Personal or Partisan Incumbency Advantage? Evidence from an Electoral Reform at the Local Level in Italy

Abstract We analyze the incumbency advantage using a large data set on Italian municipal elections held from 1993 to 2011. We first apply a non-parametric Sharp Regression Discontinuity Design comparing parties that barely win an election to those that barely lose, exploiting the fact that partisan incumbency status changes discontinuously at the threshold of margin of victory of zero. In order to disentangle the personal incumbency advantage from the partisan effect, we rely on a reform that introduced mayoral term limit, and exploit the exogenous change on the incumbency status of mayors keeping the partisan incumbency status constant. We find that the incumbency advantage is essentially driven by the personal effect. The results are robust to different specifications and estimation strategies with excellent balance in observable characteristics. Also, the effect of interest is larger in magnitude for municipalities located in the South of Italy compared to northern municipalities.

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How Much of the Incumbency Advantage is Due to Scare-Off?

Political Science Research and Methods ◽

10.1017/psrm.2014.43 ◽

2015 ◽

Vol 3 (3) ◽

pp. 493-514 ◽

Cited By ~ 26

Author(s):

Andrew B. Hall ◽

James M. Snyder

Keyword(s):

Regression Discontinuity ◽

Regression Discontinuity Design ◽

Incumbency Advantage ◽

Previous Election ◽

Us Senate ◽

State Legislative

This paper uses a regression discontinuity design to estimate the degree to which incumbents scare off challengers with previous officeholder experience. The estimates indicate a surprisingly small amount of scare-off, at least in cases where the previous election was nearly tied. As Lee and others have shown (and as we confirm for our samples) the estimated party incumbency advantage in these same cases is quite large—in fact, it is about as large as the average incumbency advantage for all races found using other approaches. Drawing from previous estimates of the electoral value of officeholder experience, we thus calculate that scare-off in these cases accounts for only about 5–7 percent of the party incumbency advantage. We show that these patterns are similar in elections for US House seats, statewide offices and US senate seats, and state legislative seats.

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Party system erosion: Evidence from Peru

Party Politics ◽

10.1177/1354068818793915 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 26 (5) ◽

pp. 581-593

Author(s):

Christopher L Carter

Keyword(s):

Party System ◽

Regression Discontinuity ◽

Party Systems ◽

Institutional Factors ◽

Third Wave ◽

Regression Discontinuity Design ◽

Improve Performance ◽

Data Set ◽

Weak Party ◽

Party Brands

Weakly institutionalized party systems are a defining feature of third-wave democracies. Yet, in some countries like Peru, party weakness is not a static equilibrium but rather part of a dynamic process of “party system erosion” in which weak parties become weaker over time as independents come to dominate subnational posts. As I argue, party system erosion is driven by a particular configuration of institutional factors—weak party brands, ease of ballot access, and limited partisan control over resource distribution. These institutional features increase the likelihood that experienced candidates will run as independents. When these candidates are elected, they obtain more intergovernmental discretionary transfers, which are used to improve performance and maintain clientelistic networks. This resource advantage of independent officials further weakens party brands and reduces experienced candidates’ incentives to run with parties in future elections. I test this theory using a data set of 80,000 subnational officials and a regression discontinuity design.

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How Much Should We Trust Regression Discontinuity Design Estimates? Evidence from Experimental Benchmarks of the Incumbency Advantage

10.33774/apsa-2020-zk94z ◽

2020 ◽

Author(s):

Jaakko Meriläinen ◽

Leandro De Magalhães ◽

Dominik Hangartner ◽

Salomo Hirvonen ◽

Nelson Ruiz ◽

...

Keyword(s):

Regression Discontinuity ◽

Regression Discontinuity Design ◽

Incumbency Advantage

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The Political Economy of Program Enforcement: Evidence from Brazil

Journal of the European Economic Association ◽

10.1093/jeea/jvz024 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 18 (2) ◽

pp. 750-791 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Fernanda Brollo ◽

Katja Kaufmann ◽

Eliana La Ferrara

Keyword(s):

Political Economy ◽

Regression Discontinuity ◽

School Attendance ◽

The Political ◽

Regression Discontinuity Design ◽

Welfare Programs ◽

Municipal Elections ◽

Electoral Outcomes ◽

Poor Families ◽

Bolsa Familia

Abstract Do politicians manipulate the enforcement of conditional welfare programs to influence electoral outcomes? We study the Bolsa Familia Program (BFP) in Brazil, which provides a monthly stipend to poor families conditional on school attendance. Repeated failure to comply with this requirement results in increasing penalties. First, we exploit random variation in the timing when beneficiaries learn about penalties for noncompliance around the 2008 municipal elections. We find that the vote share of candidates aligned with the president is lower in zip codes where more beneficiaries received penalties shortly before (as opposed to shortly after) the elections. Second, we show that politicians strategically manipulate enforcement. Using a regression discontinuity design, we find weaker enforcement before elections in municipalities where mayors from the presidential coalition can run for reelection. We provide evidence that manipulation occurs through misreporting school attendance, particularly in municipalities with a higher fraction of students in schools with politically connected principals.

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The Effect of Electing Women on Future Female Candidate Selection Patterns: Findings from a Regression Discontinuity Design

Politics & Gender ◽

10.1017/s1743923x19000096 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 15 (2) ◽

pp. 182-210 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Michael Jankowski ◽

Kamil Marcinkiewicz ◽

Anna Gwiazda

Keyword(s):

Strong Evidence ◽

Regression Discontinuity ◽

Empirical Support ◽

Proportional Representation ◽

Candidate Selection ◽

Regression Discontinuity Design ◽

Contagion Effect ◽

Representation System ◽

Incumbency Advantage ◽

Female Candidate

AbstractIn this article, we address the question of how electing women to national or subnational parliaments affects future female candidate selection in an open-list proportional representation system, using the example of Poland. We consider three potential effects of electing a woman. First, based on existing theories of the incumbency advantage, elected women should have higher chances of reselection and reelection in future elections (incumbency effect). Second, as a result of becoming more powerful within their party, elected women might have a stronger influence on future list composition, and thus more women should run for office on these lists (empowerment effect). Finally, we argue that other parties might adjust their candidate selection patterns in response to the election of women on other party lists (contagion effect). We find strong evidence for the incumbency effect and some support for the contagion effect. The empowerment hypothesis, however, finds no empirical support.

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Political Dynasties and the Incumbency Advantage in Party-Centered Environments

American Political Science Review ◽

10.1017/s0003055418000047 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 112 (3) ◽

pp. 706-712 ◽

Cited By ~ 8

Author(s):

JON H. FIVA ◽

DANIEL M. SMITH

Keyword(s):

United States ◽

Regression Discontinuity ◽

Causal Effect ◽

The United States ◽

The Philippines ◽

Organizational Networks ◽

Regression Discontinuity Design ◽

Incumbency Advantage ◽

Level Data

A handful of recent studies have investigated the causal effect of incumbency on dynasty formation in candidate-centered electoral contexts. We use candidate-level data and a regression discontinuity design to estimate the incumbency advantage and its relation to dynasty formation in the party-centered, closed-list, proportional-representation setting of Norway. The results indicate that the incumbency advantage exists even in this party-centered environment; however, in contrast to recent findings for the United States and the Philippines, we find no evidence that incumbency is important to the formation of dynasties. This finding underscores the need for more research into the role of internal party organizational networks in the perpetuation of political dynasties.

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Rank Effects in Bargaining: Evidence from Government Formation

The Review of Economic Studies ◽

10.1093/restud/rdz004 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 87 (3) ◽

pp. 1261-1295 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Thomas Fujiwara ◽

Carlos Sanz

Keyword(s):

Case Studies ◽

Coalition Formation ◽

Bargaining Power ◽

Regression Discontinuity ◽

Regression Discontinuity Design ◽

Right Wing ◽

Left Wing ◽

Municipal Elections ◽

Aggregate Information ◽

The Government

Abstract Theories of multilateral bargaining and coalition formation applied to legislatures predict that parties’ seat shares determine their bargaining power. We present findings that are difficult to reconcile with this prediction, but consistent with a norm prescribing that “the most voted party should form the government”. We first present case studies from several countries and regression discontinuity design-based evidence from twenty-eight national European parliaments. We then focus on 2,898 Spanish municipal elections in which two parties tie in the number of seats. We find that the party with slightly more general election votes is substantially more likely to appoint the mayor. Since tied parties should (on average) have equal bargaining power, this identifies the effect of being labeled the most voted. This effect is comparable to that of obtaining an additional seat, and is also present when a right-wing party is the most voted and the second and third most voted parties are allied left-wing parties who can form a combined majority. A model where elections both aggregate information and discipline incumbents can rationalize our results and yields additional predictions we take to the data, such as voters punishing second most voted parties that appoint mayors.

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A Note on Close Elections and Regression Analysis of the Party Incumbency Advantage

Statistics Politics and Policy ◽

10.1515/spp-2014-0003 ◽

2014 ◽

Vol 5 (1-2) ◽

pp. 1-11

Author(s):

Peter M. Aronow ◽

David R. Mayhew ◽

Winston Lin

Keyword(s):

Regression Analysis ◽

Least Squares ◽

Control Strategy ◽

House Of Representatives ◽

Regression Discontinuity ◽

Ordinary Least Squares ◽

Regression Discontinuity Design ◽

Least Squares Regression ◽

Incumbency Advantage ◽

The Us

AbstractMuch research has recently been devoted to understanding the effects of party incumbency following close elections, typically using a regression discontinuity design. Researchers have demonstrated that close elections in the US House of Representatives may systematically favor certain types of candidates, and that a research design that focuses on close elections may therefore be inappropriate for estimation of the incumbency advantage. We demonstrate that any issues raised with the study of close elections may be equally applicable to the ordinary least squares analysis of electoral data, even when the sample contains all elections. When vote share is included as part of a covariate control strategy, the estimate produced by an ordinary least squares regression that includes all elections either exactly reproduces or approximates the regression discontinuity estimate.

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