scholarly journals Moral Education and Transcendental Idealism

2020 ◽  
Vol 102 (4) ◽  
pp. 646-673
Author(s):  
Joe Saunders ◽  
Martin Sticker
Keyword(s):  
Moral Education ◽  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
Main Claim ◽  
Space And Time

AbstractIn this paper, we draw attention to several important tensions between Kant’s account of moral education and his commitment to transcendental idealism. Our main claim is that, in locating freedom outside of space and time, transcendental idealism makes it difficult for Kant to both provide an explanation of how moral education occurs, but also to confirm that his own account actually works. Having laid out these problems, we then offer a response on Kant’s behalf. We argue that, while it might look like Kant has to abandon his commitment to either moral education or transcendental idealism, there is a way in which he can maintain both.

scholarly journals Notas sobre o “múltiplo” na primeira Crítica

DoisPontos ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ubirajara Rancan de Azevedo Marques
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
Space And Time

Examina-se aqui uma solução de tipo “idealista” para o problema da possibilidade do múltiplo, a qual, assim parece, levaria à exigência da admissão de um espaço e um tempo inatos. Eliminando-se qualquer pretensa concessão inatista por parte de Kant, porém, observa-se que o resultado alcançado, neste caso, favorece a originalidade do idealismo transcendental. Consideration on “multiple” in the first Critique Abstract It is examined here a solution, of an idealist kind, to the problem concerning the possibility of the manifold, which, it seems, would lead to the requirement of the admission of an inate space and time. However, by excluding any pretense inatist concession from Kant’s perspective, it is observed that the achieved result, in this case, supply the originality of transcendental idealism.

Kant’s Case for Transcendental Idealism and Empirical Realism

2021 ◽  
pp. 179-244
Author(s):  
Anja Jauernig
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
Master Argument ◽  
Space And Time ◽  
Empirical Realism

The foundational structure of, and Kant’s arguments for his transcendental idealism and empirical realism are analyzed. Special attention is paid to the ‘master argument’ in the Transcendental Aesthetic for the thesis that space and time are transcendentally ideal and nothing but forms of sensibility. A reconstruction of the master argument is provided, and each of its premises is examined in detail, including the especially important premise that we have an a priori intuition of space and time.

Kant’s Argument for Transcendental Idealism in the Transcendental Aesthetic Revisited

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Damian Melamedoff-Vosters
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
Space And Time ◽  
Representations Of Space ◽  
Conceptual Confusion

Abstract This paper provides a novel reconstruction of Kant’s argument for transcendental idealism in the Transcendental Aesthetic. This reconstruction relies on two main contentions: first, that Kant accepts the then-ubiquitous view that all cognition is either from grounds or consequences, a view he props up by drawing a distinction between logical and real grounds; second, that Kant, like most of his contemporaries, holds that our representations are the most immediate grounds of our cognition. By stressing these elements, the most threatening objection to Kant’s argument can be avoided, namely, the claim that Kant ignores the possibility that our representations of space and time are subjective in origin, but objective as regards their applicability. My reconstruction shows that this so-called neglected alternative objection is based on a conceptual confusion about the nature of a priori cognition.

scholarly journals Kant’s Transcendental Idealism and Empirical Realism

2021 ◽  
pp. 110-178
Author(s):  
Anja Jauernig
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
The Core ◽  
Space And Time ◽  
Transcendental Realism ◽  
Empirical Realism ◽  
Transcendental Idealist

The core claims of transcendental idealism are examined, according to which empirical objects and empirical selves are appearances and not things in themselves, and pure space and time are nothing but forms of sensibility. Kant is shown to be a relationalist about empirical space and time in holding that empirical space and time are constituted by the spatial and temporal determinations of empirical objects. Furthermore, it is explicated how Kant can be both a transcendental idealist and an empirical realist about empirical objects, empirical selves, and empirical space and time, and how his idealism differs from transcendental realism, as well as from ordinary idealism such as Berkeley’s.

Handedness, Idealism, and Freedom

2021 ◽  
Vol 130 (3) ◽  
pp. 385-449
Author(s):  
Desmond Hogan
Keyword(s):  
Relative Position ◽  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
The Other ◽  
Surprising Result ◽  
Space And Time ◽  
Adequate Understanding ◽  
Left And Right ◽  
Incongruent Counterparts ◽  
The Way

Incongruent counterparts are pairs of objects which cannot be enclosed in the same spatial limits despite an exact similarity in magnitude, proportion, and relative position of their parts. Kant discerns in such objects, whose most familiar example is left and right hands, a “paradox” demanding “demotion of space and time to mere forms of our sensory intuition.” This paper aims at an adequate understanding of Kant’s enigmatic idealist argument from handed objects, as well as an understanding of its relation to the other key supports of his idealism. The paper’s central finding is that Kant’s idealist argument from incongruent counterparts rests essentially on his theory of freedom. The surprising result sheds new light on deep and overlooked links among the pillars of transcendental idealism, pointing the way to a comprehensive and unified reading of Kant’s system of idealist arguments.

Objections: Coherence or Plausibility

2020 ◽  
pp. 175-189
Author(s):  
Christopher J. Insole
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
Space And Time

Kant’s conception of the proper self, located outside of and prior to space and time (according to transcendental idealism), as the cite of our true autonomy, gives rise to considerable difficulties, both exegetical and philosophical. Both types of difficulty are engaged with in this chapter. First of all, the chapter investigates the exegetical problem standardly raised at this point, which involves the anxiety that in speaking, in the Groundwork, about our access to the free noumenal self, Kant violates his own critical epistemic discipline. It is shown that Kant does not, in fact, violate his own critical discipline in the Groundwork. The chapter also shows that although the conception of the noumenal intelligible self is hardly ‘common-sensical’ to ‘us’, it would not have been incredible to Kant, and would not have led, necessarily, to some of the deleterious consequences that commentators have feared.

Die Raum- und Zeitlehre Alois Riehls im Kontext realistischer Interpretationen von Kants transzendentalem Idealismus

Kant-Studien ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Rudolf Meer
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Studies ◽  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
Current Debate ◽  
Realistic Interpretation ◽  
Research Results ◽  
Space And Time ◽  
Philosophical Criticism ◽  
Thing In Itself

Abstract In The Philosophical Criticism, Alois Riehl developed a realistic interpretation of Kant’s transcendental idealism based on his theory of space and time. In doing so, more than 100 years ago, he formulated an interpretation of the relation between the thing in itself and appearances that is discussed in current research as the metaphysical „dual aspect“ interpretation, although it is rarely attributed to Riehl. To reconstruct Riehl’s position, the research results of comparative studies on Moritz Schlick are systematically extended and applied to the current debate on Kant’s transcendental idealism.

The Ideality of Space and Time: Trendelenburg versus Kant, Fischer and Bird

2013 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 263-288 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward Kanterian
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
Space And Time

AbstractTrendelenburg argued that Kant's arguments in support of transcendental idealism ignored the possibility that space and time are both ideal and real. Recently, Graham Bird has claimed that Trendelenburg (unlike his contemporary Kuno Fischer) misrepresented Kant, confusing two senses of ‘subjective/objective’. I defend Trendelenburg's ‘neglected alternative’: the ideas of space and time, asa prioriand necessary, areideal, but this does not exclude theirvalidityin the noumenal realm. This undermines transcendental idealism. Bird's attempt to show that the Analytic considers, but rejects, the alternative fails: an epistemological reading makes Kant accept the alternative, while an ontological reading makes him incoherent. As I demonstrate, Trendelenburg acknowledged the ambiguity of ‘subjective/objective’, focusing on the transcendental, not the empirical sense. Unlike Fischer, Bird denies Kant's commitment to things-in-themselves in favour of a descriptivist, non-ontological reading of transcendental idealism as an inventory of ‘immanent experience’. But neither Bird's descriptivism, nor Fischer's commitment to things-in-themselves, answers Trendelenburg's sceptical worry about transcendental idealism.

Languages in Space and Time

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Patriarca ◽  
Els Heinsalu ◽  
Jean Leó Leonard
Keyword(s):  
Space And Time
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