EWU-Krisenmanagement: Warum die Politik auf dem richtigen Weg ist

2012 ◽  
Vol 63 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Werner Becker ◽  
Horst Löchel

SummaryWith troubles in the European Monetary Union (EMU) showing great persistence, the emergency measures and ad-hoc crisis management of European authorities has been subject to harsh criticism. The current fierce debate among economists and the broad public has given rise to two camps advocating fundamentally different approaches how to exit the sustained crisis. While according to the Integrationists′ view, the only viable way to get rid of pressing debt problems and to restore confidence in the Euro area lies in a common guarantee for national debt obligations, so-called Minimalists advocate a strict return to the cornerstones of the Maastricht Treaty, in particular strict compliance with the debt and deficit limits laid out by the Treaty as well as a credible application of the ‚no-bail-out‘ rule. However, in their pure form, both strategies do not serve for a timely and effective crisis management as they either require a level of supranational integration that - given the still prevalent Westphalian order - cannot be attained in the short run nor is it on the agenda of European policy, or essentially deny the significant flaws within the EMU architecture that failed to prevent current fiscal woes.The current crisis management of European authorities has followed neither of the two extremes but has taken a viable middle-of-the-road approach that resulted in useful and necessary repairs to the institutional architecture of the Euro area, most notably the establishment of the commonly guaranteed stability mechanisms EFSF and ESM as well as the first steps taken towards a European banking union. Hence, in contrast to most observers, we argue that the European authorities, by operating a prudent stepby- step approach, are on the right track towards solving the current crisis. As a result, European Central Bank could move back to its original approach of monetary policy.

Author(s):  
Agnieszka Smoleńska

AbstractCross-border banking presents a unique set of challenges in the EU from the perspective of arranging administrative oversight structures. Structuring cooperation between different EU and national authorities in a way which is conducive to trust-building and mutual engagement is an essential condition for overcoming disintegrative tendencies in the internal market. To assess how the existing EU arrangements fare in this regard in the context of EU resolution law, this article comparatively analyses the different models of multilevel administrative cooperation in the post-crisis EU framework. These are specifically the centralised model of the European Banking Union (Single Resolution Mechanism) and the relatively looser networked model of the resolution colleges. The multilevel cooperation under both models is nuanced given the distinct roles of the national resolution authorities, EU agencies and the differentiated status of non-euro area Member States in the EBU (Croatia, Bulgaria). The article’s findings allow to identify specific problems of constitutional nature pertaining to the accountability of administrative cooperation, equality of Member States and the implications of Meroni doctrine’s distortive effects.


Subject Euro-area governance. Significance In the EU, macroeconomic governance reform is focusing around the creation of a euro-area budget and a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) -- the final pillar for the completion of the European Banking Union (EBU) which would provide stronger insurance coverage for member states. However, northern countries are reluctant to pay for crisis-prone ones in the south, so compromise on detail could take years while the initiatives will have limited scope in responding to crises. Impacts The ECB’s Single Supervisory Mechanism will continue to focus on ‘risk reduction’ measures, including the disposal of non-performing loans. The EU is unlikely to give Italian budget concessions perceived as acceptable by Rome, possibly hardening the position of Italy’s populists. If Manfred Weber’s candidacy to become European Commission president fails, Berlin will likely insist that it gets the ECB president post. The rise of migration flows in the Mediterranean and the lack of EU resolution on burden-sharing will worsen north-south relations.


2020 ◽  
pp. 151
Author(s):  
Pery Bazoti

The European Banking Union embarked as a highly ambitious project of the European Union as a response to the signifi cant fl aws and weaknesses in the original architecture of the European Monetary Union that became apparent during the economic crisis. However, the establishment of a single European banking system has stumbled upon the creation of a common deposit insurance scheme that could safeguard depositors and create a more stable fi nancial framework in the euro area. The European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) was fi rstly introduced by the European Commission in 2015. As a bold proposal that comprises wide risk mutualization among the euro area member states, it has spurred a vivid discussion in the European public speech and many proposals have been made since then altering its original planning in an effort to tackle the moral hazard concerns that have risen. The present article, after discussing the reasons that keep obstructing EDIS, presents these suggestions that move around, primarily, the role of the national deposit guarantee schemes. However, as highlighted in the article, before moving to any alterations on the structure and role of a proposed common deposit insurance scheme, signifi cant risk minimization on behalf of the national banking systems, must precede by limiting the sovereign exposures of banks and the size of the Non-Performing Loans. Such steps of risk minimization are critical for addressing concerns and the political unwillingness demonstrated by several European countries in moving forward towards deeper integration.


Author(s):  
Kleftouri Nikoletta

Having a multiplicity of financial regulators, supervisors, and resolution authorities in Europe can weaken supervision, heighten legal uncertainty, and impede effective resolution. European officials recently agreed that further steps are needed to tackle the specific risks in particular within the euro area, where pooled monetary responsibilities had increased the possibility of cross-border spillover effects in the event of bank crises. As a result, they created a union aimed to centralize bank supervision, deposit insurance, and bank resolution. This chapter sets out two components of the European banking union: single supervision, and single deposit insurance. Single resolution is separately discussed in Chapter 8, where international and European bank resolution frameworks are examined. The chapter concludes that deeper reforms are needed, in conjunction with effective cooperation arrangements.


Author(s):  
Rachel A. Epstein

If post-communist countries realized marketized bank–state ties through transition and international pressure to privatize their banks with foreign capital, western Eurozone states have more recently come under pressure to follow suit. European Banking Union centralized bank supervision and introduced a single resolution board at the expense of national authority. Thus under banking union, national regulatory and supervisory forbearance was curbed; barriers to banking market entry were no longer the purview of national authorities; disproportionate bank lending to one’s own sovereign would be discouraged; and bank bondholders, creditors and depositors—i.e. market actors—paid the price for bank failures first, before governments and taxpayers. While European Banking Union put the euro on stronger foundations, it also curbed national economic policy discretion and limited tools for adjustment. Taking Italy, Portugal, Spain and Germany as examples, this chapter explains why and in what policy areas Eurozone states’ sovereignty clashed with banking union.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document