scholarly journals Public reason and reliability democracy

2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 12-23
Author(s):  
Elvio Baccarini
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
Democratic Theory ◽  
Democratic Legitimacy ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Hybrid Theory

The article starts with a sketch of Prijic Samarzija?s hybrid theory. After that, it provides an overview of the virtue epistemology theory, to which she attributes a relevant influence on her own position, as well as that of reliability democracy which constitutes her view about democratic legitimacy. Secondly, her proposal is discussed and confronted with a slightly amended version of the leading liberal democratic theory of democratic legitimacy, formulated and defended by John Rawls.

Jürgen Habermas and Public Reason

2020 ◽  
pp. 189-240
Author(s):  
Miguel Vatter
Keyword(s):  
Public Reason ◽  
Democratic Theory ◽  
Democratic Legitimacy ◽  
Jürgen Habermas ◽  
Ernst Bloch ◽  
Karl Jaspers ◽  
Jurgen Habermas ◽  
Political Form

This chapter explores Jürgen Habermas’s conception of a post-metaphysical idea of public reason as basis of democratic legitimacy in postsecular societies. It discusses Habermas’s interpretation of Kant’s and Hegel’s philosophies of religion in terms of their efforts to ‘translate’ theological substance into ethico-political form, thus giving a secular meaning to the idea of God’s Kingdom. The chapter shows the roots of Habermas’s adoption of ‘methodological atheism’ in the writings of Karl Jaspers and Ernst Bloch on the relation between philosophy and faith in revelation. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the similarities between Habermas’s and Jacques Derrida’s defences of an essential messianic component in contemporary democratic theory.

Rational Reasonableness: Toward a Positive Theory of Public Reason

2012 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-46 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gillian K. Hadfield ◽  
Stephen Macedo
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
Common Knowledge ◽  
Democratic Politics ◽  
Moral Problem ◽  
Positive Theory ◽  
Constitutional Design ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Diverse Society

Abstract Why is it important for people to agree on and articulate shared reasons for just laws, rather than whatever reasons they personally find compelling? What, if any, practical role does public reason play in liberal democratic politics? We argue that the practical role of public reason can be better appreciated by examining the confluence of normative and positive political theory; the former represented here by liberal social contract theory of John Rawls and others, and the latter by rational choice or game theory. Citizens in a diverse society face a practical as well as a moral problem. How can they have confidence that others will reciprocate their commitment to supporting governing principles that depart from their own ideal conceptions of truth and value in order to be reasonable to all? Citizens face a practical problem of mutual assurance that public reason helps them solve, and solve as a matter of common knowledge. The solution, on both views, requires citizens’ reciprocal commitment to basing law on a system of shared reasons. Both views place public reason at the core of liberal democratic politics in conditions of diversity, and for quite similar reasons. Our argument illustrates the (often) complementary roles of positive and values-based analysis in constitutional design.

scholarly journals Public Reason And Public Policy: The Need For Epistemic Realism In Political Argument

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
James D. Rinn
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Civil Society ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
Political Knowledge ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Political Will ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Epistemic Realism ◽  
Shared Commitment

This paper examines the concept of public reason, the regime of principles and rules under which political argument in a liberal-democratic society should be conducted. It examines the two most prominent accounts of public reason: John Rawls’, which derives rules of public reason from a presumed duty of mutual respect, and Jurgen Habermas’, which begins with the premise that communication is a necessary condition for knowledge. It then answers subjectivist objections to public reason, and concludes that public reason is ultimately defined and upheld by a shared commitment to epistemic realism: the understanding that we inhabit a shared world made up of mind-independent objects that can be known by all members of that shared world. The paper then examines the Canadian citizenry’s willingness and capacity to engage in public reason and the government’s ability to facilitate it, and concludes that in the absence of political will or a pre-existing culture of public reason, the burden of promoting and sustaining it will fall to organized and motivated sub-sectors of civil society. Keywords: Public Reason, Public Policy, Rawls, Habermas, Political Knowledge, Civil Society

scholarly journals Public Reason And Public Policy: The Need For Epistemic Realism In Political Argument

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
James D. Rinn
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Civil Society ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
Political Knowledge ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Political Will ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Epistemic Realism ◽  
Shared Commitment

This paper examines the concept of public reason, the regime of principles and rules under which political argument in a liberal-democratic society should be conducted. It examines the two most prominent accounts of public reason: John Rawls’, which derives rules of public reason from a presumed duty of mutual respect, and Jurgen Habermas’, which begins with the premise that communication is a necessary condition for knowledge. It then answers subjectivist objections to public reason, and concludes that public reason is ultimately defined and upheld by a shared commitment to epistemic realism: the understanding that we inhabit a shared world made up of mind-independent objects that can be known by all members of that shared world. The paper then examines the Canadian citizenry’s willingness and capacity to engage in public reason and the government’s ability to facilitate it, and concludes that in the absence of political will or a pre-existing culture of public reason, the burden of promoting and sustaining it will fall to organized and motivated sub-sectors of civil society. Keywords: Public Reason, Public Policy, Rawls, Habermas, Political Knowledge, Civil Society

scholarly journals Public Reason, Partisanship and the Containment of the Populist Radical Right

2021 ◽  
pp. 003232172110059
Author(s):  
Gabriele Badano ◽  
Alasia Nuti
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Radical Right ◽  
Democratic Institutions ◽  
Democratic Deliberation ◽  
Strategic Behaviour ◽  
Populist Radical Right ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Influential Theory

This article discusses the growth of the populist radical right as a concrete example of the scenario where liberal democratic ideas are losing support in broadly liberal democratic societies. Our goal is to enrich John Rawls’ influential theory of political liberalism. We argue that even in that underexplored scenario, Rawlsian political liberalism can offer an appealing account of how to promote the legitimacy and stability of liberal democratic institutions provided it places partisanship centre stage. Specifically, we propose a brand-new moral duty binding ‘reasonable’ partisans committed to pluralism. This duty establishes conditions where partisans must strategically transform society’s public reason (i.e. transform the visions for society their parties campaign on) in ways that promise to attract back support from illiberal and antidemocratic competitors. While this strategic behaviour might seem impermissible, we show that Rawls’ distinctive account of sincerity in democratic deliberation is uniquely placed to justify it as perfectly ethical.

scholarly journals “Fantasy Upon Fantasy”: Some Reflections on Dworkin’s Philosophy of International Law

Jus Cogens ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Tasioulas
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Dual Function ◽  
Law Of Peoples ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
International Court ◽  
International Legal Order ◽  
Theory Of Law ◽  
The One ◽  
Core Part

AbstractThis article offers a critique of Ronald Dworkin’s article “A New Philosophy for International Law”, (Philos Public Aff 41: 1–30, 2013). It begins by showing that Dworkin’s moralised theory of law is built on two highly questionable background assumptions. On the one hand, a descriptively implausible characterisation of a positivist-voluntarist view of international law as the reigning “orthodoxy”. On the other hand, the methodologically questionable assumption that a theory of international law must discharge the dual function of explaining the validity of international law in a manner that underwrites its presumptive legitimacy. In its core part, the article then offers a sustained criticism of Dworkin’s moralised account of the validity and legitimacy of international law. Various problems are identified with the “principle of salience” that Dworkin offers in place of consent as a ground for international law. A key concern is the difficulties that stem from Dworkin’s willingness to proceed on the “fantasy” assumption that his theory needs to get off the ground, i.e. that there is an international court with compulsory jurisdiction and reliable mechanisms for enforcing its judgements. Finally, the article concludes with some thoughts on how Dworkin’s “fantasy-based” approach led him to over-estimate the degree to which international law can be a vehicle for the global spread of liberal democratic values. More minimalist ambitions for international legal order, along the lines suggested by John Rawls in The Law of Peoples, seem more realistic.

Shared intentions, public reason, and political autonomy

2019 ◽  
Vol 49 (6) ◽  
pp. 776-804 ◽  
Author(s):  
Blain Neufeld
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
State Power ◽  
Public Justification ◽  
Political Autonomy ◽  
Public Reasoning ◽  
Corporate Body ◽  
Gerald Gaus

AbstractJohn Rawls claims that public reasoning is the reasoning of ‘equal citizens who as a corporate body impose rules on one another backed by sanctions of state power’. Drawing upon an amended version of Michael Bratman’s theory of shared intentions, I flesh out this claim by developing the ‘civic people’ account of public reason. Citizens realize ‘full’ political autonomy as members of a civic people. Full political autonomy, though, cannot be realised by citizens in societies governed by a ‘constrained proceduralist’ account of democratic self-government, or the ‘convergence’ account of public justification formulated recently by Gerald Gaus and Kevin Vallier.

La Idea de “Razón Publica” (y su Revisión) en el Último Rawls

2003 ◽  
Vol 11 (22) ◽  
pp. 5-31
Author(s):  
Fernando Aranda Fraga ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Public Good ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
The Political ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Key Topics ◽  
Political Philosopher

In 1993 John Rawls published his main and longest work since 1971, where he had published his reknowned A Theory of Justice, book that made him famous as the greatest political philosopher of the century. We are referring to Political Liberalism, a summary of his writings of the 80’s and the first half of the 90’s, where he attempts to answer the critics of his intellectual partners, communitarian philosophers. One of the key topics in this book is the issue of “public reason”, whose object is nothing else than public good, and on which the principles and proceedings of justice are to be applied. The book was so important for the political philosophy of the time that in 1997 Rawls had to go through the 1993 edition, becoming this new one the last relevant writing published before the death of the Harvard philosopher in November 2002.

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