scholarly journals Research on Spatial Economic Interactions: A Cooperative Game Theory Approach

2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 144-162
Author(s):  
Natalya Dzhurka ◽  
◽  
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Spatial Distribution ◽  
Economic Activity ◽  
Cooperative Games ◽  
Cooperative Game Theory ◽  
Complex Structure ◽  
Objective Functions ◽  
Economic Space ◽  
Economic Agents ◽  
Economic Interactions

The article is dedicated to describing the capabilities of the cooperative game theory for studying spatial distribution of economic activity. The paper discusses the features of cooperative games the spatial connotation of which drives from the fact that they formalize the conflict between the forces aimed at concentration of economic activity, and the forces aimed at its dispersion (hereinafter ‘the fundamental conflict’). The author proposes a classification of spatial cooperative games based on: 1) the method of specifying the set of players, 2) the type of solution to the fundamental conflict. The players in the models under consideration are the elements of the economic space with either a simple or a complex structure. The elements with a simple structure are economic agents with their objective functions deriving from their rational choices. The elements with a complex structure are aggregates, such as regions, economic areas, or countries. If we consider it possible to describe objective functions for such players, we should use the functions incorporating a great range of decisions made by different economic agents. The article pays special attention to justification of the usage of spatial cooperative games to model interactions between the elements of the economic space with a complex structure. In spatial cooperative games, the fundamental conflict is solved either by creating a spatial projection of economic interactions, and picking the player’s locations or by studying the delocalization of economic interactions and evaluating the coalition productivity of players. The author distinguishes four types of spatial cooperative games and for each class gives an example of a specific application of the game model. Within the given classification, the author studies game models of distribution networks, interregional interactions, service facilities location, spatial growth, and production planning for spatially concentrated firms. The conclusion is that even though spatial cooperative games are used for research on various levels of generalization, they are, first of all, useful as a means of researching the phenomena of economic activity delocalization. Thus, as far as the location theory is concerned, the games act rather as a tool that complements the optimization calculations with evaluations of stability of the obtained solutions to coalitional and migration threats. From the standpoint of the concept of interregional interactions it acts as an independent tool significant for assessing system effects and their distribution between different elements of the economic space. Furthermore, the author suggests that the future of cooperative games as a tool for research on spatial distribution of economic activity is associated with the search for statements that connect the results of analysis of economic space elements with a simple and complex structure

On Inheritance of Complementarity in Non-Additive Measures Under Bounded Interactions

2018 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-33
Author(s):  
Katsushige Fujimoto ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Cooperative Games ◽  
Cooperative Game Theory ◽  
Multicriteria Decision Making ◽  
Multicriteria Decision ◽  
Restricted Domains ◽  
Additive Measures ◽  
Exponential Complexity

The notions ofk-monotonicity and superadditivity for non-additive measures (e.g., capacity and cooperative games) are used as indices to measure the complementarity of criteria/coalitions in decision-making involving multiple criteria and/or cooperative game theory. To avoid exponential complexity in capacity-based multicriteria decision-making models,k-additive capacities and/or 𝒞-decomposable capacities are often adopted. While, in cooperative game theory, under communication-restricted situations, some coalitions cannot generally be formed. This paper investigates the inheritance of complementary relationships/effects in non-additive measures with restricted domains (or under bounded interactions).

Cooperative games and multiagent systems

2013 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 381-424 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stéphane Airiau
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Sensor Networks ◽  
Web Services ◽  
Multiagent Systems ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Cooperative Games ◽  
Cooperative Game Theory ◽  
Coalitional Games ◽  
Electronic Marketplaces ◽  
Key Issues

AbstractForming coalitions is a generic means for cooperation: people, robots, web services, resources, firms; they can all improve their performance by joining forces. The use of coalitions has been successful in domains such as task allocations, sensor networks, and electronic marketplaces. Forming efficient coalitions requires the identification of matching synergies between different entities (finding complementary partners, or similar partners, or partners who add diversity). In addition, the different parties must negotiate a fair repartition of the worth created by the coalition. The first part of this paper is a tutorial on cooperative game theory (also called coalitional games). We then survey the different scenarios and the key issues addressed by the multiagent systems community.

scholarly journals Arrangements of Employer-Labor Conflicts With Game Theory: Implementation of Islamic Ethic Value

ETIKONOMI ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Siti Najma ◽  
Ramadhan Razali ◽  
Harjoni Desky
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Cooperative Games ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Cooperative Game Theory ◽  
Labor Relations ◽  
Organizational Management ◽  
Ethical Values ◽  
Conflict Situations ◽  
Labor Relationship ◽  
Labor Conflicts

Employer-labor conflicts are sometimes eternal and challenging to solve. Game theory is one of the essential ideas in settling these conflicts. Furthermore, employer-labor interactions in conflict situations are strategic. In case the employer-labor relationship is non-cooperative, taking place only once, both parties are involved in a prisoner's dilemma situation. In cooperative game theory, the players work together to win the game. Organizational management needs to consider strategic behavior, built-in cooperative games, effective and efficient collaboration between workers and employers. This study examines employer-labor conflict resolution with game theory. It incorporates Islamic ethical values using qualitative research methods. Cooperative games built on employer-labor relations derive from the brotherhood principles (ukhuwah), justice ('adl), and goodness (ihsan) that maximizes cooperation and prevent conflicts.JEL Classification: C70, J01, Z12How to Cite:Najma, S., Ramadhan., & Desky, H. (2020). Arrangements of Employer-Labor Conflicts with Game Theory: Implementation of Islamic Ethic Value. Etikonomi: Jurnal Ekonomi, 19(2), xx – xx. https://doi.org/10.15408/etk.v19i2.15614.

scholarly journals A review of cooperative rules and their associated algorithms for minimum-cost spanning tree problems

SERIEs ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gustavo Bergantiños ◽  
Juan Vidal-Puga
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Operations Research ◽  
Cooperative Games ◽  
Spanning Tree ◽  
Cooperative Game Theory ◽  
Minimum Cost ◽  
Research Literature ◽  
Minimal Tree ◽  
Connection Cost

AbstractMinimum-cost spanning tree problems are well-known problems in the operations research literature. Some agents, located at different geographical places, want a service provided by a common supplier. Agents will be served through costly connections. Some part of the literature has focused, mainly, in studying how to allocate the connection cost among the agents. We review the papers that have addressed the allocation problem using cooperative game theory. We also relate the rules defined through cooperative games with rules defined directly from the problem, either through algorithms for computing a minimal tree, either through a cone-wise decomposition.

scholarly journals M&A Cooperative Games

Equilibrium ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 119-130
Author(s):  
Maria A. Nastych
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Corporate Finance ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Cooperative Games ◽  
Strategic Alliance ◽  
Cooperative Game Theory ◽  
Research Issues

Cooperative game theory instruments application to the corporate finance M&A research issues provide an ability to extend the field considered and conclusions obtained. The paper presents the M&A cooperative games modeling and its empirical implementation to analyze the airline strategic alliance as M&A deal.

CORES OF STOCHASTIC COOPERATIVE GAMES WITH STOCHASTIC ORDERS

2002 ◽  
Vol 04 (03) ◽  
pp. 265-280 ◽  
Author(s):  
F. R. FERNÁNDEZ ◽  
J. PUERTO ◽  
M. J. ZAFRA
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Probability Distribution ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Cooperative Games ◽  
Stochastic Games ◽  
Cooperative Game Theory ◽  
Random Variables ◽  
Stochastic Orders ◽  
Core Conditions

In this paper we analyze cooperative games where the worth of a coalition is uncertain and the players only know their probability distribution. The novelty of our analysis is that the comparison among the uncertain values is done by stochastic orders among random variables. Thus, the classical concepts in cooperative game theory have to be revisited and redefined. This form of comparison leads to two-different notions of core. Conditions are given under which these cores are nonempty. The results are applied on three families of stochastic games.

A CONSISTENT IMPUTATION GENERATION METHOD FOR LINGUISTIC COOPERATIVE GAMES AND ITS APPLICATION TO RISK AVERSION

2012 ◽  
Vol 20 (supp01) ◽  
pp. 49-66
Author(s):  
JIAN LIN ◽  
QIANG ZHANG
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Shapley Value ◽  
Cooperative Games ◽  
Existence And Uniqueness ◽  
Cooperative Game Theory ◽  
Management Systems ◽  
Linguistic Label ◽  
Null Player ◽  
Linguistic Labels

Cooperative game theory is very useful to risk aversion problems in economics and management systems. The existing methods only focus on the situation payoffs take the form of numerical values, ones take the form of linguistic labels are seldom discussed. The aim of this study is to propose the consistent imputation for cooperative games under a linguistic environment. To support risk aversion, a 2-tuple linguistic representation is employed to obtain the valid results and avoid the loss of linguistic information. This paper firstly defines some concepts for linguistic cooperative games, such as linguistic imputation, carrier, core and null player. A set of their desirable properties are also discussed. The linguistic Shapley value is then presented based on three axioms. Moreover, the existence and uniqueness of the linguistic Shapley value are discussed in detail. To adjust the linguistic imputation in accordance with the cardinality of a given original linguistic label set, an adjustment algorithm for generating consistent imputation is proposed. Finally, we give the application of linguistic imputation in solving risk aversion problems to illustrate the validity of the consistent imputation generation (CIG) method.

Multi-Objective Optimization Design of the Helical Gear Transmission Based on Coalition Cooperative Game Theory

2010 ◽  
Vol 44-47 ◽  
pp. 1525-1532 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rui Meng ◽  
Neng Gang Xie ◽  
Xiao Jing Han
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Optimization Design ◽  
Cooperative Game Theory ◽  
Helical Gear ◽  
Objective Functions ◽  
Multi Objective Optimization ◽  
Strategy Space ◽  
Multi Objective ◽  
Design Variables

Considering helical gear transmission's economic performance and drive reliability, construct multi-objective optimization model of the helical gear transmission with taking normal module, teeth number of small helical gear, helix angle and the gear width coefficient as design variables and taking the volume of small and large helical gear and opposite number of overlap ratio as objective functions. Propose multi-objective optimization design method based on coalition cooperative game theory where the two design goals are seen as two game players. By calculating the impact factor of design variables to objective functions and fuzzy clustering, the design variables are divided into strategy space of game players. Each game player takes its own revenue function as target and does single objective optimization in its own strategy space in order to get its own best strategy. The best strategies of all players form a combination of one round game and the optimal solution can be obtained through several game rounds. Example results show the effectiveness of game method.

scholarly journals How to Form Winning Coalitions in Mixed Human-Computer Settings

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yair Zick ◽  
Kobi Gal ◽  
Yoram Bachrach ◽  
Moshe Mash
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Real World ◽  
Cooperative Games ◽  
Cooperative Game Theory ◽  
Predictive Analytics ◽  
Acceptance Rate ◽  
Good Prediction ◽  
Weighted Voting ◽  
Negotiation Game

Despite the prevalence of weighted voting in the real world, there has been relatively little work studying real people's behavior in such settings. This paper proposes a new negotiation game, based on the weighted voting paradigm in cooperative games, where players need to form coalitions and agree on how to share the gains. We show that solution concepts from cooperative game theory (in particular, an extension of the Deegan-Packel Index) provide a good prediction of people's decisions to join a given coalition. With this insight in mind, we design an agent that combines predictive analytics with decision theory to make offers to people in the game. We show that the agent was able to obtain higher shares from coalitions than did people playing other people, without reducing the acceptance rate of its offers. These results demonstrate the potential of incorporating concepts from cooperative game theory in the design of negotiating agents.

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