Rank Effects in Bargaining: Evidence from Government Formation

2019 ◽  
Vol 87 (3) ◽  
pp. 1261-1295 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Fujiwara ◽  
Carlos Sanz

Abstract Theories of multilateral bargaining and coalition formation applied to legislatures predict that parties’ seat shares determine their bargaining power. We present findings that are difficult to reconcile with this prediction, but consistent with a norm prescribing that “the most voted party should form the government”. We first present case studies from several countries and regression discontinuity design-based evidence from twenty-eight national European parliaments. We then focus on 2,898 Spanish municipal elections in which two parties tie in the number of seats. We find that the party with slightly more general election votes is substantially more likely to appoint the mayor. Since tied parties should (on average) have equal bargaining power, this identifies the effect of being labeled the most voted. This effect is comparable to that of obtaining an additional seat, and is also present when a right-wing party is the most voted and the second and third most voted parties are allied left-wing parties who can form a combined majority. A model where elections both aggregate information and discipline incumbents can rationalize our results and yields additional predictions we take to the data, such as voters punishing second most voted parties that appoint mayors.

2021 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 163-185
Author(s):  
Sung Min Han ◽  
Mi Jeong Shin

AbstractIn this article, we argue that rising housing prices increase voter approval of incumbent governments because such a rise increases personal wealth, which leads to greater voter satisfaction. This effect is strongest under right-wing governments because those who benefit from rising prices—homeowners—are more likely to be right-leaning. Non-homeowners, who are more likely to vote for left-leaning parties, will view rising housing prices as a disadvantage and therefore feel the government does not serve them well, which will mitigate the advantage to left-wing governments. We find support for our arguments using both macro-level data (housing prices and government approval ratings in 16 industrialized countries between 1960 and 2017) and micro-level data (housing prices and individuals’ vote choices in the United Kingdom using the British Household Panel Survey). The findings imply that housing booms benefit incumbent governments generally and right-wing ones in particular.


Energies ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (13) ◽  
pp. 2582 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Lotsu ◽  
Yuichiro Yoshida ◽  
Katsufumi Fukuda ◽  
Bing He

Confronting an energy crisis, the government of Ghana enacted a power factor correction policy in 1995. The policy imposes a penalty on large-scale electricity users, namely, special load tariff (SLT) customers of the Electricity Company of Ghana (ECG), whose power factor is below 90%. This paper investigates the impact of this policy on these firms’ power factor improvement by using panel data from 183 SLT customers from 1994 to 1997 and from 2012. To avoid potential endogeneity, this paper adopts a regression discontinuity design (RDD) with the power factor of the firms in the previous year as a running variable, with its cutoff set at the penalty threshold. The result shows that these large-scale electricity users who face the penalty because their power factor falls just short of the threshold are more likely to improve their power factor in the subsequent year, implying that the power factor correction policy implemented by Ghana’s government is effective.


2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 571-597 ◽  
Author(s):  
Helmut Gruber

Abstract This paper investigates the reference statements and rhetorical functions of politicians’ reactive (“uptaking”) statements in parliamentary debates as well as their self-positioning effects. Uptaking moves may be used by speakers for pursuing strategic, global discourse aims. The specific properties of such ‘uptaking’ utterances and their sequential embedding in the unfolding discourse provide analysts with cues of speakers’ global interactional goals. Results indeed show how global and local pragmatic factors impact content, form, and rhetorical function of MPs’ uptaking statements. The data comprises four Austrian parliamentary sessions, which follow the inaugural speech each newly appointed Austrian chancellor has to deliver in the Austrian national assembly at the beginning of a legislative term. Overall, four fifths of the uptaking discourse units (consisting of ‘reference to previous statement plus comment’) refer to the government program, the inaugural speech or a previous MPs’ statement. Whereas a closer investigation of the reference statements seems to indicate a left wing vs. right wing rhetorical pattern (with left wing and center parties referring to ‘official’ sources, while right wing parties set their own topical agenda), investigating the rhetorical functions of the uptaking discourse units reveals a clear government vs. opposition (but no party-specific) rhetoric: Government party MPs praise the government program (or the inaugural speech), opposition party speakers criticize it. Both groups thus focus on the interpersonal plain of interaction. In contrast, argumentative (or counter-argumentative) uptaking discourse units which would indicate speakers’ willingness to enter into a rational discourse (in a Habermasian sense) with their political opponents are extremely rare. Through their rhetorical activities, the vast majority of government and opposition speakers thus reinforce and perpetuate already known political stances and affiliations in front of a third party (i.e. the general public watching the debates via TV or Internet livestream) rather than presenting themselves as rational, problem-focused politicians.


Subject Outlook for the coalition and the government's reform programme. Significance Seventeen months into its four-year term, the centre-left government of President Michelle Bachelet is deeply divided on the future of its reform plans, with the conflicts aggravated by sluggish growth and the administration's mounting unpopularity. There are signs that, looking ahead to October 2016 municipal elections and November 2017 general elections, the centre Christian Democrat Party (PDC) is starting to mark a distance from the government in a bid to appeal to voters alienated by the coalition's left wing. Impacts Infighting within the coalition will persist to the detriment of the government's credibility. For the 2016 municipal elections, the two wings of the coalition will probably field separate candidates. Uncertainty about the government's reform plans will hamper any acceleration of economic growth.


Monitor ISH ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-31
Author(s):  
Igor Grdina

The paper discusses various interpretative strategies and narratives applied to the role which was played by Alexander Fyodorovich Kerensky (1881–1970) in the Russian Revolution. It critically evaluates views of the provisional government’s president as a non-radical revolutionary, whose work called for an upgrade in a ‘second revolution’, as well as the interpretation which makes him out to have been a counter-revolutionary at his core. Tracing the causes of his actions in 1917 to his personality traits, the study arrives at the conclusion that Kerensky was a revolutionary of an entirely different breed from those who removed him from power in October 1917; for him, the ‘first revolution’ was enough. The contribution also examines those of Kerensky’s actions which benefited his left-wing opponents, particularly his policy of disassembling the government apparatus out of fear of the right-wing enemy.


Gesnerus ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 77 (1) ◽  
pp. 102-122
Author(s):  
Hadrien Buclin

In 1974, the Swiss citizens voted against a popular initiative aimed at reforming the health insurance, launched by the Swiss Socialist Party. They refused as well a less ambitious counter-proposal elaborated by the government. This failure of the left-wing reformers is worthy of interest. This was, indeed, the main attempt until now to implement a healthcare subsidization based on social funding that would provide a wide risk coverage. In fact, shortly after the vote, the emerging economic crisis rather reinforced the advocates of a limitation of social welfare benefits. This durably hindered the political Left’s hopes of transforming in depth the Swiss healthcare system. The 1974 failure of the socialist initiative thus contributed to strengthen the conservative model, which received support from right-wing forces and the business community.


Significance Months of negotiations between the government, parliament and EU member states on the Netherlands’ approval of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement -- which Dutch voters rejected in a referendum last April -- damaged the electoral prospects of Rutte's Liberal Party (VVD). However, he reached a provisional deal in December. His success in temporarily parking this contentious issue comes amid the unfolding of a two-party race between the VVD and the PVV in the final weeks before the elections on March 15. Impacts If the VVD stays in power for another term, a referendum on EU membership is highly unlikely. The VVD’s tougher stance on immigration and integration could attract right-wing voters and make it a more tempered alternative to the PVV. The Labour Party may shift its focus from economic to social issues to differentiate itself from the VVD and attract left-wing voters.


2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 750-791 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fernanda Brollo ◽  
Katja Kaufmann ◽  
Eliana La Ferrara

Abstract Do politicians manipulate the enforcement of conditional welfare programs to influence electoral outcomes? We study the Bolsa Familia Program (BFP) in Brazil, which provides a monthly stipend to poor families conditional on school attendance. Repeated failure to comply with this requirement results in increasing penalties. First, we exploit random variation in the timing when beneficiaries learn about penalties for noncompliance around the 2008 municipal elections. We find that the vote share of candidates aligned with the president is lower in zip codes where more beneficiaries received penalties shortly before (as opposed to shortly after) the elections. Second, we show that politicians strategically manipulate enforcement. Using a regression discontinuity design, we find weaker enforcement before elections in municipalities where mayors from the presidential coalition can run for reelection. We provide evidence that manipulation occurs through misreporting school attendance, particularly in municipalities with a higher fraction of students in schools with politically connected principals.


2016 ◽  
Vol 106 (8) ◽  
pp. 2349-2370 ◽  
Author(s):  
Massimo Bordignon ◽  
Tommaso Nannicini ◽  
Guido Tabellini

We compare single round versus runoff elections under plurality rule, allowing for partly endogenous party formation. Under runoff elections, the number of political candidates is larger, but the influence of extremist voters on equilibrium policy, and hence policy volatility, is smaller because the bargaining power of the political extremes is reduced compared to single round elections. The predictions on the number of candidates and on policy volatility are confirmed by evidence from a regression discontinuity design in Italy, where cities above 15,000 inhabitants elect the mayor with a runoff system, while those below hold single round elections. (JEL C78, D72)


2012 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-37 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANNA CANT

AbstractLatin American military dictatorships of the twentieth century were often right-wing, elitist and violent. A marked exception was the left-wing Peruvian military government of Juan Velasco Alvarado. More exceptional still was the government's use of visual media. Between 1968 and 1970 it produced approximately 20 posters, printed in editions of 50,000 to 200,000, to promote the radical Agrarian Reform Law. These posters provide vibrant representations of the agrarian reform's ideological aspects, which have been under-studied. A detailed exploration of visual communication shows that the government deployed aesthetically sophisticated propaganda and symbols to encourage social participation in the reform.


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