The Ideality of Space and Time: Trendelenburg versus Kant, Fischer and Bird

2013 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 263-288 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward Kanterian
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
Space And Time

AbstractTrendelenburg argued that Kant's arguments in support of transcendental idealism ignored the possibility that space and time are both ideal and real. Recently, Graham Bird has claimed that Trendelenburg (unlike his contemporary Kuno Fischer) misrepresented Kant, confusing two senses of ‘subjective/objective’. I defend Trendelenburg's ‘neglected alternative’: the ideas of space and time, asa prioriand necessary, areideal, but this does not exclude theirvalidityin the noumenal realm. This undermines transcendental idealism. Bird's attempt to show that the Analytic considers, but rejects, the alternative fails: an epistemological reading makes Kant accept the alternative, while an ontological reading makes him incoherent. As I demonstrate, Trendelenburg acknowledged the ambiguity of ‘subjective/objective’, focusing on the transcendental, not the empirical sense. Unlike Fischer, Bird denies Kant's commitment to things-in-themselves in favour of a descriptivist, non-ontological reading of transcendental idealism as an inventory of ‘immanent experience’. But neither Bird's descriptivism, nor Fischer's commitment to things-in-themselves, answers Trendelenburg's sceptical worry about transcendental idealism.

Kant’s Case for Transcendental Idealism and Empirical Realism

2021 ◽  
pp. 179-244
Author(s):  
Anja Jauernig
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
Master Argument ◽  
Space And Time ◽  
Empirical Realism

The foundational structure of, and Kant’s arguments for his transcendental idealism and empirical realism are analyzed. Special attention is paid to the ‘master argument’ in the Transcendental Aesthetic for the thesis that space and time are transcendentally ideal and nothing but forms of sensibility. A reconstruction of the master argument is provided, and each of its premises is examined in detail, including the especially important premise that we have an a priori intuition of space and time.

Kant’s Argument for Transcendental Idealism in the Transcendental Aesthetic Revisited

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Damian Melamedoff-Vosters
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
Space And Time ◽  
Representations Of Space ◽  
Conceptual Confusion

Abstract This paper provides a novel reconstruction of Kant’s argument for transcendental idealism in the Transcendental Aesthetic. This reconstruction relies on two main contentions: first, that Kant accepts the then-ubiquitous view that all cognition is either from grounds or consequences, a view he props up by drawing a distinction between logical and real grounds; second, that Kant, like most of his contemporaries, holds that our representations are the most immediate grounds of our cognition. By stressing these elements, the most threatening objection to Kant’s argument can be avoided, namely, the claim that Kant ignores the possibility that our representations of space and time are subjective in origin, but objective as regards their applicability. My reconstruction shows that this so-called neglected alternative objection is based on a conceptual confusion about the nature of a priori cognition.

Ursprünge transzendentaler Ästhetik. Zum Wandel von Kants Raum- und Zeitargumentation von derInauguraldissertation zurKritik

Kant-Studien ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 111 (3) ◽  
pp. 331-385
Author(s):  
Christian Martin
Keyword(s):  
Present Article ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Space And Time ◽  
Representations Of Space ◽  
Widespread View

AbstractAccording to a widespread view, the essentials of Kant’s critical conception of space and time as set forth in the Transcendental Aesthetic can already be found in his 1770 Inaugural Dissertation. Contrary to this assumption, the present article shows that Kant’s later arguments for the a priori intuitive character of our original representations of space and time differ crucially from those contained in the Dissertation. This article highlights profound differences between Kant’s transcendental and his pre-critical conception of pure sensibility by systematically comparing the topic, method and argumentation of the First Critique with that of the Inaugural Dissertation. It thus contributes to a better understanding of the Transcendental Aesthetics itself, which allows one to distinguish its peculiar transcendental mode of argumentation from considerations made by the pre-critical Kant, with which it can easily be conflated.

scholarly journals Moral Education and Transcendental Idealism

2020 ◽  
Vol 102 (4) ◽  
pp. 646-673
Author(s):  
Joe Saunders ◽  
Martin Sticker
Keyword(s):  
Moral Education ◽  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
Main Claim ◽  
Space And Time

AbstractIn this paper, we draw attention to several important tensions between Kant’s account of moral education and his commitment to transcendental idealism. Our main claim is that, in locating freedom outside of space and time, transcendental idealism makes it difficult for Kant to both provide an explanation of how moral education occurs, but also to confirm that his own account actually works. Having laid out these problems, we then offer a response on Kant’s behalf. We argue that, while it might look like Kant has to abandon his commitment to either moral education or transcendental idealism, there is a way in which he can maintain both.

Reichenbach, Hans (1891–1953)

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wesley C. Salmon
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Vienna Circle ◽  
Philosophy Of Physics ◽  
Theory Of Relativity ◽  
Sense Experience ◽  
Space And Time ◽  
The World ◽  
Synthetic A Priori ◽  
And Mathematics

Philosophy of science flourished in the twentieth century, partly as a result of extraordinary progress in the sciences themselves, but mainly because of the efforts of philosophers who were scientifically knowledgeable and who remained abreast of new scientific achievements. Hans Reichenbach was a pioneer in this philosophical development; he studied physics and mathematics in several of the great German scientific centres and later spent a number of years as a colleague of Einstein in Berlin. Early in his career he followed Kant, but later reacted against his philosophy, arguing that it was inconsistent with twentieth-century physics. Reichenbach was not only a philosopher of science, but also a scientific philosopher. He insisted that philosophy should adhere to the same standards of precision and rigour as the natural sciences. He unconditionally rejected speculative metaphysics and theology because their claims could not be substantiated either a priori, on the basis of logic and mathematics, or a posteriori, on the basis of sense-experience. In this respect he agreed with the logical positivists of the Vienna Circle, but because of other profound disagreements he was never actually a positivist. He was, instead, the leading member of the group of logical empiricists centred in Berlin. Although his writings span many subjects Reichenbach is best known for his work in two main areas: induction and probability, and the philosophy of space and time. In the former he developed a theory of probability and induction that contained his answer to Hume’s problem of the justification of induction. Because of his view that all our knowledge of the world is probabilistic, this work had fundamental epistemological significance. In philosophy of physics he offered epoch-making contributions to the foundations of the theory of relativity, undermining space and time as Kantian synthetic a priori categories.

scholarly journals Kritische Metaphysik oder Analytische Hermeneutik?

2019 ◽  
Vol 67 (1) ◽  
pp. 118-131
Author(s):  
Anton Friedrich Koch
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Transcendental Philosophy ◽  
Narrow Sense ◽  
Transcendental Deduction ◽  
Space And Time ◽  
Present Essay ◽  
General Logic ◽  
Time And Being ◽  
Hermeneutic Science ◽  
Invasive Intervention

Abstract Kant in his critical metaphysics, as one might call his transcendental philosophy, proceeds from the syncategorematic, subject-sided forms of thinking, which are revealed by general logic qua doctrine of the inferences of reason (i. e. syllogistics), and assigns to them one-to-one categorematic, object-sided forms of thinking: the categories qua pure, non-empirical predicates of things. Kant then shows in his transcendental deduction that the categories are objectively, – i. e. without our invasive intervention – valid of all things in space-time. In the present essay, philosophy is understood not so much as critical metaphysics in a narrow sense of “metaphysics”, but rather as the a priori hermeneutic science; and the transcendental deduction of the categories is replaced by arguments for (1) a readability thesis and (2) a theory of the a priori presuppositions of referencing things in space and time. The readability thesis states that things can be read (1) as world-sided primal tokens (ur-tokens) of proper names of themselves and also (2) as world-sided primal tokens (ur-tokens) of elementary propositions about them. The theory of the a priori presuppositions clarifies the conditions of the possibility of subjects orienting themselves in space and time and being able to refer, first, to themselves qua embodied thinkers and then as well to arbitrary individual items.

scholarly journals Notas sobre o “múltiplo” na primeira Crítica

DoisPontos ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ubirajara Rancan de Azevedo Marques
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
Space And Time

Examina-se aqui uma solução de tipo “idealista” para o problema da possibilidade do múltiplo, a qual, assim parece, levaria à exigência da admissão de um espaço e um tempo inatos. Eliminando-se qualquer pretensa concessão inatista por parte de Kant, porém, observa-se que o resultado alcançado, neste caso, favorece a originalidade do idealismo transcendental. Consideration on “multiple” in the first Critique Abstract It is examined here a solution, of an idealist kind, to the problem concerning the possibility of the manifold, which, it seems, would lead to the requirement of the admission of an inate space and time. However, by excluding any pretense inatist concession from Kant’s perspective, it is observed that the achieved result, in this case, supply the originality of transcendental idealism.

scholarly journals O PAPEL DA AFINIDADE TRANSCENDENTAL ENTRE OS FENÔMENOS NA TEORIA DO CONHECIMENTO KANTIANA

2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (01) ◽  
Author(s):  
Gualtiero LORINI
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
The Core ◽  
Space And Time ◽  
Opus Postumum ◽  
Shed Light

The article focuses on a concept placed at the core of the A-Deduction, of which the B-Version provides a different but not necessarily better exposition. It is the concept of “transcendental affinity” [transcendentale Affinität] (A 144). This concept is not present in the whole B-Edition of the KrV, and even the term “Affinity” does not appear in the B-Deduction, but only four times in the Transcendental Dialectic, and twice in the Discipline of the Pure Reason. In the economy of the A-Deduction, the concept of “transcendental affinity” plays a central role. It represents indeed the “thoroughgoing connection according to necessary laws” of all the possible phenomena. This connection is presupposed by transcendental consciousness insofar as it has a representation of these phenomena and their relationships, since what all the possible phenomena share is their determination in space and time according to the synthetic unity of the apperception. The concept of transcendental affinity between all the possible phenomena is intimately linked to imagination, which makes this affinity arise by reproducing a phenomenon in space and time according to the a priori laws of understanding. The necessary link between transcendental affinity and imagination represents an important passage in this paper. One goal is to point out that the implications of transcendental affinity are not rejected but rather deepened in the B-Deduction. On these assumptions, we consider the role of the “I think” in the B-Deduction, in order to claim that it implicitly relies upon the concept of transcendental affinity too. The last part of the paper aims to point out that the transcendental affinity between the phenomena describedin the A-Deduction is particularly apt to understand the unity of the representation of nature. To shed light on this point, we will deal with some significant passages from the Opus postumum.

scholarly journals El espacio en cuanto forma de los fenómenos y la tesis de la receptividad: mutua implicación

2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 270
Author(s):  
Diana Gloria Contreras Gallegos
Keyword(s):  
Space Form ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
Full Treatment ◽  
Palabras Clave ◽  
Empirical Realism

Mi objetivo es hacer notar que existe un nexo de mutua implicación entre dos tesis kantianas: la tesis de la receptividad (nuestro conocimiento depende de que seamos afectados por los objetos) y la tesis del espacio en cuanto forma de los fenómenos. Un tratamiento completo de la tesis de la receptividad implica el idealismo trascendental de Kant en torno al espacio. Desde mi lectura, ello en absoluto afecta al realismo empírico kantiano. Para mostrar lo anterior, exploro aquí la segunda consecuencia ("b) a la que Kant arriba tras haber presentado sus argumentos en favor de la naturaleza a priori e intuitiva del espacio en la Estética Trascendental.  Palabras clave:  espacio, forma de la intuición, receptividad, idealismo trascendental, realismo empírico   Abstract: My purpose in this paper is to point out that there is a mutual implication between two Kantian thesis: the Receptivity Thesis (our knowledge depends on being affected by objects) and the thesis of the space at a form of the phenomena; so that, a full treatment of the receptivity thesis implies Kant's transcendental idealism of space. On my reading this doesn't compromise Kant's empirical realism. In order to show this I explore here the second consequence ("b") that Kant arrives after he shows his arguments in favour of the space in the Transcendental Aesthetics.   Keywords: space, form of intuition, receptivity, transcendental idealism, empirical realism 

scholarly journals Hume's Correlationism: On Meillassoux, Necessity and Belief

2013 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 132-160
Author(s):  
Paul O'Mahoney
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Weak Form ◽  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
A Priori Knowledge ◽  
Sufficient Criterion ◽  
Principle Of Sufficient Reason ◽  
Final Causes ◽  
The Way ◽  
Priori Knowledge

The article argues that Meillassoux's 'After Finitude' underestimates the nature and profundity of Hume's sceptical challenge; it neglects the fact that Hume's scepticism concerns final causes (and agrees fundamentally with Bacon and Descartes in this respect), and that in Hume even the operations of reason do not furnish entirely a priori knowledge. We contend that Hume himself institutes a form of correlationism (which in part showed Kant the way to counter the sceptical challenge via transcendental idealism), and sought not merely to abolish the 'principle of sufficient reason' but to salvage it in a weak form, in turning his attention to the grounds for our beliefs in necessity. We argue further that the 'mathematizability' of properties is not a sufficient criterion to yield realist, non-correlational knowledge, or to demonstrate the 'irremediable realism' of the 'ancestral' statement. Finally, we contend that Meillassoux himself relies on a certain 'Kantian moment' which exempts the reasoning subject from otherwise 'omnipotent' chaos, and that ultimately the 'speculative materialist' position remains exposed to the original Humean sceptical challenge. 

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