Efficiency and administrative regulation: the case of electoral systems in Peru and Ecuador

The purpose of the article is to research the history of creation and formation of the Chancellery of Contract Affairs – the first supervisory and regulatory body in the field of public procurement in Russia. The early history of the Contracting Chancellery (1715–1717) can be traced in the context of the development of legislative and administrative regulation of public procurement during the reign of Peter the Great. The institution of public procurement itself, according to the author, is associated with the acquisition of distinct features of the modern state by Russia, which was manifested in the previous time. The immediate impetus for the development of the institution was the reform of the armed forces and the resulting mobilization efforts of the supreme power. The very content of the research predetermined the use of source-based and historical-legal methods. As a result of the study, the author states that the creation of a special body – the Chancellery of Contract Affairs, designed to take control of the situation under state contracts, turned out to be the right decision. The well-coordinated work of the Contracting Chancellery with the Senate, fiscal authorities and investigative bodies led to the creation of a number of important regulatory legal acts, almost ‘from scratch’ forming the legislative basis for the institution of public procurement functioning. The need for further work on the designated topic is noted.

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Democracy, Parliament and Electoral Systems

10.2307/j.ctt18fs53z ◽

2015 ◽

Keyword(s):

Electoral Systems

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Realignment and Beyond

10.1093/oso/9780198830986.003.0010 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Russell J. Dalton

Keyword(s):

Twentieth Century ◽

Public Opinion ◽

Social Change ◽

Driving Force ◽

Electoral Systems ◽

The Political ◽

Democratic Process ◽

Economic Changes ◽

Economic Issues ◽

Societal Changes

Affluent democracies have experienced tremendous socio-economic changes since the mid- twentieth century, which has reshaped public opinion, party programs, and electoral choices. This chapter first summarizes the societal changes that have been a driving force behind the political changes described in this study. One pattern involves the longstanding economic issues of contemporary democracies, and shifting social positions on these issues. In addition, an evolving cultural cleavage and its ties to broader attitudes toward social change have altered citizen policy preferences. In most affluent democracies, the parties’ responses to these changing citizen demands have produced a realignment to represent both economic and cultural positions. The chapter concludes by discussing the implications of the findings for the working of electoral systems and the democratic process more broadly.

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Electoral Systems and Ethnic Minority Representation

The Oxford Handbook of Electoral Systems ◽

10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190258658.013.26 ◽

2017 ◽

pp. 158-174

Author(s):

David Lublin ◽

Shaun Bowler

Keyword(s):

Ethnic Minority ◽

Minority Groups ◽

Political Power ◽

Electoral Systems ◽

Electoral System ◽

Demographic Characteristics ◽

Democratic Process ◽

Minority Representation ◽

Ethnic Geography

Every democratic process short of unanimity produces opinion minorities. Political divisions along anchored demographic characteristics like language, religion, race, or ethnicity challenge pluralist models of governance by threatening to entrench the exclusion of minority groups from political power. Especially when attuned to ethnic geography, electoral engineering through manipulation of the electoral system and other rules governing the electoral process, such as boundary delimitation, reserved seats, ballot-access requirements, and ethnic party bans, can help promote either inclusion or exclusion of minorities. Ensuring long-term interethnic peace has proved more difficult. Scholars continue to grapple with how to ensure minority inclusion without freezing existing divisions.

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Electoral Systems in Context

The Oxford Handbook of Electoral Systems ◽

10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190258658.013.46 ◽

2017 ◽

pp. 720-740

Author(s):

Steven L. Taylor

Keyword(s):

United States ◽

United States Of America ◽

Electoral Systems ◽

Party Systems ◽

The United States ◽

Primary Elections ◽

Unique Element ◽

Unique System ◽

The World ◽

Elected Office

The United States of America has one of the longest, continually functional electoral systems in the world. On one level, the system is seemingly simple, as it is based predominantly on plurality winners in the context of single-seat districts. However, its extensive usage of primary elections adds a nearly unique element to the process of filling elected office. This mechanism is used more extensively in the United States than in any other case. Additionally, the United States has a complex, and unique, system for electing its national executive. All of these factors help create and reinforce one of the most rigid two-party systems in the world.

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Ballot spoilage as a response to limitations on choice and influence

Party Politics ◽

10.1177/1354068821990258 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 135406882199025

Author(s):

Patrick Cunha Silva ◽

Brian F Crisp

Keyword(s):

Regression Discontinuity ◽

Electoral Systems ◽

Electoral Rules ◽

Municipal Elections ◽

Proportional Systems ◽

Reasoning Systems

Electoral systems vary in terms of the choice and influence they offer voters. Beyond selecting between parties, preferential systems allow for choices within parties. More proportional systems make it likely that influence over who determines the assembly’s majority will be distributed across relatively more voters. In response to systems that limit choice and influence, we hypothesize that voters will cast more blank, null, or spoiled ballots on purpose. We use a regression discontinuity opportunity in French municipal elections to test this hypothesis. An exogenously chosen and arbitrary cutpoint is used to determine the electoral rules municipalities use to select their assemblies. We find support for our reasoning—systems that do not allow intraparty preference votes and that lead to disproportional outcomes provoke vote spoilage. Rates of vote spoilage are frequently sufficient to change control over the assembly if those votes had instead been cast validly for the second-place party.

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