scholarly journals The Effect of Electing Women on Future Female Candidate Selection Patterns: Findings from a Regression Discontinuity Design

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 182-210 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Jankowski ◽  
Kamil Marcinkiewicz ◽  
Anna Gwiazda
Keyword(s):  
Strong Evidence ◽  
Regression Discontinuity ◽  
Empirical Support ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Candidate Selection ◽  
Regression Discontinuity Design ◽  
Contagion Effect ◽  
Representation System ◽  
Incumbency Advantage ◽  
Female Candidate

AbstractIn this article, we address the question of how electing women to national or subnational parliaments affects future female candidate selection in an open-list proportional representation system, using the example of Poland. We consider three potential effects of electing a woman. First, based on existing theories of the incumbency advantage, elected women should have higher chances of reselection and reelection in future elections (incumbency effect). Second, as a result of becoming more powerful within their party, elected women might have a stronger influence on future list composition, and thus more women should run for office on these lists (empowerment effect). Finally, we argue that other parties might adjust their candidate selection patterns in response to the election of women on other party lists (contagion effect). We find strong evidence for the incumbency effect and some support for the contagion effect. The empowerment hypothesis, however, finds no empirical support.

How Much of the Incumbency Advantage is Due to Scare-Off?

2015 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 493-514 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew B. Hall ◽  
James M. Snyder
Keyword(s):  
Regression Discontinuity ◽  
Regression Discontinuity Design ◽  
Incumbency Advantage ◽  
Previous Election ◽  
Us Senate ◽  
State Legislative

This paper uses a regression discontinuity design to estimate the degree to which incumbents scare off challengers with previous officeholder experience. The estimates indicate a surprisingly small amount of scare-off, at least in cases where the previous election was nearly tied. As Lee and others have shown (and as we confirm for our samples) the estimated party incumbency advantage in these same cases is quite large—in fact, it is about as large as the average incumbency advantage for all races found using other approaches. Drawing from previous estimates of the electoral value of officeholder experience, we thus calculate that scare-off in these cases accounts for only about 5–7 percent of the party incumbency advantage. We show that these patterns are similar in elections for US House seats, statewide offices and US senate seats, and state legislative seats.

scholarly journals How Much Should We Trust Regression Discontinuity Design Estimates? Evidence from Experimental Benchmarks of the Incumbency Advantage

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jaakko Meriläinen ◽  
Leandro De Magalhães ◽  
Dominik Hangartner ◽  
Salomo Hirvonen ◽  
Nelson Ruiz ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Regression Discontinuity ◽  
Regression Discontinuity Design ◽  
Incumbency Advantage

scholarly journals Political Dynasties and the Incumbency Advantage in Party-Centered Environments

2018 ◽  
Vol 112 (3) ◽  
pp. 706-712 ◽  
Author(s):  
JON H. FIVA ◽  
DANIEL M. SMITH
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Regression Discontinuity ◽  
Causal Effect ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Philippines ◽  
Organizational Networks ◽  
Regression Discontinuity Design ◽  
Incumbency Advantage ◽  
Level Data

A handful of recent studies have investigated the causal effect of incumbency on dynasty formation in candidate-centered electoral contexts. We use candidate-level data and a regression discontinuity design to estimate the incumbency advantage and its relation to dynasty formation in the party-centered, closed-list, proportional-representation setting of Norway. The results indicate that the incumbency advantage exists even in this party-centered environment; however, in contrast to recent findings for the United States and the Philippines, we find no evidence that incumbency is important to the formation of dynasties. This finding underscores the need for more research into the role of internal party organizational networks in the perpetuation of political dynasties.

A Note on Close Elections and Regression Analysis of the Party Incumbency Advantage

2014 ◽  
Vol 5 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Peter M. Aronow ◽  
David R. Mayhew ◽  
Winston Lin
Keyword(s):  
Regression Analysis ◽  
Least Squares ◽  
Control Strategy ◽  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Regression Discontinuity ◽  
Ordinary Least Squares ◽  
Regression Discontinuity Design ◽  
Least Squares Regression ◽  
Incumbency Advantage ◽  
The Us

AbstractMuch research has recently been devoted to understanding the effects of party incumbency following close elections, typically using a regression discontinuity design. Researchers have demonstrated that close elections in the US House of Representatives may systematically favor certain types of candidates, and that a research design that focuses on close elections may therefore be inappropriate for estimation of the incumbency advantage. We demonstrate that any issues raised with the study of close elections may be equally applicable to the ordinary least squares analysis of electoral data, even when the sample contains all elections. When vote share is included as part of a covariate control strategy, the estimate produced by an ordinary least squares regression that includes all elections either exactly reproduces or approximates the regression discontinuity estimate.

Splitting the Difference? Causal Inference and Theories of Split-party Delegations

2006 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 439-455 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel M. Butler ◽  
Matthew J. Butler
Keyword(s):  
Causal Inference ◽  
Strong Evidence ◽  
Regression Discontinuity ◽  
The Other ◽  
Regression Discontinuity Design ◽  
Senate Elections ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Using Data

We provide an introduction to the regression discontinuity design (RDD) and use the technique to evaluate models of sequential Senate elections predicting that the winning party for one Senate seat will receive fewer votes in the next election for the other seat. Using data on U.S. Senate elections from 1946 to 2004, we find strong evidence that the outcomes of the elections for the two Senate seats are independent.

scholarly journals (A)Political Constituency Development Funds: Evidence from Pakistan

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Rabia Malik
Keyword(s):  
Strong Evidence ◽  
Regression Discontinuity ◽  
Distributive Politics ◽  
Regression Discontinuity Design ◽  
Development Fund ◽  
Partisan Bias ◽  
Development Patterns ◽  
Ruling Party

Most of the distributive politics literature focuses on how incumbent politicians allocate development resources in the absence of spending rules, and on the politicization of rules when they do determine distribution. What is less clear is whether politically neutral spending rules lead to neutral spending. Using new data on a long-running federal development fund and elections from Pakistan in a regression discontinuity design, the author presents strong evidence that the ruling party manipulated fund distribution to disproportionately benefit its co-partisans and punish the weakest opposition. Considering various factors, partisan bias is the most plausible explanation. These findings are important not only because the purpose of rules-based funds is to prevent politicized distribution but also because they have implications for development patterns and for using such funds to address questions about legislator effort and patronage patterns within constituencies, which requires assuming that legislators do receive their share of funds in the first place.

Personal or Partisan Incumbency Advantage? Evidence from an Electoral Reform at the Local Level in Italy

2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Alberto De Benedetto
Keyword(s):  
Regression Discontinuity ◽  
Local Level ◽  
Large Data ◽  
Electoral Reform ◽  
Regression Discontinuity Design ◽  
Incumbency Advantage ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Term Limit ◽  
Municipal Elections ◽  
Personal Effect

Abstract We analyze the incumbency advantage using a large data set on Italian municipal elections held from 1993 to 2011. We first apply a non-parametric Sharp Regression Discontinuity Design comparing parties that barely win an election to those that barely lose, exploiting the fact that partisan incumbency status changes discontinuously at the threshold of margin of victory of zero. In order to disentangle the personal incumbency advantage from the partisan effect, we rely on a reform that introduced mayoral term limit, and exploit the exogenous change on the incumbency status of mayors keeping the partisan incumbency status constant. We find that the incumbency advantage is essentially driven by the personal effect. The results are robust to different specifications and estimation strategies with excellent balance in observable characteristics. Also, the effect of interest is larger in magnitude for municipalities located in the South of Italy compared to northern municipalities.

scholarly journals The Effect of Electoral Systems on Voter Turnout: Evidence from a Natural Experiment

2015 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 689-710 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlos Sanz
Keyword(s):  
Population Size ◽  
Voter Turnout ◽  
Natural Experiment ◽  
Regression Discontinuity ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Institutional Framework ◽  
Local Elections ◽  
Regression Discontinuity Design ◽  
Percentage Points

I exploit the unique institutional framework of Spanish local elections, where municipalities follow different electoral systems depending on their population size, as mandated by a national law. Using a regression discontinuity design, I compare turnout under closed list proportional representation and under an open list, plurality-at-large system where voters can vote for individual candidates from the same or different party-lists. I find that the open list system increases turnout by between 1 and 2 percentage points. The results suggest that open list systems, which introduce competition both across and within parties, are conducive to more voter turnout.

Socialist Threat? Radical Party Entry, Electoral Alliances, and the Introduction of Proportional Representation

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
ANDRÉ WALTER
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Regression Discontinuity ◽  
Economic Reforms ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Institutional Setting ◽  
Regression Discontinuity Design ◽  
Coordination Problems ◽  
Substantial Body ◽  
Imperial Germany ◽  
Do So

A substantial body of research shows that the entry of socialist parties to the electoral arena is linked to major political and economic reforms at the beginning of the twentieth century. However, how socialist parties have affected electoral competition and coordination has never been investigated in detail. Drawing on the debate of the adoption of proportional representation, I employ a regression discontinuity design to estimate the casual effect of socialist entry to the electoral arena on the formation of electoral alliances and the support of established parties. To do so, I use newly collected data for Imperial Germany 1890–1912. I show that established parties facing strong socialist competitors received more endorsement by other non-socialist parties and, as a result, a higher voter share. The findings suggest that established parties were able to mitigate coordination problems within the institutional setting of majoritarian electoral systems.

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