scholarly journals In an Imperfect World Policy Rules Cannot be Perfect Either

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Gert G. Wagner
Keyword(s):  
Choice Theory ◽  
Public Choice Theory ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Standard Assumption ◽  
Government Regulations ◽  
Policy Rules ◽  
Electoral Success ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Simple Rules ◽  
Model World

Abstract It is striking that economists in particular firmly believe in the benefits of rule-binding, even though this belief runs counter to the standard assumption of economic theory that we humans are self-interested and therefore extremely resourceful when it comes to circumventing inconvenient government regulations, e.g. taxes. In Public Choice Theory, politicians are even assumed to have nothing but self-interest as their guiding motive for action. Why then, in this world of thought, should ultra-self-interested politicians of all people adhere to simple rules such as the debt brake instead of bypass them, if – as is also assumed in this model world all that matters to them is short-term electoral success, for which government debt can be helpful.

scholarly journals Looking Deeper at the Reform of New Zealand's Roading System: Driven by Economic Rationalism or an Example of Public Choice Theory in Action

2000 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 781
Author(s):  
Matthew J Coull
Keyword(s):  
Public Choice ◽  
Road Network ◽  
Institutional Design ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Law And Economics ◽  
Efficiency Gains ◽  
Public Choice Theory ◽  
Public Road ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Operational Management

Successive New Zealand governments have investigated reforming New Zealand's road network since 1994. The draft Roads Bill 1998 creates a system of road provision operated according to commercial principles. Roads remain publicly owned, but operational management passes from Transit and 74 territorial authorities to newly incorporated "public road companies". The reforms are examined from "a law and economics" perspective, which finds that while efficiency gains may be generated, the proposed institutional design may prevent these gains from being realised to the proposed extent. The reform proposal is then analysed using public choice theory. This analysis finds that while some elements of the proposal are consistent with legislator and bureaucrat self interest, it contains too many politically sensitive variables to displace the Government's stated "efficiency gains" premise as the overriding motivation for reform.  

scholarly journals Implementing Public Policies with User Fees that Align with Partisan Ideology: A Canadian Example

2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-27
Author(s):  
Connie Hache
Keyword(s):  
Federal Government ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
User Fees ◽  
Criminal Record ◽  
Public Choice Theory ◽  
Political Activities ◽  
Pressure Groups ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Group Members

The Canadian federal government not only provides public services such as infrastructure, healthcare and education that benefit all citizens, but government also provides services on an individual basis to citizens. Through a case study, this paper explores how government makes decisions that support its political party’s ideology in deciding whether or not to implement user fees for services that benefit individuals. Using public choice theory, we discuss three actors with each actor striving to maximize their utility: elected officials by obtaining enough votes to form government; citizen-voters by obtaining more benefits than what they finance through general taxation; and pressure groups by spending resources on political activities to secure the group members’ preferences. We then apply these three actors to a case study: the decision to increase user fees for criminal record suspensions. The case study brings forth an example of government not acquiescing to the majority of citizen-voters’ and pressure groups’ demands if these demands do not align with government’s self-interest such as furthering their ideological stance.

scholarly journals Politics of Active Representation: The Trade-off Between Organizational Role and Active Representation

2018 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 132-154 ◽  
Author(s):  
Changgeun Yun
Keyword(s):  
Social Group ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Organizational Socialization ◽  
Interrole Conflict ◽  
Public Choice Theory ◽  
Optimal Point ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Organizational Role ◽  
Active Representation ◽  
Self Interest

The translation of passive into active representation assumes that bureaucrats are willing to serve the interest of their social group when developing and implementing policies. However, the assumption does not account for organizational socialization—the process of being taught what is important in an organization. In addition, there is a comparative paucity of theoretical and conceptual frameworks to explain why and how bureaucrats decide to become active representatives. In this study, I develop a framework for analyzing the decision to engage in active representation. The framework recognizes that active representation conflicts with organizational role and is based on the assumption of public choice theory that humans are utility maximizers. Bureaucrats are not totally devoted to active representation, but instead find an optimal point at which their self-interest is maximized in interrole conflict.

Fonctions de vote et prévisions électorales, une application à la présidentielle française de 2007

2010 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 163-186 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruno Jérôme ◽  
Véronique Jérôme-Speziari
Keyword(s):  
Public Choice ◽  
Political Science ◽  
Presidential Election ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Public Policies ◽  
National Level ◽  
Revealed Preferences ◽  
Public Choice Theory ◽  
Electoral Success ◽  
Politiques Publiques

Résumé. Prévoir le vote en tant que révélation des préférences des citoyens dans les choix collectifs permet d'évaluer les chances de succès des sortants ou de l'opposition et d'anticiper les politiques publiques futures. Dans cet article, nous donnons une prévision de l'élection présidentielle de 2007 en France à partir d'une fonction de vote mobilisant les apports de la théorie des choix publics et de la science politique des comportements électoraux. Les prévisions générées au niveau territorial sont plus pertinentes pour le second tour que pour le premier tour. Nous offrons quelques éléments d'explication et des pistes d'amélioration pour 2012.Abstract. Forecasting votes understood as citizens revealed preferences in collective choices allow to evaluate electoral success opportunities both for incumbents and opposition and to anticipate future public policies. In this paper, we provide forecasts for the 2007 French presidential election gathering contributions from Public Choice theory and Political science dealing with electoral behaviors. Forecasts generated at a sub-national level exhibit more accuracy at the second round than at the first one. We propose some explanation and improvements for 2012.

scholarly journals Prosociality in Majority Decisions: A Laboratory Experiment on the Robustness of the Uncovered Set

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Jan Sauermann
Keyword(s):  
Majority Rule ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Behavioral Model ◽  
Uncovered Set ◽  
Multiple Dimensions ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Empirical Perspective ◽  
Committee Decision Making ◽  
Policy Shifts

Abstract Social choice theory demonstrates that majority rule is generically indeterminate. However, from an empirical perspective, large and arbitrary policy shifts are rare events in politics. The uncovered set (UCS) is the dominant preference-based explanation for the apparent empirical predictability of majority rule in multiple dimensions. Its underlying logic assumes that voters act strategically, considering the ultimate consequences of their actions. I argue that all empirical applications of the UCS rest on an incomplete behavioral model assuming purely egoistically motivated individuals. Beyond material self-interest, prosocial motivations offer an additional factor to explain the outcomes of majority rule. I test my claim in a series of committee decision-making experiments in which I systematically vary the fairness properties of the policy space while keeping the location of the UCS constant. The experimental results overwhelmingly support the prosociality explanation.

Collective Decision-making: FIFA from the Perspective of Public Choice

2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Florian Follert ◽  
Lukas Richau ◽  
Eike Emrich ◽  
Christian Pierdzioch
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Public Choice ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Collective Decision ◽  
Public Confidence ◽  
Collective Decision Making ◽  
Public Choice Theory ◽  
World Cup ◽  
The World ◽  
Selection Of

AbstractVarious scandals have shaken public confidence in football's global governing body, Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA). It is evident that decision-making within such a collective provides incentives for corruption. We apply the Buchanan-Tullock model that is known from Public Choice theory to study collective decision-making within FIFA. On the basis of this theoretical model, we develop specific proposals that can contribute to combating corruption. Three core aspects are discussed: the selection of the World Cup host, transparency in the allocation of budgets, and clear guidelines for FIFA officials and bodies with regard to their rights and accountability. Our insights can contribute to a better understanding of collective decision making in heterogenous groups.

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