaux préparatoires leave no doubt that the terms ‘territorial integrity’ and ‘political independence’ were included not to qualify an absolute prohibition of the use of force but rather as intensifiers to emphasize the protection of States from acts of aggression. The purpose of inserting the phrase ‘or in any other manner inconsistent with’ in Article 2(4) was not to open the door to implicit exceptions from the rule but to make the prohibition watertight. Thus, Article 2(4) constitutes general prohibition of use of force in international law, subject only to the two exceptions outlined in the Charter: self-defense under Article 51 and chapter 7 enforcement action by the Security Council. Thus, except in self-defense, the use of force is the preserve of the Security Council. On this basis, any use of force to protect human rights in another State is subject to authorization of the Security Council.


Author(s):  
Olivier Corten

Use of force is a politically sensitive and legally undetermined topic. It is therefore not surprising that it constitutes a highly controversial issue. During the Cold War, various critical debates about the legality of military interventions (Korea, Vietnam, Nicaragua, Palestine, Afghanistan) were prevalent. These controversies did not disappear in the 1990s (Yugoslavia) nor in the 2000s and 2010s (Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel/Lebanon, Russia/Georgia, Libya, Syria, Ukraine, among others). A general assessment of the numerous books and articles dedicated to this issue reveals a deep ambivalence. On the one hand, no one really contests that the use of force is strictly forbidden in contemporary international law. This prohibition is recognized as a core rule of the law of nations, and even a rule of imperative international law (jus cogens). Indeed, it seems difficult to conceive any kind of legal order without at least affirming that its subjects cannot attack one another. The prohibition of the use of force is also logically linked to the notion of external sovereignty, aiming both at protecting the identity and the personality of every state and at preserving individuals “from the scourge of war” (preamble of the UN Charter). On the other hand, there are, to say the least, a great variety of interpretations of the rule. Are collective security and self-defense the only exceptions in allowing states to use force? Is the Security Council the only authority able to authorize states to use force? Under what conditions are states able to invoke self-defense? Those questions seem difficult to address, as the conventional sources are rather limited: Article 2(4) and Chapters VII and VIII of the UN Charter are far from providing explicit answers to all the questions raised. Thus, the answers can be found mainly in customary international law, with all the difficulties surrounding the task of establishing that law.


2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 238-269
Author(s):  
Benedetta Rossi

Abstract This article investigates the causes of the resilience of slavery in the region of Tahoua in the Republic of Niger in the West African Sahel. It attributes slavery’s lingering vitality to the semi-autonomous evolution of slavery and abolitionism in this region. It illustrates the historical processes through which, following colonial legal abolition, slavery in Tahoua started being challenged, but not effectively eradicated. The article shows that slavery and abolitionism in the Nigerien Sahel are rooted in different historical processes and discursive genealogies than those that led to the development of colonial abolitionism and international law on slavery and trafficking. It advocates appropriate historical contextualization of slavery-related phenomena in regions where European abolitionism was initially tied to imperialism. In such regions different groups engaged critically with European attitudes toward local slavery. Following decolonization, the rise of Nigerien abolitionist movements was informed both by integration in international humanitarian networks and by engagement with the specific forms of slavery prevalent in local society.


2017 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 449-492
Author(s):  
Erik Denters ◽  
Tarcisio Gazzini

A complex, fragmented and heterogeneous network of domestic and international legal instruments promotes and protects foreign investment in Africa. While bilateral treaties seem to be increasingly unpopular, regionalism is clearly on the rise in the continent. The article examines how regional treaties have contributed to upgrade the current regulation of foreign investment. From this perspective, Africa can be seen as a normative laboratory. Regional treaties, most prominently those concluded within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), contain several important novelties meant to rebalance the rights and obligations of the various stakeholders as well as to safeguard host State policy space. The content of these treaties has been brought more in line with the evolution of international law, especially with regard to the protection of the environment, social and human rights, transparency, corruption, public scrutiny, economic development, and corporate responsibility.


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