A CONSISTENT IMPUTATION GENERATION METHOD FOR LINGUISTIC COOPERATIVE GAMES AND ITS APPLICATION TO RISK AVERSION

Author(s):  
JIAN LIN ◽  
QIANG ZHANG

Cooperative game theory is very useful to risk aversion problems in economics and management systems. The existing methods only focus on the situation payoffs take the form of numerical values, ones take the form of linguistic labels are seldom discussed. The aim of this study is to propose the consistent imputation for cooperative games under a linguistic environment. To support risk aversion, a 2-tuple linguistic representation is employed to obtain the valid results and avoid the loss of linguistic information. This paper firstly defines some concepts for linguistic cooperative games, such as linguistic imputation, carrier, core and null player. A set of their desirable properties are also discussed. The linguistic Shapley value is then presented based on three axioms. Moreover, the existence and uniqueness of the linguistic Shapley value are discussed in detail. To adjust the linguistic imputation in accordance with the cardinality of a given original linguistic label set, an adjustment algorithm for generating consistent imputation is proposed. Finally, we give the application of linguistic imputation in solving risk aversion problems to illustrate the validity of the consistent imputation generation (CIG) method.

2021 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 78-85
Author(s):  
Ester Livshits ◽  
Leopoldo Bertossi ◽  
Benny Kimelfeld ◽  
Moshe Sebag

Database tuples can be seen as players in the game of jointly realizing the answer to a query. Some tuples may contribute more than others to the outcome, which can be a binary value in the case of a Boolean query, a number for a numerical aggregate query, and so on. To quantify the contributions of tuples, we use the Shapley value that was introduced in cooperative game theory and has found applications in a plethora of domains. Specifically, the Shapley value of an individual tuple quantifies its contribution to the query. We investigate the applicability of the Shapley value in this setting, as well as the computational aspects of its calculation in terms of complexity, algorithms, and approximation.


Author(s):  
Selma Benkessirat ◽  
Narhimene Boustia ◽  
Rezoug Nachida

Recommendation systems can help internet users to find interesting things that match more with their profile. With the development of the digital age, recommendation systems have become indispensable in our lives. On the one hand, most of recommendation systems of the actual generation are based on Collaborative Filtering (CF) and their effectiveness is proved in several real applications. The main objective of this paper is to improve the recommendations provided by collaborative filtering using clustering. Nevertheless, taking into account the intrinsic relationship between users can enhance the recommendations performances. On the other hand, cooperative game theory techniques such as Shapley Value, take into consideration the intrinsic relationship among users when creating communities. With that in mind, we have used SV for the creation of user communities. Indeed, our proposed algorithm preforms into two steps, the first one consists to generate communities user based on Shapley Value, all taking into account the intrinsic properties between users. It applies in the second step a classical collaborative filtering process on each community to provide the Top-N recommendation. Experimental results show that the proposed approach significantly enhances the recommendation compared to the classical collaborative filtering and k-means based collaborative filtering. The cooperative game theory contributes to the improvement of the clustering based CF process because the quality of the users communities obtained is better.


2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (04) ◽  
pp. 2050012
Author(s):  
Zhendong Gu ◽  
Shuming Zhou ◽  
Jiafei Liu ◽  
Qianru Zhou ◽  
Dajin Wang

The Shapley distance in a graph is defined based on Shapley value in cooperative game theory. It is used to measure the cost for a vertex in a graph to access another vertex. In this paper, we establish the Shapley distance between two arbitrary vertices for some special graphs, i.e., path, tree, cycle, complete graph, complete bipartite, and complete multipartite graph. Moreover, based on the Shapley distance, we propose a new index, namely Shapley index, and then compare Shapley index with Wiener index and Kirchhoff index for these special graphs. We also characterize the extremal graphs in which these three indices are equal.


Author(s):  
Katsushige Fujimoto ◽  

The notions ofk-monotonicity and superadditivity for non-additive measures (e.g., capacity and cooperative games) are used as indices to measure the complementarity of criteria/coalitions in decision-making involving multiple criteria and/or cooperative game theory. To avoid exponential complexity in capacity-based multicriteria decision-making models,k-additive capacities and/or 𝒞-decomposable capacities are often adopted. While, in cooperative game theory, under communication-restricted situations, some coalitions cannot generally be formed. This paper investigates the inheritance of complementary relationships/effects in non-additive measures with restricted domains (or under bounded interactions).


2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 257-272
Author(s):  
Leszek Zaremba ◽  
Cezary S. Zaremba ◽  
Marek Suchenek

Abstract The article presents a solution of a problem that is critical from a practical point of view: how to share a higher than usual discount of $10 million among 5 importers. The discount is a result of forming a coalition by 5 current, formerly competing, importers. The use of Shapley value as a concept for co-operative games yielded a solution that was satisfactory for 4 lesser importers and not satisfactory for the biggest importer. Appropriate modification of Shapley value presented in this article allowed to identify appropriate distribution of the saved purchase amount, which according to each player accurately reflects their actual strength and position on the importer market. A computer program was used in order to make appropriate calculations for 325 permutations of all possible coalitions. In the last chapter of this paper, we recognize the lasting contributions of Lloyd Shapley to the cooperative game theory, commemorating his recent (March 12, 2016) descent from this world.


2013 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 381-424 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stéphane Airiau

AbstractForming coalitions is a generic means for cooperation: people, robots, web services, resources, firms; they can all improve their performance by joining forces. The use of coalitions has been successful in domains such as task allocations, sensor networks, and electronic marketplaces. Forming efficient coalitions requires the identification of matching synergies between different entities (finding complementary partners, or similar partners, or partners who add diversity). In addition, the different parties must negotiate a fair repartition of the worth created by the coalition. The first part of this paper is a tutorial on cooperative game theory (also called coalitional games). We then survey the different scenarios and the key issues addressed by the multiagent systems community.


2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 165-168
Author(s):  
Stan Lipovetsky

The work describes developments in the multiple regression performed for building models resistant to multicollinearity, having meaningful robust solution for individual parameters, convenient for interpretation of the results, and good for prediction. A tool from the cooperative game theory, the Shapley Value analysis, have been tried for estimation of regression coefficients and relative usefulness of the predictors in a model. This approach has been checked and successfully applied in various real-life projects in data analysts for commercial companies. It is useful for decision makers in economics, management, marketing research, and any other practical fields.


Author(s):  
N. Boyko ◽  
S. Dotsenko

The article is consider three different mechanisms of project’s profit sharing, assuming that the projects have common resource pool and both resources and profit may be distributed at arbitrary way without losses. The resources and profit distribution mechanisms are based on cooperative game theory thesis. As three different alternatives, such cooperative game solutions, as Shapley value, nucleolus ant τ-value are proposed. The calculation routine is delivered by easy typical example.


ETIKONOMI ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Siti Najma ◽  
Ramadhan Razali ◽  
Harjoni Desky

Employer-labor conflicts are sometimes eternal and challenging to solve. Game theory is one of the essential ideas in settling these conflicts. Furthermore, employer-labor interactions in conflict situations are strategic. In case the employer-labor relationship is non-cooperative, taking place only once, both parties are involved in a prisoner's dilemma situation. In cooperative game theory, the players work together to win the game. Organizational management needs to consider strategic behavior, built-in cooperative games, effective and efficient collaboration between workers and employers. This study examines employer-labor conflict resolution with game theory. It incorporates Islamic ethical values using qualitative research methods. Cooperative games built on employer-labor relations derive from the brotherhood principles (ukhuwah), justice ('adl), and goodness (ihsan) that maximizes cooperation and prevent conflicts.JEL Classification: C70, J01, Z12How to Cite:Najma, S., Ramadhan., & Desky, H. (2020). Arrangements of Employer-Labor Conflicts with Game Theory: Implementation of Islamic Ethic Value. Etikonomi: Jurnal Ekonomi, 19(2), xx – xx. https://doi.org/10.15408/etk.v19i2.15614.


2011 ◽  
Vol 13 (04) ◽  
pp. 383-402
Author(s):  
HARALD WIESE

The aim of this paper is to analyze the interconnections between employment and unionization. We will also see how unemployment benefits drive the interplay of employment and unionization. The basic input into our model stems from cooperative game theory. Building on the Shapley value, several values for TU games with coalition structures have been presented in the literature, most notably by Aumann and Drèze and Owen. We present a value that is capable of dealing with unemployment and unionization. We show that unemployment benefits increase wages but contribute to unemployment, that unemployment can be voluntary, and that unions tend to be beneficial for employed workers if there is overstaffing.


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