Kant’s Argument for Transcendental Idealism in the Transcendental Aesthetic Revisited

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Damian Melamedoff-Vosters
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
Space And Time ◽  
Representations Of Space ◽  
Conceptual Confusion

Abstract This paper provides a novel reconstruction of Kant’s argument for transcendental idealism in the Transcendental Aesthetic. This reconstruction relies on two main contentions: first, that Kant accepts the then-ubiquitous view that all cognition is either from grounds or consequences, a view he props up by drawing a distinction between logical and real grounds; second, that Kant, like most of his contemporaries, holds that our representations are the most immediate grounds of our cognition. By stressing these elements, the most threatening objection to Kant’s argument can be avoided, namely, the claim that Kant ignores the possibility that our representations of space and time are subjective in origin, but objective as regards their applicability. My reconstruction shows that this so-called neglected alternative objection is based on a conceptual confusion about the nature of a priori cognition.

Ursprünge transzendentaler Ästhetik. Zum Wandel von Kants Raum- und Zeitargumentation von derInauguraldissertation zurKritik

Kant-Studien ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 111 (3) ◽  
pp. 331-385
Author(s):  
Christian Martin
Keyword(s):  
Present Article ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Space And Time ◽  
Representations Of Space ◽  
Widespread View

AbstractAccording to a widespread view, the essentials of Kant’s critical conception of space and time as set forth in the Transcendental Aesthetic can already be found in his 1770 Inaugural Dissertation. Contrary to this assumption, the present article shows that Kant’s later arguments for the a priori intuitive character of our original representations of space and time differ crucially from those contained in the Dissertation. This article highlights profound differences between Kant’s transcendental and his pre-critical conception of pure sensibility by systematically comparing the topic, method and argumentation of the First Critique with that of the Inaugural Dissertation. It thus contributes to a better understanding of the Transcendental Aesthetics itself, which allows one to distinguish its peculiar transcendental mode of argumentation from considerations made by the pre-critical Kant, with which it can easily be conflated.

Kant’s Case for Transcendental Idealism and Empirical Realism

2021 ◽  
pp. 179-244
Author(s):  
Anja Jauernig
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
Master Argument ◽  
Space And Time ◽  
Empirical Realism

The foundational structure of, and Kant’s arguments for his transcendental idealism and empirical realism are analyzed. Special attention is paid to the ‘master argument’ in the Transcendental Aesthetic for the thesis that space and time are transcendentally ideal and nothing but forms of sensibility. A reconstruction of the master argument is provided, and each of its premises is examined in detail, including the especially important premise that we have an a priori intuition of space and time.

scholarly journals Kant’s Original Space and Time as Mere Grounds for Possibilities

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Thomas Raysmith
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Transcendental Deduction ◽  
Original Space ◽  
Space And Time ◽  
Representations Of Space ◽  
Temporal Representations

Abstract In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant appears to make incompatible claims regarding the unitary natures of what he takes to be our a priori representations of space and time. I argue that these representations are unitary independently of all synthesis and explain how this avoids problems encountered by other positions regarding the Transcendental Deduction and its relation to the Transcendental Aesthetic in that work. Central is the claim that these representations (1) contain, when characterized as intuitions and considered as prior to any affections of sensibility, only an infinitude of merely possible finite spatial and temporal representations, and (2) are representations that are merely transcendental grounds for the possibilities for receiving or generating finite representations in sensibility that are determined (immediately, in the case of reception) by means of syntheses that accord with the categories.

The Ideality of Space and Time: Trendelenburg versus Kant, Fischer and Bird

2013 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 263-288 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward Kanterian
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
Space And Time

AbstractTrendelenburg argued that Kant's arguments in support of transcendental idealism ignored the possibility that space and time are both ideal and real. Recently, Graham Bird has claimed that Trendelenburg (unlike his contemporary Kuno Fischer) misrepresented Kant, confusing two senses of ‘subjective/objective’. I defend Trendelenburg's ‘neglected alternative’: the ideas of space and time, asa prioriand necessary, areideal, but this does not exclude theirvalidityin the noumenal realm. This undermines transcendental idealism. Bird's attempt to show that the Analytic considers, but rejects, the alternative fails: an epistemological reading makes Kant accept the alternative, while an ontological reading makes him incoherent. As I demonstrate, Trendelenburg acknowledged the ambiguity of ‘subjective/objective’, focusing on the transcendental, not the empirical sense. Unlike Fischer, Bird denies Kant's commitment to things-in-themselves in favour of a descriptivist, non-ontological reading of transcendental idealism as an inventory of ‘immanent experience’. But neither Bird's descriptivism, nor Fischer's commitment to things-in-themselves, answers Trendelenburg's sceptical worry about transcendental idealism.

scholarly journals Moral Education and Transcendental Idealism

2020 ◽  
Vol 102 (4) ◽  
pp. 646-673
Author(s):  
Joe Saunders ◽  
Martin Sticker
Keyword(s):  
Moral Education ◽  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
Main Claim ◽  
Space And Time

AbstractIn this paper, we draw attention to several important tensions between Kant’s account of moral education and his commitment to transcendental idealism. Our main claim is that, in locating freedom outside of space and time, transcendental idealism makes it difficult for Kant to both provide an explanation of how moral education occurs, but also to confirm that his own account actually works. Having laid out these problems, we then offer a response on Kant’s behalf. We argue that, while it might look like Kant has to abandon his commitment to either moral education or transcendental idealism, there is a way in which he can maintain both.

scholarly journals Developing a Sense of Place with Locative Media: An “Underview Effect”

Leonardo ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 169-174 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chris Speed
Keyword(s):  
Sense Of Place ◽  
Global Context ◽  
Locative Media ◽  
Space And Time ◽  
Representations Of Space

The author explores the potential for locative media to offer a sense of a place. Frank White's “Overview Effect” is cited as a model for perceiving a sense of place in a global context. The paper describes the inherent limitations of Cartesian representations of space in supporting this perception. Finally, the author proposes that the capacity of locative media to connect people offers a path for a creative reconciliation between space and time. The author proposes that this kind of connected model may provide an “Underview Effect” and foster an appreciation of a global sense of place.

Representing Commodified Space

2019 ◽  
pp. 91-128
Author(s):  
Anish Vanaik
Keyword(s):  
Real Estate ◽  
Urban Space ◽  
State Power ◽  
Property Market ◽  
Space And Time ◽  
Representations Of Space

Chapter 4 examines ways of representing space as a commodity that played key roles in colonial Delhi: maps, lease deeds, advertisements, and auctions. These representations were related to the buying and selling of real estate in distinct ways. At the same time, they also referred to and relied on each other to give effect to their pronouncements. Two elements ran through these disparate representations: connections between space and time, and the imbrication of state and property market. This chapter argues that the ability to utilize these representations of space to develop narratives about urban space was a critical constituent of state power.

Reichenbach, Hans (1891–1953)

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wesley C. Salmon
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Vienna Circle ◽  
Philosophy Of Physics ◽  
Theory Of Relativity ◽  
Sense Experience ◽  
Space And Time ◽  
The World ◽  
Synthetic A Priori ◽  
And Mathematics

Philosophy of science flourished in the twentieth century, partly as a result of extraordinary progress in the sciences themselves, but mainly because of the efforts of philosophers who were scientifically knowledgeable and who remained abreast of new scientific achievements. Hans Reichenbach was a pioneer in this philosophical development; he studied physics and mathematics in several of the great German scientific centres and later spent a number of years as a colleague of Einstein in Berlin. Early in his career he followed Kant, but later reacted against his philosophy, arguing that it was inconsistent with twentieth-century physics. Reichenbach was not only a philosopher of science, but also a scientific philosopher. He insisted that philosophy should adhere to the same standards of precision and rigour as the natural sciences. He unconditionally rejected speculative metaphysics and theology because their claims could not be substantiated either a priori, on the basis of logic and mathematics, or a posteriori, on the basis of sense-experience. In this respect he agreed with the logical positivists of the Vienna Circle, but because of other profound disagreements he was never actually a positivist. He was, instead, the leading member of the group of logical empiricists centred in Berlin. Although his writings span many subjects Reichenbach is best known for his work in two main areas: induction and probability, and the philosophy of space and time. In the former he developed a theory of probability and induction that contained his answer to Hume’s problem of the justification of induction. Because of his view that all our knowledge of the world is probabilistic, this work had fundamental epistemological significance. In philosophy of physics he offered epoch-making contributions to the foundations of the theory of relativity, undermining space and time as Kantian synthetic a priori categories.

Kant’s Categories Reconsidered

1998 ◽  
pp. 58-64
Author(s):  
Robert Greenberg
Keyword(s):  
Ontological Commitment ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Space Time ◽  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
A Priori Knowledge ◽  
Representations Of Space ◽  
Direct Concern ◽  
Priori Knowledge

Adopting a Quinean criterion of ontological commitment, I consider the question of the ontological commitment of Kant's theory of our a priori knowledge of objects. Its direct concern is the customary view that the ontology of Kant's theory of knowledge in general, whether a priori or empirical, must be thought in terms of the a priori conditions or representations of space, time, and the categories. Accordingly, this view is accompanied by the customary interpretation of ontology as consisting of Kantian "appearances" or "empirical objects." I argue against this view and interpretation. My argument turns on the opposition between the necessity and universality of the a priori and the particularity and contingency of the existent. Its main point is that the a priori can remain necessary and universal only if the existence of objects is kept distinct from it.

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