Rational Reasonableness: Toward a Positive Theory of Public Reason

2012 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-46 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gillian K. Hadfield ◽  
Stephen Macedo
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
Common Knowledge ◽  
Democratic Politics ◽  
Moral Problem ◽  
Positive Theory ◽  
Constitutional Design ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Diverse Society

Abstract Why is it important for people to agree on and articulate shared reasons for just laws, rather than whatever reasons they personally find compelling? What, if any, practical role does public reason play in liberal democratic politics? We argue that the practical role of public reason can be better appreciated by examining the confluence of normative and positive political theory; the former represented here by liberal social contract theory of John Rawls and others, and the latter by rational choice or game theory. Citizens in a diverse society face a practical as well as a moral problem. How can they have confidence that others will reciprocate their commitment to supporting governing principles that depart from their own ideal conceptions of truth and value in order to be reasonable to all? Citizens face a practical problem of mutual assurance that public reason helps them solve, and solve as a matter of common knowledge. The solution, on both views, requires citizens’ reciprocal commitment to basing law on a system of shared reasons. Both views place public reason at the core of liberal democratic politics in conditions of diversity, and for quite similar reasons. Our argument illustrates the (often) complementary roles of positive and values-based analysis in constitutional design.

The Role of Religion in Liberal Democratic Politics

2018 ◽  
pp. 1-23
Author(s):  
Benjamin R. Hertzberg
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
Salt Lake ◽  
Salt Lake City ◽  
Democratic Politics ◽  
Way Of Life ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Lake City ◽  
Friday Prayer ◽  
Role Of Religion

This chapter introduces the book’s main claims by analyzing three examples where religion inspired political controversy in recent US politics: Amina Wadud’s decision to lead a mixed-gender Friday prayer in New York City in 2005, the protests outside an Islamic Circle of North America fundraiser in Yorba Linda, California in 2011, and Mormons Building Bridges’ inaugural march in the Salt Lake City Pride Parade in 2012. Public discussions of these cases exemplify the dominant approaches American citizens use to evaluate religion’s roles in democratic politics. The chapter contrasts these approaches with the alternative defended in this book: a way-of-life conception of democracy. The way of life-conception implies a framework for evaluating religion in politics that is democratic, liberal, and pluralistic. Approaching religion in politics with this conception avoids prominent concerns about evaluating religion: that extant perspectives flatten and deform religious phenomena.

scholarly journals Public Reason And Public Policy: The Need For Epistemic Realism In Political Argument

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
James D. Rinn
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Civil Society ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
Political Knowledge ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Political Will ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Epistemic Realism ◽  
Shared Commitment

This paper examines the concept of public reason, the regime of principles and rules under which political argument in a liberal-democratic society should be conducted. It examines the two most prominent accounts of public reason: John Rawls’, which derives rules of public reason from a presumed duty of mutual respect, and Jurgen Habermas’, which begins with the premise that communication is a necessary condition for knowledge. It then answers subjectivist objections to public reason, and concludes that public reason is ultimately defined and upheld by a shared commitment to epistemic realism: the understanding that we inhabit a shared world made up of mind-independent objects that can be known by all members of that shared world. The paper then examines the Canadian citizenry’s willingness and capacity to engage in public reason and the government’s ability to facilitate it, and concludes that in the absence of political will or a pre-existing culture of public reason, the burden of promoting and sustaining it will fall to organized and motivated sub-sectors of civil society. Keywords: Public Reason, Public Policy, Rawls, Habermas, Political Knowledge, Civil Society

Rawlsian Public Reason and the Theological Framework of Martin Luther King's “Letter from Birmingham City Jail”

2013 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 145-163 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin Buckley Dyer ◽  
Kevin E. Stuart
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
Public Discourse ◽  
Martin Luther ◽  
Public Officials ◽  
The Public ◽  
Proper Role ◽  
Martin Luther King ◽  
The Ideal

AbstractThe ideal of public reason, made prominent by John Rawls, has become a mainstay of discussions about the proper role of religious arguments in a politically liberal society. In particular, Rawls's theory of public reason requires citizens and public officials to refrain from appealing to comprehensive religious and philosophical doctrines in public deliberation on matters of basic justice and constitutional essentials. In this essay, we review the ways in which the public life of Martin Luther King, Jr. — with its frequent appeals to a comprehensive doctrine to justify disobedience to the law — represents a challenge to the ideal of public reason, and we consider several Rawlsian rejoinders. What is missing from the existing body of scholarship on public reason is a thorough analysis of King's philosophical and theological arguments, including the examples of legal injustice he offered in his celebrated “Letter from Birmingham Jail.” As we note, King's specific examples of unjust laws rely on a theological framework that bedevils the attempt to reconcile his Letter with the constructivist underpinnings of Rawls's theory of public reason. Indeed, Rawls is in something of a bind: either King's argument is not acceptable under the terms of public reason or public reason simply cannot limit contemporary public discourse in the way Rawls has in mind. We consider several possible Rawlsian arguments for the accommodation of King's theological rhetoric, but conclude that the Rawlsian idea of public reason remains deeply problematic.

scholarly journals Equal Respect, Liberty, and Civic Friendship. Why Liberal Public Justification Needs a Dual Understanding of Reciprocity

2021 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-19
Author(s):  
Pavel Dufek ◽  
Sylvie Bláhová
Keyword(s):  
Public Reason ◽  
Political Community ◽  
Public Justification ◽  
Civic Friendship ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
The Common ◽  
Liberal Approach ◽  
Epistemic Aspect

This paper critically discusses the generally recognized dualism in the interpretation of the moral basis of public reason. We argue that in order to maintain the complementarity of both liberal and democratic values within the debate on public reason, the arguments from liberty and from civic friendship cannot be considered in isolation. With regard to the argument from liberty, we contend that because the idea of natural liberty is an indispensable starting point of liberal theory, no explanation of the justification of political power can do without it. In particular, we focus on the requirement of reasonableness and show that we should retain the epistemic aspect of the reasonableness of persons. Perhaps the main reason for this is to be found in the criterion of reciprocity which provides the deepest justification of the respect for people’s liberty – that is, the liberal aspect of liberal democracy. At the same time, however, we argue that reciprocity also provides the grounds for responding to the criticism that the essentially liberal approach fails to adequately take into consideration the role of political community. Because reciprocity may also be interpreted as being based on civic friendship, it provides the resources to respond to such criticism. It thus supplies the normative background also for the second, democratic pillar of public reason. We then critically examine the newly emerging approach built predominantly on the argument from civic friendship, arguing that by prioritising the civic friendship interpretation and, at times, tending to completely abandon the liberty-based one, it overlooks the indispensability of liberty-based considerations for the criterion of reciprocity. We conclude that in order to adequately capture the common liberal-democratic basis of public reason, both interpretations of reciprocity must be linked within a comprehensive account.

scholarly journals Public reason and reliability democracy

2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 12-23
Author(s):  
Elvio Baccarini
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
Democratic Theory ◽  
Democratic Legitimacy ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Hybrid Theory

The article starts with a sketch of Prijic Samarzija?s hybrid theory. After that, it provides an overview of the virtue epistemology theory, to which she attributes a relevant influence on her own position, as well as that of reliability democracy which constitutes her view about democratic legitimacy. Secondly, her proposal is discussed and confronted with a slightly amended version of the leading liberal democratic theory of democratic legitimacy, formulated and defended by John Rawls.

scholarly journals Public Reason And Public Policy: The Need For Epistemic Realism In Political Argument

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
James D. Rinn
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Civil Society ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
Political Knowledge ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Political Will ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Epistemic Realism ◽  
Shared Commitment

This paper examines the concept of public reason, the regime of principles and rules under which political argument in a liberal-democratic society should be conducted. It examines the two most prominent accounts of public reason: John Rawls’, which derives rules of public reason from a presumed duty of mutual respect, and Jurgen Habermas’, which begins with the premise that communication is a necessary condition for knowledge. It then answers subjectivist objections to public reason, and concludes that public reason is ultimately defined and upheld by a shared commitment to epistemic realism: the understanding that we inhabit a shared world made up of mind-independent objects that can be known by all members of that shared world. The paper then examines the Canadian citizenry’s willingness and capacity to engage in public reason and the government’s ability to facilitate it, and concludes that in the absence of political will or a pre-existing culture of public reason, the burden of promoting and sustaining it will fall to organized and motivated sub-sectors of civil society. Keywords: Public Reason, Public Policy, Rawls, Habermas, Political Knowledge, Civil Society

scholarly journals Public Reason, Partisanship and the Containment of the Populist Radical Right

2021 ◽  
pp. 003232172110059
Author(s):  
Gabriele Badano ◽  
Alasia Nuti
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Radical Right ◽  
Democratic Institutions ◽  
Democratic Deliberation ◽  
Strategic Behaviour ◽  
Populist Radical Right ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Influential Theory

This article discusses the growth of the populist radical right as a concrete example of the scenario where liberal democratic ideas are losing support in broadly liberal democratic societies. Our goal is to enrich John Rawls’ influential theory of political liberalism. We argue that even in that underexplored scenario, Rawlsian political liberalism can offer an appealing account of how to promote the legitimacy and stability of liberal democratic institutions provided it places partisanship centre stage. Specifically, we propose a brand-new moral duty binding ‘reasonable’ partisans committed to pluralism. This duty establishes conditions where partisans must strategically transform society’s public reason (i.e. transform the visions for society their parties campaign on) in ways that promise to attract back support from illiberal and antidemocratic competitors. While this strategic behaviour might seem impermissible, we show that Rawls’ distinctive account of sincerity in democratic deliberation is uniquely placed to justify it as perfectly ethical.

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