scholarly journals Wittgenstein jako filozof kultury

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Piotr Dehnel

The paper raises the question of the extent to which Wittgenstein’s philosophy can be read as a philosophy of culture. The answer aims at grasping the conceptual bonds between three aspects of Wittgenstein’s thought: first, his taking both language and thinking to be expressions of a ‘form of life’ (or culture); second, his taking philosophical theories to result from some disorders that occur in ‘language games’; and third, his critique and rejection of the scientific and technical civilization. The paper advances the thesis that the task of bringing words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use – recommended by Wittgenstein – can be understood as a critique of scientism and culture dominated by scientific and technical rationality.

2021 ◽  
pp. 146144482110594
Author(s):  
Yiyi Yin ◽  
Zhuoxiao Xie

This study discusses the shifting dynamics of fan participatory cultures on social media platforms by introducing the concept of “platformized language games.” We conceive of a fan community as a “speech community” and propose that the language and discourses of fan participatory cultures are technological practices that only make sense in use and interactions as “games” on social media platform. Based on an ethnography of communication on fan communities on Weibo, we analyze the technological-communicative acts of fan speech communities, including the platformized setting, participants, topics, norms, and key purposes. We argue that the social media logic (programmability, connectivity, popularity, and datafication) articulates with fans’ language games, thus shifting the “form of life” of celebrity fans on social media. Empirically, fan participatory cultures continue to mutate in China, as fan communities create idiosyncratic platformized language games based on the selective appropriation of the social media logics of connectivity and data-driven metrics.


2015 ◽  
pp. 99-115
Author(s):  
Beth Savickey

Wendy Lee-Lampshire writes that Wittgenstein’s conception of language has something valuable to offer feminist attempts to construct epistemologies firmly rooted in the social, psychological and physical situations of language users (1999: 409).  However, she also argues that his own use of language exemplifies a form of life whose constitutive relationships are enmeshed in forms of power and authority. For example, she interprets the language game of the builders as one of slavery, and questions how we read and respond to it.  She asks: “Who are ‘we’ as Wittgenstein’s reader(s)?” This is an important question, and how we answer offers insight not only into our own philosophical practices, but also into Wittgenstein’s use of language games. With the words “Let us imagine...”, Wittgenstein invites readers to participate in creative, collaborative, and improvisational language games that alter not only the texts themselves, but our relationship with others.


2015 ◽  
pp. 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Hacker

The phrase ‘Lebensform’ (form of life) had a long and varied history prior to Wittgenstein’s use of it on a mere three occasions in the Philosophical Investigations. It is not a pivotal concept in Wittgenstein’s philosophy. But it is a minor signpost of a major reorientation of philosophy, philosophy of language and logic, and philosophy of mathematics that Wittgenstein instigated. For Wittgenstein sought to replace the conception of a language as a meaning calculus (Frege, Russell, the Tractatus) by an anthropological or ethnological conception. A language is not a class of sentences that can be formed from a set of axioms (definitions), formation and transformation rules and the meanings of which is given by their truth-conditions, but an open-ended series of interlocking language-games constituting a form of life or way of living (a culture). Wittgenstein’s uses of ‘Lebensform’ and its cognates, both in the Investigations and in his Nachlass are severally analysed, and various exegetical misinterpretations are clarified.


Author(s):  
Greg Ekeh

This paper explored the conflict between Umuaro and Okperi (Fictitious Igbo towns) in Chinua Achebe’s Arrow of God (A novel written by Chinua Achebe in 1965, which is a picture of struggle and dialectics between Igbo culture/religion and imported European culture/religion) in the light of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language. The aim of the paper was to show how the use and understanding made of language can have implications for peace or war, between individuals or communities. The goal is to contribute to the promotion of peace through appropriate use and understanding of language. Philosophical method of analysis was applied in discussing Wittgenstein’s views on language as well as extracts from Arrow of God. The extracts hinged on the utterances among the elders of Umuaro, as well as between Umuaro’s emissaries led by Akukalia and the elders of Okperi, which eventually culminated in a war between Umuaro and Okperi. The findings of the study showed that use of words and languages can lead to peace or war, by their implications, understanding and context. The conclusion was that understanding and applying Wittgenstein’s view of language as a social practice through meaning as use, language-games, rule-following, grammar and form of life can help people, especially those in positions of authority, power and influence, to make good choice of words and languages in their speeches or utterances – words and languages that promote peace instead of war or any kind of violence. Mahatma Gandhi was an example of such leaders, and it was recommended that today’s leaders emulate him, for a peaceful coexistence, especially as the present society is apparently enveloped in political tensions and struggle for supremacy in various dimensions.


Author(s):  
V. V. Tselishchev

The article is devoted to the applicability of Wittgenstein’s following the rule in the context of his philosophy of mathematics to real mathematical practice. It is noted that in «Philosophical Investigations» and «Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics» Wittgenstein resorted to the analysis of rather elementary mathematical concepts, accompanied also by the inherent ambiguity and ambiguity of his presentation. In particular, against this background, his radical conventionalism, the substitution of logical necessity with the «form of life» of the community, as well as the inadequacy of the representation of arithmetic rules by a language game are criticized. It is shown that the reconstruction of the Wittgenstein concept of understanding based on the Fregian division of meaning and referent goes beyond the conceptual framework of Wittgenstein language games.


2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Brusotti

Abstract:Wittgenstein remarks that “What belongs to a language game is a whole culture”, and that describing the language games in which the “words we call expressions of aesthetic judgement” are used implies describing “the culture of a period” (LA 1966: 8). Without aiming at a full reconstruction, the paper addresses the gradual emergence of the close conceptual connection between “language game” and “culture” in Wittgenstein’s manuscripts. The apparently obvious idea that “language game” and “form of life” (or “culture”) belong together or even coincide was originally missing. The paper picks out few episodes from Wittgenstein’s philosophical development. The first chapter shows that the topic of cultural diversity emerges in Wittgenstein’s reception of Oswald Spengler’s The Decline of the West, but still plays only a limited role in his first criticism of James Frazer’s The Golden Bough. The second chapter discusses the emergence of the term “language game” and establishes that Wittgenstein’s first language games do not yet imply something like an “anthropological view”. Real and imaginary “peoples” and “tribes” make their first appearance in remarks that ascribe a “primitive” arithmetic to them (chapter 3). Finally, with an eye to the possible influence of Sraffa and Malinowski, the fourth section shows how the Brown Book conceives translation as holistic cultural comparison.


2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henrike Moll ◽  
Ryan Nichols ◽  
Ellyn Pueschel

Abstract Osiurak and Reynaud argue that cumulative technological culture is made possible by a “non-social cognitive structure” (sect. 1, para. 1) and they offer an account that aims “to escape from the social dimension” (sect. 1, para. 2) of human cognition. We challenge their position by arguing that human technical rationality is unintelligible outside of our species' uniquely social form of life, which is defined by shared intentionality (Kern & Moll 2017, Philosophical Psychology30(3):319–37; Tomasello 2019a, Becoming human: A theory of ontogeny. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press).


2006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin A. Harris ◽  
Desiree S. Howell ◽  
Don W. Spurgeon ◽  
Adam W. Sirken ◽  
John M. McConnell ◽  
...  

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