Stock price synchronicity and corporate governance mechanisms: evidence from an emerging market

Author(s):  
Omar Farooq ◽  
Sheraz Ahmed
2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 34-46
Author(s):  
Ming-Te Lee ◽  
Kai-Ting Nien

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to address the opposing views of the relationship between directors’ and officers’ liability insurance (D&O insurance) and stock price crash risk in a major Asian emerging stock market. Design/methodology/approach This paper finds an endogenous relationship between D&O insurance and stock price crash risk. Hence, the two-stage least squares regression analysis is used to address the endogeneity issue when the relationship is examined. Moreover, this paper further controls the quality of other corporate governance mechanisms to investigate whether D&O insurance still has an effect on stock price crash risk. Findings The effect of D&O insurance coverage is significantly negatively related to firm-specific stock price crash risk in Taiwan. More importantly, even when the quality of other corporate governance mechanisms is controlled, the negative relationship between D&O insurance coverage and firm-specific stock price crash risk remains significant. The evidence supports that D&O insurance serves as an effective external monitoring mechanism, strengthens corporate governance, and thus reduces stock price crash risk. Originality/value Emerging Asian markets suffer a dearth of research on the relationship of D&O insurance coverage and the firm-specific stock price crash risk. Investigating the relationship in Taiwan, the present study fills the research void. The findings show that D&O insurance plays an important role in reducing stock price crash risk of Taiwanese firms even when other corporate governance mechanisms are in place.


2019 ◽  
Vol 43 (4) ◽  
pp. 387-409
Author(s):  
Hanh Song Thi Pham ◽  
Duy Thanh Nguyen

Purpose This paper aims to investigate the moderating effects of corporate governance mechanisms on the financial leverage–profitability relation in emerging market firms. Design/methodology/approach The paper examines the impacts by estimating the empirical model in which a firm’s accounting profitability is a dependent variable, while financial leverage, board size, board independence, CEO duality, CEO ownership, state ownership and the interaction variables are predictors. The paper uses the panel data set of 295 listed firms in Vietnam in the period 2011-2015 and two key econometric methods for panel data, namely, the two-stage least square instrumental variable and general moments method. Findings The paper finds the evidence for the significant and positive effect of board size, board independence and state ownership on the financial leverage–profitability relation. The effect of CEO duality on the financial leverage–profitability relation tends to be negative, and the impact CEO ownership inclines to be positive, although both of them are statistically insignificant. The results are consistent across different estimation methods. Originality/value This paper is the first investigating the moderating effect of various corporate governance mechanisms on the financial leverage–profitability relationship in emerging market firms.


2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 52-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ali R. Almutairi ◽  
Majdi A. Quttainah

This review paper highlights the internal and external corporate governance mechanisms in the State of Kuwait. It sheds light on the legal environment by which Shari’ah is a major source of legislation. Since culture is influenced by religion, the ownership structure is, therefore, affecting legislation. Further, it discusses the market for corporate control, which is an important determinant of corporate governance external mechanism. Due to regional geopolitical instability, disruption of the full implementation of corporate governance and code of ethics is prevalent. Nevertheless, Kuwait is on the right path for the reinforcement of corporate governance and its code of ethics.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Tamanna Dalwai ◽  
Syeeda Shafiya Mohammadi ◽  
Gaitri Chugh ◽  
Mahdi Salehi

PurposeThis study examines the impact of intellectual capital efficiency and corporate governance mechanisms on the annual report readability of Oman's financial sector companies.Design/methodology/approachThe study uses a sample of 150 firm-year observations of listed financial sector companies in the Muscat Securities Market, Oman, from 2014 to 2018. Flesch Reading ease and Flesch Kinkaid Index are used as proxies for annual report readability. As part of sensitivity analysis, the study also uses the natural logarithm of annual report pages as alternative readability measures. The investigation is conducted using random effects regression analysis and supported with system GMM estimation for robustness.FindingsThe findings of this study demonstrate a decrease in intellectual capital efficiency associated with better readability of annual reports for the financial sector firms. Alternatively, banks report a positive association of intellectual capital efficiency with the Flesch Reading ease score of the annual report. The structural capital and capital employed efficiency are also found to be negatively associated with annual report readability. Corporate governance mechanisms such as dispersed ownership and audit committee size also result in easy-to-read annual reports that support agency theory.Research limitations/implicationsThe research was conducted for financial firms of Oman, and thereby the findings can be generalized to the financial sector of countries with similar settings, such as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) region.Practical implicationsThe policy implications arising from this study suggest a strengthening of the intellectual capital efficiency and corporate governance mechanisms to improve the readability of the firms and thereby increase investor confidence.Originality/valueThis paper's uniqueness is in the model used to investigate the impact of intellectual capital efficiency and corporate governance mechanisms on the annual report readability of an emerging market.


2018 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-88 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mahdi Salehi ◽  
Mohammad Tahervafaei ◽  
Hossein Tarighi

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the relationship between the characteristics of the audit committee and the board and profitability among the companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) in Iran. Design/methodology/approach In this study, the companies listed on the TSE during the period from 2010 to 2015 are investigated. The Linear panel regression method is employed for this purpose. The independent variables of the study are composed of some corporate governance mechanisms including audit committee size, audit committee expertise, board size, board independence, chief executive officer (CEO) duality, and institutional ownership. Findings In spite of the fact that there does not exist any significant association between audit committee size and corporate financial performance, the results indicate that there is a positive and significant relationship between audit committee financial expertise and profitability. The authors found that the number of board members cannot affect corporate performance; moreover, duality of CEO role in Iranian companies does not affect company performance. However, the outcomes showed a positive and significant association between the proportion of outside directors on the board (board independence) and profitability at 99 percent confidence level. This implies that the role of non-executive directors in Iran is inconsistent with the stewardship theory. This is due to the fact that independent directors understand the status of business and market better than the board’s executive members. Finally, the results indicated that there is no significant association between institutional owners and Iranian companies’ performance. Practical implications The findings of this study will reveal more than ever the role of corporate governance mechanisms for society and users of financial statements because as tools on the CEO actions, they always have to pay attention to the implementation of corporate principles in the economic entity’ operation. Originality/value This is one of the most important studies that simultaneously examine the impacts of characteristics of the audit committee and the board on profitability in an emerging market, and the results of the study may give strength to Iranian as well other developing countries.


2018 ◽  
Vol 41 (8) ◽  
pp. 939-967 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mahdi Salehi ◽  
Hossein Tarighi ◽  
Samaneh Safdari

Purpose This paper aims to investigate the effects of some corporate governance mechanisms and executive compensation on audit fees in an emerging market. Design/methodology/approach The study population consists of 540 observations and 90 listed companies on the Tehran Stock Exchange during the years 2009-2014. The statistical model used in this study is a multivariate regression model; besides, the statistical technique used to test the hypotheses proposed in this research is panel data. Findings The changes in the value of a CEO’s own firm stock option portfolio, in thousands of rials (Iran’s currency), for a 0.01 change in stock return volatility and stock price are defined as Vega and Delta, respectively. The results demonstrated that there is a positive association between audit fees and delta, but not Vega; this means that a fee premium is linked to CEO Delta incentives. The findings show that Iranian companies pay more audit fees when they give managers more rewards. In addition, the results show that there is not a significant relationship between fees resulting from audit risk and Delta and Vega incentives of the board. Inconsistent with agency theory, the authors found that the independence of board members did not have any effect on audit fees. As a final point, the outcomes of the paper demonstrate that managers who invest in companies under their own management do not have any impact on the amount of audit fee. To put it another way, there is not any significant connection between the board ownership and audit fees. Practical implications This is one of the most important studies that simultaneously surveys the impacts of corporate governance mechanisms and executive compensation in the Iranian audit market. The results of this study will reveal more than the role of corporate governance mechanisms for society and users of financial statements because as tools on the CEO actions, they always have to pay attention to the implementation of corporate principles in the economic entity’ operation. Originality/value The present study has examined the relationship between two cases of corporate governance mechanisms named the board independence and the board ownership with audit fees in a country where, to the authors’ knowledge as in most other developing markets, such a relationship has not been a subject of empirical research. Moreover, the use of a two-dimensional measure of executive compensation, namely, Delta and Vega incentives, primarily considering research undertaken in an emerging market, as a valuable contribution may be observed.


2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 22-28
Author(s):  
Omran Ahmad Al-Ibbini ◽  
Osama Samih Shaban

The primary goal of corporate governance is to create a balance of power-sharing among shareholders, directors, and management to enhance shareholder value and protect the interests of other stakeholders. The main aim of this study is to find out the effect of internal corporate governance in improving the confidence of investors and minimizing stock fluctuations risk. In order to achieve the objectives of the study, a questionnaire has been designed and distributed randomly to 200 traders at the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE). Resolution data were analyzed using the statistical program (Smart PLS), in addition to other statistical methods. The study concluded that there is a significant statistical effect of internal corporate governance mechanisms in improving the confidence of investors and minimizing stock fluctuations risk. Also, the study recommended to maintain the current level of investors’ confidence and to work on developing the legal framework for corporate governance in the light of the proposed development of a conceptual framework, and economic growth.


Author(s):  
Vladimiro Marini ◽  
Massimo Caratelli ◽  
Gian Paolo Stella ◽  
Ilaria Barbaraci

AbstractPrivate equity is a source of finance and a governance device characterised by active monitoring through sponsors that intervene in targets’ corporate governance. As sponsors are skilled and motivated acquirors, we investigated whether corporate governance mechanisms mitigate leveraged targets’ risk of financial distress differently compared to non-acquired companies through the lenses of agency theory and resource-based theories. We found that targets and non-acquired companies are not significantly different in terms of corporate governance features, but sponsors are skilled enough to choose corporate governance members to mitigate risk more, especially when boards are smaller, have busier industry expert directors, and mandate execution to more managers. These results can be useful to targets, targets’ investors and lenders, and policymakers.


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