Impact of corporate governance and financial stability on bank risk in Malaysia

2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 353
Author(s):  
Mei Foong Wong
2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 8-20
Author(s):  
Panagiotis Ballas ◽  
Alexandros Garefalakis ◽  
Christos Lemonakis ◽  
Vassiliki Balla

The financial system consists, without doubt, one of the most important determinants of the world national economies, which undergoes numerous changes and challenges with major impact on the economic growth prospects of a country. A healthy financial system is the steam engine of the economy, a major source for economic growth through which capitals are attracted for investments; hence, it is regarded as a trustee of financial stability. Given the difference in structure and function of the financial sector in various countries, we investigate the extent to which the implementation of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) accompanied by Corporate Governance practices affected the quality of financial and narrative reporting offered within published statements of Greek banks for the period from 2008 to 2011. The originality of the work lies at the fact that it focuses on Greek financial institutions for a period that incorporates both the burst of global financial crisis and the beginning of the Greek sovereign debt crisis making inferences on quality of reporting as a result of IFRS and Corporate Governance practices adoption. Our analysis revealed the positive contribution of both of the above categories of variables to the accuracy and quality of the information offered to stakeholders.


2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (5) ◽  
pp. 1729 ◽  
Author(s):  
Imang Dapit PAMUNGKAS ◽  
St. Dwiarso UTOMO

This study aims to detect and examine fraudulent financial reporting by applying fraud pentagon theory to all companies implementing the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Corporate Governance Scorecard in Indonesia. This study has the following objectives: to examine and analyze the effect of financial stability, external pressure, financial target, nature of industry, audit opinion, change of directors, managerial ownership against fraudulent financial reporting. In this research, we use correlation research type. The population of this sample is all sectors of companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. Using sampling technique in the form of Purposive Sampling Technique applying ASEAN Corporate Governance Scorecard in Indonesia with research period of 2012 to 2016, which produce 30 samples, multiple linear regression analysis using SPSS version 22. The results of this study found that financial stability, managerial ownership has a negative and insignificant effect on fraudulent financial reporting. External pressure, nature of industry has a negative and significant effect on fraudulent financial reporting. Financial Target, Audit Opinion, Change of Directors has a positive and insignificant effect on Fraudulent Financial Reporting.


2018 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 138
Author(s):  
Lawrence Ansah Addo ◽  
Gloria Clarissa Dzeha ◽  
Baah Aye Kusi ◽  
Daniel Ofori Sasu

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (4, Special Issue) ◽  
pp. 292-307
Author(s):  
Aws AlHares ◽  
Osama M. Al-Hares

The current study evaluated the influence of corporate governance mechanisms (CGM) from 130 banks from 13 Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries. The goal was to analyze their risk disclosure practices from 2012-2019 and understand the impact of corporate governance (CG) on the level of bank risk disclosure. The current findings reveal a positive association between the level of bank-risk disclosure and 1) the presence of Sharia supervisory board; 2) the ownership of structure at the bank level; and 3) control of corruption at the country-level. The study has implications for developing, implementing, and enforcing governance standards at the corporate and national levels that are relevant to corporate boards, investors, governments, and regulatory authorities.


2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 117-128
Author(s):  
Haileslasie Tadele ◽  
Baliira Kalyebara

The lessons from the 2008 global financial crisis show that excessive risk taking and governance failures contribute to the failure of several banks. As a result, the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and risk taking has been the subject of many studies. However, extant studies report inconclusive results. Therefore, this study aims to investigate the relationship between CEO power and bank risk in the UAE using data over the period of 2015–2018 and a sample of 19 UAE banks. The study uses a Pearson pairwise correlation to analyze the relationship between CEO power and bank risk. In addition, a two-tailed t-test is used to examine the differences between conventional and Islamic banks in terms of CEO power and risk-taking. The results of the study show that CEO power measured using CEO duality and CEO tenure reduces risk. Furthermore, the paper indicates that larger boards and higher CEO ownership tend to increase risk. The study also reports that conventional banks have higher return variability, larger boards and powerful CEOs than Islamic banks. However, Islamic banks tend to have higher non-performing finances than conventional banks. The study provides important insights on the relationship between CEO power and bank risk and concurs with earlier studies. The findings can be of interest to policy makers and can be used as input data for the development of corporate governance mechanisms. Shareholders can also use the survey results as input when appointing a CEO for their banks.


2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (4, Special Issue) ◽  
pp. 246-256
Author(s):  
Francesca Arnaboldi ◽  
Vincenzo Capizzi

This paper investigates whether bank corporate governance can play a role in the aggregate risk score assigned to individual banks by regulators. We exploit regulatory changes at the European level and a fixed-effects model to reduce endogeneity issues. We contribute to the existing literature on bank corporate governance by showing that board age significantly increases bank risk. This may indicate that boards formed by older members are more entrenched and can also be less dynamic. Board size and gender composition of the board are risk-neutral.


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