scholarly journals Research and development accounting treatment: effects of CEO characteristics and corporate governance mechanisms

2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 124
Author(s):  
Sana Triki Damak
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Research And Development ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Accounting Standard ◽  
Financial Firms ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Development Accounting ◽  
Ceo Characteristics

This study aims to examine empirically the influence of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) characteristics and corporate governance mechanisms on Research and Development (R&D) capitalization in France.Using data drawn from a sample of non-financial firms listed in SBF 120, this study provides empirical evidence for the influence of CEO characteristics and audit quality on R&D capitalization. As results, we find that R&D capitalization is likely to be increased in firms managed by younger managers, CEOs with higher ownership, shorter tenure and higher educational level. Also, R&D capitalization is likely to be increased in firms with lower audit quality, in higher leveraged firms, in less performed and larger firms.This study offers insights to investors and accounting standard setters interested about the subject of R&D capitalization determinants. Importantly, it confirms that some CEO characteristics and corporate governance mechanisms are likely to affect the CEO’s behavior regarding the R&D accounting treatment.

scholarly journals Pengaruh Ukuran Perusahaan Dan Corporate Governance Terhadap Manajemen Laba Di Industri Perbankan Indonesia

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-120
Author(s):  
Karina Karina ◽  
Sutarti Sutarti
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Banking Sector ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Size Firm

The purpose of this research is to provide empirical evidence of the affect of ownership concetration, firms size, and corporate governance mechanisms on earnings management. Ownership concetration was measure by the biggest stock of individual or organization, firms size was measure by natural logaritma of net assets, and corporate governance mechanisms were measure by three variabels (composition of board of commisioner, audit quality were measure by industry specialize audit firm, and composition of audit committee). Earnings management was measure by discretionary accruals use Modified Jones Method. The population of this research is 41 companies in the banking sector which were listed in Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX). The research data were collected from banking companies financial statement for the period of 2016 to 2018. Based on purposive sampling method. The reseacrh hypotesis were tested using multiple regression analysis. The results of this research show that firm size, firm of commissioner and proportion of commissioner have significant relationships with earnings management. Next, variables composition of board of commissioner, ownership concetration and specialize audit firm have no significant relationship with earnings management. Keywords: ownership concetration, firms size, corporate governance, earnings management

scholarly journals PENGARUH MEKANISME CORPORATE GOVERNANCE TERHADAP TRANSPARANSI

2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 52-67
Author(s):  
Dian Ramadhani ◽  
Raja Adri Satriawan Surya ◽  
Arumega Zarefar
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Statistical Tests ◽  
Foreign Ownership ◽  
Debt Financing ◽  
Annual Reports ◽  
Managerial Ownership ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms

This study aims to examine the influence of corporate governance mechanisms to transparency. Corporate governance mechanisms examined in this study include internal mechanism consisting of: commissioners, managerial ownership, foreign ownership, debt financing, and audit quality. The population in this study is a registered company in Indonesia Stock Exchange for the period 2015 - 2018. The sample in this research determined by purposive sampling method with a total sample of 103 annual reports. Statistical tests showed that the board of directors, managerial ownership, foreign ownership, debt financing has no effect on the performance of the company while the quality of the audit have an impact on transparency.

scholarly journals The effects of corporate governance mechanisms and investment opportunity set on firm performance

2008 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 135-148
Author(s):  
Ruey-Dang Chang ◽  
Yeun-Wen Chang ◽  
Ching-Ping Chang ◽  
Fiona Hu
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
High Growth ◽  
Moderating Effect ◽  
Investment Opportunity ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Investment Opportunity Set

This study uses investment opportunity set (IOS) as an environmental factor, and investigates its moderating effect on the relationships between corporate governance mechanisms (including internal and external corporate governance mechanisms) and firm performance. The empirical results using regression analysis show: (1) The IOS does not have a moderating effect on audit quality and firm performance. (2) The negative relationship between institutional investor ownership and firm performance is stronger for firms with higher investment opportunities. (3) When CEO is the chairman of the board, high growth firms can lead to better firm performance. (4) The relationship between the IOS and pledged shares ratio of directors and supervisors has positive influence on firm performance

scholarly journals Corporate governance mechanisms, sensitive factors and earnings management in Nigerian oil and gas industry

2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 39-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nuraddeen Usman Miko ◽  
Hasnah Kamardin
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Oil And Gas ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Oil And Gas Industry ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Gas Industry ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Oil And Gas Firms

Oil and gas industry is considered as the sector that contributes a big share to the Nigeria economy. This study investigated the effects of corporate governance mechanisms, sensitive factors on earnings management of quoted oil and gas firms in Nigeria using the sample of nine (9) listed oil and gas firms for the period of ten years (2004-2013). Discretionary current accruals was used as the proxy for earnings management. Corporate governance mechanisms (boards size, chief executive officer (CEO) duality, directors’ ownership, audit committee size, audit committee independence), sensitive factors (corporate tax, corporate profit, corporate social responsibility) served as independent variables. The study concludes that corporate governance mechanisms curves earnings management while sensitive factors increase earnings management. The study recommends that corporate governance regulations should be strengthened to reflect present challenges.

Audit committee versus other governance mechanisms and the effect of investment opportunities: evidence from Palestine

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 527-544 ◽  
Author(s):  
Islam Abdeljawad ◽  
Ghassan A.I. Oweidat ◽  
Norman Mohd Saleh
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Valuable Insight ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Investment Opportunities ◽  
The Relationship

Purpose This paper aims to explore how the presence of an audit committee is associated with other corporate governance mechanisms, i.e. board structure, ownership structure and quality of external audit. The present study evaluated whether the presence of the audit committee complements or substitutes other governance mechanisms in Palestinian companies. Moreover, the effect of investment opportunities on the relationship between the formation of the audit committee and the quality of the auditor was addressed. Design/methodology/approach The association between the formation of the audit committee and other governance variables was modelled as a binary logistic model. The sample comprising 44 firms listed on Palestine exchange for the period between 2013 and 2017, amounting to 220 firm-year observations. Findings Based on the investigation, the results have indicated that board independence, the distinction between the chairman and chief executive officer function, ownership concentration and audit quality enhance the chance of audit committee formation, implying complementary effect. Contrastingly, board size and board ownership serve as a substitute to audit committee formation. It has also been found that investment opportunities act as an effective moderating factor that strengthens the relationship between audit quality and the formation of the audit committee. Originality/value The study provides valuable insight into the interaction between multiple corporate governance mechanisms within the economy of Palestine where the external uncertainty is high and investment opportunities are constrained by the decisions of the occupying authority. The findings may help regulators and policymakers in Palestine alongside those of other countries with similar environmental features to revise and update their corporate governance codes to ensure that the best control can be achieved, subsequently attracting more foreign and domestic investments.

scholarly journals The use of corporate derivatives: Effects on firm value in the Italian market

2021 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-68
Author(s):  
Alberto Tron ◽  
Federico Colantoni
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Control Variable ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Financial Firms ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Italian Market ◽  
Effect Regression ◽  
And Control ◽  
The Impact

It is an empirical question whether the use of derivatives hedging among firms actually contributes to enhancing firm performances. Despite the increasing use of derivatives by non-financial firms, existing literature still debates about their effect, especially in countries with peculiar corporate governance mechanisms. By using a sample of non-financial Italian firms listed from 2007 to 2018, this paper investigates if the use of several types (currency, interest rate, and commodity) of financial derivatives can affect the value of a company. For measuring the impact of the derivatives and in order to address any possible endogeneity problem, besides using the conventional methodologies applied by previous literature (fixed-effect regression models and system GMM estimators), we run a random forest model, a machine learning technique not yet applied before in this field, and calculate the relative importance of each independent and control variable. Differently from other European countries, findings show that the use of derivatives does not affect the firm value in the Italian market. Therefore, our results confirm the role of corporate governance mechanisms on the relationship between firm value and the use of derivatives and that their impact is country-specific.

scholarly journals Equity incentives, earnings management and corporate governance: Empirical evidence using UK panel data

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 104-123 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohamed A. Shabeeb Ali ◽  
Hazem Ramadan Ismael ◽  
Ahmed H. Ahmed
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Panel Data ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Governance System ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Equity Incentives ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Relationship

Using a UK panel data set drawn from 1675 Chief Executive Officer (CEO) year observations and 1540 Chief Financial Officer (CFO) year observations, we examine the relationship between CEO and CFO equity incentives and earnings management. In addition, we examine the moderation effect of corporate governance mechanisms on the relationship between executives’ equity incentives and earnings management. We use multivariate regression models to test our hypotheses. We find that CEO equity incentives are related to higher absolute and income increasing earnings management. These results support the managerial power theory argument that CEOs exploit equity-linked compensation to obtain more personal benefits without causing public anger. Contrary to CEO equity incentives, we could not find any significant relationship between CFO equity incentives and any of the earnings management proxies. In addition, we find that corporate governance quality (measured by individual mechanisms and overall index) has no effect on the relationship between executives’ equity incentives and earnings management. This result indicates that whereas some corporate governance mechanisms can reduce earnings management in general, they do not affect wealth driven incentives to manipulate accruals. In total, results question the effectiveness of the corporate governance system in mitigating opportunistic behavior motivated by executives’ compensation structures

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