Estimating the welfare loss due to vehicle tariffs in Malaysia

Author(s):  
Brian Chua Tatt Shen ◽  
Daniel Borer ◽  
Kock Lim Tan
Keyword(s):  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Habtamu Shiferaw Amogne ◽  
Taiji Hagiwara

AbstractThe Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) is a Free Trade Area (FTA) regional trade agreement in Africa. Currently, Ethiopia is negotiating to join COMESA FTA. This study assesses the impact of three regional trade arrangements, COMESA FTA, customs unions, and the European Partnership Agreement (EPA) on the economy of Ethiopia. The analysis is based on a static Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model, version 9 database. Unlike previous studies, the customs union scenarios are designed at the detailed Harmonized System (HS) level. COMESA FTA (scenario 1) with standard GTAP model results in a welfare loss for Ethiopia due to negative terms of trade and investment-saving effect, but with unemployment closure (scenario 2); Ethiopia enjoys a welfare gain mainly due to endowment effect. In scenario 3 (COMESA customs union) and scenario 4 (European Partnership Agreement), Ethiopia loses due to negative terms of trade and investment-saving effect. There is a large increase in demand for unskilled labor force in Ethiopia by around US$23 million, US$112 million, and US$43 million for scenario 2, 3, and 4 respectively. Moreover, there is a positive output effect for oilseeds, leather, and basic metals across all scenarios. The world, as a whole, enjoys welfare gains with COMESA FTA (scenario 1 and 2). However, with scenario 3 and 4, there is an overall welfare loss. There is no strong reason for Ethiopia to move to the customs union, and the EPA in the short run. Therefore, a transition period is necessary, but it is recommended for Ethiopia to join COMESA FTA.


Author(s):  
Daniel Borer ◽  
Kock Lim Tan ◽  
Brian Chua Tatt Shen
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Atsushi Yamagishi

Abstract: I analyze markets in which consumers may misestimate the true value of goods and the government can affect the valuation through public promotion. When entry of firms is not allowed, the government makes consumers overvalue the goods to mitigate welfare loss from underproduction in an oligopolistic market, provided that the promotion cost is sufficiently low. On the contrary, in a free-entry market, no matter how low the promotion cost is, the government may make consumers undervalue them in order not to induce wasteful entries despite the remaining underproduction problem. In addition, my result in a free-entry market suggests that the main finding of Glaeser and Ujhelyi (J Public Econ 94: 247-257, 2010)crucially depends on the barriers to entry and the opposite result may be obtained under free entry.


2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (12) ◽  
pp. 195-213
Author(s):  
Anzhelika Gerasymenko ◽  
Nataliia Mazaraki

The article gives an overview of Ukrainian legislation and experiences concerning antitrust damages actions. The analysis has led to a number of conclusions: private claims are rare in Ukraine due to difficulties in obtaining evidence, high legal costs, and lacking confidence in the Ukrainian court system. The paper gives examples of Ukrainian private antitrust enforcement practice and provides a statistical analysis of the dynamics of ‘compensated’ damages caused by antitrust infringements in Ukraine. The value of ‘compensated’ damages is compared to the value of the economic effect of stopping antitrust infringements, as well as to the value of the overall welfare loss deriving from market power in the national economy. Finally, some new sources of damages caused by market power are discussed considering the development perspectives of this branch of antitrust activity.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-44
Author(s):  
Hakan Yilmazkuday

Exchange rate pass-through (ERPT) into prices and into income loss are shown to be enough to calculate ERPT into welfare loss using implications of a simple model. These ERPT measures are estimated at the good level using a unique micro-price data set from Turkey, and they are combined with income-group-specific expenditure shares at the good level to obtain aggregate-level ERPT measures for alternative income groups. An exchange rate shock resulting in a real depreciation of 1% is shown to decrease welfare by about 0.80% for the average-income consumer, while this estimate ranges between 0.73% and 0.83% for consumers in the lowest- and highest-income quintiles, respectively, suggesting evidence for redistributive effects of an exchange rate shock. Using micro prices has further resulted in showing that traded, nondurable, flexible-price, or income-elastic goods contribute more to ERPT into welfare loss for the average-income consumer, suggesting important policy implications for filtering out the noise in the measurement of aggregate-level prices.


2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (5) ◽  
pp. 561-579
Author(s):  
Soner Uysal ◽  
Turan Subasat
Keyword(s):  

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