scholarly journals On Emily Paul on Brian Leftow

Author(s):  
Matthew James Collier

Emily Paul has recently argued that Brian Leftow’s account of why the import of God’s becoming Incarnate is not temporal but modal fails. She argues that Leftow’s required modal variation is not satisfied. That is, we do not have the required variation across logical space concerning the Incarnation. Paul examines her argument on two possible worlds theories: theistic ersatzism and (what I call) Lewisian theism. She thinks that both possible worlds theories face difficulties. I argue that Paul fails to provide a compelling argument against Leftow because, firstly, her defence of one her premises fails, and, secondly, she misjudges what is required for some of Leftow’s claims to be true. I also argue that some of the problematic consequences that Paul raises for theistic ersatzism and Lewisian theism either are not problematic or can be avoided.

Author(s):  
Emily Paul

A central part of the Christian doctrine of the incarnation is that the Son of God ‘becomes’ incarnate. Furthermore, according to classical theism, God is timeless: He exists ‘outside’ of time, and His life has no temporal stages. A consequence of this ‘atemporalist’ view is that a timeless being cannot undergo intrinsic change—for this requires the being to be one way at one time, and a different way at a later time. How, then, can we understand the central Christian claim that the Son of God ‘becomes’ human? This paper examines one such explanation, drawn from a brief remark by Brian Leftow: the Word takes on flesh by exhibiting modal variation with regards to the incarnation. On this account, a timeless God ‘becomes’ incarnate simply due to variation across logical space: at some possible worlds He is incarnate and at others He is not. Modal variation need not, therefore, require temporality: it only requires variation across (static) possible worlds. I draw out the problems with Leftow’s modal claim under the heads of Ersatzism and Genuine Modal Realism about possible worlds, respectively. I argue that in both instances, Leftow’s desired cross–worldly variation of the Son’s incarnation cannot be achieved.  


Author(s):  
Robert Stalnaker

This chapter first sketches a minimal theory of propositions—one that ascribes to propositions just the structure that anyone who is willing to talk of propositions at all must ascribe to them. It extends the minimal theory by adding some assumptions about the modal properties of propositions and possibilities, and then sketches a general model of logical space that makes room for merely possible possibilities. Next, it considers the relation between models and the reality that they purport to model and the extent to which our theory of propositions and possibilities provides a realistic semantics. Finally, it responds to some arguments against the thesis that propositions may exist contingently.


1991 ◽  
Vol 36 (12) ◽  
pp. 1057-1058
Author(s):  
Marvin R. Goldfried ◽  
Douglas A. Vakoch
Keyword(s):  

2002 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 44-61
Author(s):  
Ruth Perlmutter
Keyword(s):  

2016 ◽  
Vol 60 (74) ◽  
pp. 173
Author(s):  
[Eduardo  García Ramírez]
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Andrew Bacon

According to a fairly widespread assumption, there is some definite collection of completely factual or fundamental propositions upon which all truths supervene and which are unaffected by vagueness. This assumption manifests itself in formal models of vagueness as well—for example, the supervaluationist who represents propositions as sets of world-precisification pairs may divide logical space into propositions that only depend on the world-coordinate. This chapter argues that this assumption leads to paradoxes of higher-order vagueness, and, ultimately, should be rejected in favour of a weaker notion of fundamentality or factuality. It suggests an alternative picture in which there is vagueness ‘all the way down’: logical-space can be divided into basic propositions that settle all precise matters, but it is vague where those divisions lie.


Author(s):  
Jennifer McKitrick

Dispositions are often regarded with suspicion. Consequently, some philosophers try to semantically reduce disposition ascriptions to sentences containing only non-dispositional vocabulary. Typically, reductionists attempt to analyze disposition ascriptions in terms of conditional statements. These conditional statements, like other modal claims, are often interpreted in terms of possible worlds semantics. However, conditional analyses are subject to a number of problems and counterexamples, including random coincidences, void satisfaction, masks, antidotes, mimics, altering, and finks. Some analyses fail to reduce disposition ascriptions to non-modal vocabulary. If reductive analysis of disposition ascriptions fails, then perhaps there can be metaphysical reduction of dispositions without semantic reduction. However, the reductionist still owes us an account of what makes disposition ascriptions true. But to posit a causal power for every unreduced dispositional predicate is an overreaction to the failure of conceptual analysis.


Author(s):  
Mark Wilson

Scientists have developed various collections of specialized possibilities to serve as search spaces in which excessive reliance upon speculative forms of lower dimensional modeling or other unwanted details can be skirted. Two primary examples are discussed: the search spaces of machine design and the virtual variations utilized within Lagrangian mechanics. Contemporary appeals to “possible worlds” attempt to imbed these localized possibilities within fully enunciated universes. But not all possibilities are made alike and these reductive schemes should be resisted, on the grounds that they render the utilities of everyday counterfactuals and “possibility” talk incomprehensible. The essay also discusses whether Wittgenstein’s altered views in his Philosophical Investigations reflect similar concerns.


Author(s):  
Dorota M. Dutsch

Modern scholarly accounts of Greek philosophical history usually exclude women. And yet, from Dixaearchus of Messana to Diogenes Laertius, classical writers record the names of women philosophers from various schools. What is more, pseudonymous treatises and letters (likely dating after the first century CE) articulate the teachings of Pythagorean women. How can this literature inform our understanding of Greek intellectual history? To take these texts at face value would be naïve; to reject them, narrow-minded. This book is a deep examination of the literary tradition surrounding female Pythagoreans; it envisions the tradition as a network of texts that does not represent female philosophers but enacts their role in Greek culture. Part I, “Portraits,” assembles and contextualizes excerpts from historical accounts and wisdom literature. Part II, “Impersonations,” analyzes pseudonymous treatises and letters. Texts are approached with a mixture of suspicion and belief, inspired by Paul Ricoeur’s hermeneutics. Suspicion serves to disclose the misogyny of the epistemic regimes that produced the texts about and by women philosophers. Belief takes us beyond the circumstances of the texts’ production to possible worlds of diverse readers, institutions, and practices that grant agency to the female knower. In the process, the book uncovers traces of a fascinating dialogue about the gender of philosophical knowledge, which includes female voices.


2021 ◽  
pp. 096394702110097
Author(s):  
Naomi Adam

Framed by cognitive-poetic and possible worlds theories, this article explores two 21st century novels by the British postmodernist author Ian McEwan. Building upon Ryan’s (1991) seminal conceptualisation of the theory in relation to literature and using the novels as case studies, possible worlds theory is used to explain the unique and destabilising stylistic effects at play in the texts, which result in a ‘duplicitous point of view’ and consequent disorientation for the reader. With reference to the stylistically deviant texts of McEwan, it is argued that revisions to current theoretical frameworks are warranted. Most significantly, the concepts of suppositious text-possible worlds and (total) frame readjustment are introduced. Further to this, neuropsychiatric research is applied to the novels, highlighting the potential for interdisciplinary overlap in the study of narrative focalisation. It is concluded that the duplicity integral to both novels’ themes and texture is effected through artful use of hypothetical focalisation and suppositious text-possible worlds.


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