Explaining Brexit: How the City of London came to be Regulated by the European Union

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Roland Vaubel

Abstract Qualified majority voting on financial market regulation was made possible by the European Court of Justice changing the meaning of the term “internal market” from “free movement of goods, services, persons and capital” to “conditions of competition which are not distorted”.

2020 ◽  
pp. 287-318
Author(s):  
Nigel Foster

This chapter examines European Union (EU) law concerning non-tariff barriers to free movement of goods. It describes member states’ attempts to influence imports and the way the European Commission and the European Court of Justice (CoJ) handled these issues. This chapter explains the provisions of the relevant legislation for non-tariff barriers, which include Articles 34, 36, and 35 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). It also analyses example cases including ‘Dassonville’, ‘Cassis de Dijon’, and post ‘Keck’ case law. It concludes with a consideration of the latest trend of cases concerning product use and residual rules.


Author(s):  
Mark Thatcher ◽  
Cornelia Woll

The chapter shows how European internal market regulation expanded and was transformed from a limited and often non-binding set of policies to an integrated and wide-ranging framework. Incremental but profound change was possible because critical junctures, in particular judgments by the European Court of Justice, allowed the European Commission and its allies to advance new policy proposals with new default positions. This affected the preferences of major member states, created new coalitions, and also led to the emergence of new actors. Feedback loops reinforced the orientation of previous agreements and created changes that most observers would have qualified as impossible three or four decades earlier.


2019 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 120-140
Author(s):  
Gisela Ernst

Abstract As a result of the constantly increasing number of innovative but exceedingly high priced medicines, many Member States have implemented price-regulating mechanisms to ensure the financial viability of their healthcare systems. However, the European Court of Justice applies strict criteria to these measures – some of them have already been suspended for the purposes of the free movement of goods. The European Union (EU) allowed the development of an ever-stricter case law on one hand, without changing the legal frame on the other hand. Considering the importance and the binding nature of the Court’s judgements, this leaves great uncertainty for national legislators about which measures to remedy the pricing problem are legally possible and which are not. In order to provide clarity, this article seeks to analyse the development of the case law and to define the legal scope for pharmaceutical pricing mechanisms in the EU.


Author(s):  
Nigel Foster

This chapter examines European Union (EU) law concerning non-tariff barriers to free movement of goods. It describes member states’ attempts to influence imports and the way the European Commission and the European Court of Justice (CoJ) handled these issues. This chapter explains the provisions of the relevant legislation for non-tariff barriers, which include Articles 34, 36, and 35 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). It also analyses example cases including ‘Dassonville’, ‘Cassis de Dijon’, and ‘Keck’.


2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (2-2019) ◽  
pp. 419-433
Author(s):  
Stefanie Vedder

National high courts in the European Union (EU) are constantly challenged: the European Court of Justice (ECJ) claims the authority to declare national standing interpretations invalid should it find them incompatible with its views on EU law. This principle noticeably impairs the formerly undisputed sovereignty of national high courts. In addition, preliminary references empower lower courts to question interpretations established by their national ‘superiors’. Assuming that courts want to protect their own interests, the article presumes that national high courts develop strategies to elude the breach of their standing interpretations. Building on principal-agent theory, the article proposes that national high courts can use the level of (im-) precision in the wording of the ECJ’s judgements to continue applying their own interpretations. The article develops theoretical strategies for national high courts in their struggle for authority.


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (5) ◽  
pp. 1073-1098 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mattias Derlén ◽  
Johan Lindholm

AbstractThe case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is one of the most important sources of European Union law. However, case law's role in EU law is not uniform. By empirically studying how the Court uses its own case law as a source of law, we explore the correlation between, on the one hand, the characteristics of a CJEU case—type of action, actors involved, and area of law—and, on the other hand, the judgment's “embeddedness” in previous case law and value as a precedent in subsequent cases. Using this approach, we test, confirm, and debunk existing scholarship concerning the role of CJEU case law as a source of EU law. We offer the following conclusions: that CJEU case law cannot be treated as a single entity; that only a limited number of factors reliably affect a judgment's persuasive or precedential power; that the Court's use of its own case law as a source of law is particularly limited in successful infringement proceedings; that case law is particularly important in preliminary references—especially those concerning fundamental freedoms and competition law; and that initiating Member State and the number of observations affects the behavior of the Court.


2020 ◽  
pp. 203228442097974
Author(s):  
Sibel Top ◽  
Paul De Hert

This article examines the changing balance established by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) between human rights filters to extradition and the obligation to cooperate and how this shift of rationale brought the Court closer to the position of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in that respect. The article argues that the ECtHR initially adopted a position whereby it prioritised human rights concerns over extraditions, but that it later nuanced that approach by establishing, in some cases, an obligation to cooperate to ensure proper respect of human rights. This refinement of its position brought the ECtHR closer to the approach adopted by the CJEU that traditionally put the obligation to cooperate above human rights concerns. In recent years, however, the CJEU also backtracked to some extent from its uncompromising attitude on the obligation to cooperate, which enabled a convergence of the rationales of the two Courts. Although this alignment of the Courts was necessary to mitigate the conflicting obligations of European Union Member States towards both Courts, this article warns against the danger of making too many human rights concessions to cooperation in criminal matters.


2004 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
pp. 1-34
Author(s):  
Anthony Arnull

The purpose of this article is to consider the effect of the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe on the European Court of Justice (ECJ). At the time of writing, the future of the draft Constitution is somewhat uncertain. Having been finalised by the Convention on the Future of Europe in the summer of 2003 and submitted to the then President of the European Council, it formed the basis for discussion at an intergovernmental conference (IGC) which opened in October 2003. Hopes that the text might be finalised by the end of the year were dashed when a meeting of the IGC in Brussels in December 2003 ended prematurely amid disagreement over the weighting of votes in the Council. However, it seems likely that a treaty equipping the European Union with a Constitution based on the Convention’s draft will in due course be adopted and that the provisions of the draft dealing with the ECJ will not be changed significantly. Even if either assumption proves misplaced, those provisions will remain of interest as reflecting one view of the position the ECJ might occupy in a constitutional order of the Union.


2002 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 727-754 ◽  
Author(s):  
SEAN KELSEY

By the winter of 1648–9, demands for retributive justice on Charles I and his supporters had built to a crescendo. But regicide was generally regarded as an extremely bad idea, and the king's trial was contrived as a final bid for peaceful settlement, not a prelude to king-killing. In return for a place at the heart of a new constitutional order, Charles I was required to abdicate his negative voice by pleading to charges brought on the sole authority of the House of Commons. This was a high-risk strategy inspired and justified by the weakening of opposition to the trial in the House of Lords, the city of London and at Edinburgh, and by some of the encouraging signals emanating from deep within the royalist camp itself. However, in their anxiety to avoid having their ultimate sanction forced upon them, the commissioners of the high court of justice gave the king rather more opportunities to plead to the charges against him than was consistent with the maintenance of their own authority. Rather than persuading him to give in, they encouraged him to stand firm, with fatal consequences. Far from being a providential act of vengeance, or indeed the inexorable fate of a man predestined to martyrdom, the execution of Charles I was a highly adventitious occurrence – predictable, perhaps, yet contingent on a wide range of unpredictable circumstances.


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