Safeguarding the Stability of the Greek Banking System Amidst the Fiscal Crisis in the Euro Area: Arrangements Before and After the Establishment of the European Banking Union

2017 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 479-502 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christos V. Gortsos
Keyword(s):  
Euro Area ◽  
Banking System ◽  
Fiscal Crisis ◽  
Banking Union ◽  
European Banking Union ◽  
Before And After ◽  
European Banking ◽  
The Stability

Justice system and corruption dog Bulgaria’s euro bid

2019 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Banking System ◽  
Political Support ◽  
Banking Union ◽  
Waiting Room ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
European Banking Union ◽  
Finance Minister ◽  
European Banking ◽  
The Stability

Significance Bulgaria must also join the European Banking Union (EBU) as part of its Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) II bid, in order to alleviate concerns over institutional governance, economic convergence and the stability of its banking system. ERM II accession -- the ‘waiting room to the euro’ -- would bolster Bulgaria’s financial and monetary stability, and help serve as a policy anchor; Bulgaria had hoped to join this month, but Finance Minister Vladislav Goranov said in June he now hoped for entry by year-end if not before. Impacts Timing will depend on Bulgaria’s meeting the new requirement to join both ERM II and the EBU at the same time. Political support from other euro-area states could also affect the ultimate timeline. That Croatia has just applied for ERM II shows adopting the euro is still a goal, particularly for smaller EU member states.

scholarly journals The missing European Deposit Insurance Scheme

2020 ◽  
pp. 151
Author(s):  
Pery Bazoti
Keyword(s):  
Euro Area ◽  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
Banking System ◽  
Banking Union ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Risk Minimization ◽  
Insurance Scheme ◽  
European Banking Union ◽  
European Banking

The European Banking Union embarked as a highly ambitious project of the European Union as a response to the signifi cant fl aws and weaknesses in the original architecture of the European Monetary Union that became apparent during the economic crisis. However, the establishment of a single European banking system has stumbled upon the creation of a common deposit insurance scheme that could safeguard depositors and create a more stable fi nancial framework in the euro area. The European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) was fi rstly introduced by the European Commission in 2015. As a bold proposal that comprises wide risk mutualization among the euro area member states, it has spurred a vivid discussion in the European public speech and many proposals have been made since then altering its original planning in an effort to tackle the moral hazard concerns that have risen. The present article, after discussing the reasons that keep obstructing EDIS, presents these suggestions that move around, primarily, the role of the national deposit guarantee schemes. However, as highlighted in the article, before moving to any alterations on the structure and role of a proposed common deposit insurance scheme, signifi cant risk minimization on behalf of the national banking systems, must precede by limiting the sovereign exposures of banks and the size of the Non-Performing Loans. Such steps of risk minimization are critical for addressing concerns and the political unwillingness demonstrated by several European countries in moving forward towards deeper integration.

scholarly journals Multilevel cooperation in the EU resolution of cross-border bank groups: lessons from the non-euro area Member States joining the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM)

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Agnieszka Smoleńska
Keyword(s):  
Euro Area ◽  
Banking Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Essential Condition ◽  
European Banking Union ◽  
Cross Border ◽  
Single Resolution Mechanism ◽  
European Banking ◽  
Administrative Oversight ◽  
The Eu

AbstractCross-border banking presents a unique set of challenges in the EU from the perspective of arranging administrative oversight structures. Structuring cooperation between different EU and national authorities in a way which is conducive to trust-building and mutual engagement is an essential condition for overcoming disintegrative tendencies in the internal market. To assess how the existing EU arrangements fare in this regard in the context of EU resolution law, this article comparatively analyses the different models of multilevel administrative cooperation in the post-crisis EU framework. These are specifically the centralised model of the European Banking Union (Single Resolution Mechanism) and the relatively looser networked model of the resolution colleges. The multilevel cooperation under both models is nuanced given the distinct roles of the national resolution authorities, EU agencies and the differentiated status of non-euro area Member States in the EBU (Croatia, Bulgaria). The article’s findings allow to identify specific problems of constitutional nature pertaining to the accountability of administrative cooperation, equality of Member States and the implications of Meroni doctrine’s distortive effects.

EWU-Krisenmanagement: Warum die Politik auf dem richtigen Weg ist

2012 ◽  
Vol 63 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Werner Becker ◽  
Horst Löchel
Keyword(s):  
Crisis Management ◽  
Euro Area ◽  
Ad Hoc ◽  
Banking Union ◽  
Current Crisis ◽  
European Banking Union ◽  
Short Run ◽  
European Banking ◽  
Great Persistence ◽  
The Right

SummaryWith troubles in the European Monetary Union (EMU) showing great persistence, the emergency measures and ad-hoc crisis management of European authorities has been subject to harsh criticism. The current fierce debate among economists and the broad public has given rise to two camps advocating fundamentally different approaches how to exit the sustained crisis. While according to the Integrationists′ view, the only viable way to get rid of pressing debt problems and to restore confidence in the Euro area lies in a common guarantee for national debt obligations, so-called Minimalists advocate a strict return to the cornerstones of the Maastricht Treaty, in particular strict compliance with the debt and deficit limits laid out by the Treaty as well as a credible application of the ‚no-bail-out‘ rule. However, in their pure form, both strategies do not serve for a timely and effective crisis management as they either require a level of supranational integration that - given the still prevalent Westphalian order - cannot be attained in the short run nor is it on the agenda of European policy, or essentially deny the significant flaws within the EMU architecture that failed to prevent current fiscal woes.The current crisis management of European authorities has followed neither of the two extremes but has taken a viable middle-of-the-road approach that resulted in useful and necessary repairs to the institutional architecture of the Euro area, most notably the establishment of the commonly guaranteed stability mechanisms EFSF and ESM as well as the first steps taken towards a European banking union. Hence, in contrast to most observers, we argue that the European authorities, by operating a prudent stepby- step approach, are on the right track towards solving the current crisis. As a result, European Central Bank could move back to its original approach of monetary policy.

The opportunity for euro-area reform is closing

2019 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Euro Area ◽  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
Insurance Coverage ◽  
Burden Sharing ◽  
Banking Union ◽  
Governance Reform ◽  
Content Type ◽  
European Banking Union ◽  
European Banking ◽  
The Eu

Subject Euro-area governance. Significance In the EU, macroeconomic governance reform is focusing around the creation of a euro-area budget and a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) -- the final pillar for the completion of the European Banking Union (EBU) which would provide stronger insurance coverage for member states. However, northern countries are reluctant to pay for crisis-prone ones in the south, so compromise on detail could take years while the initiatives will have limited scope in responding to crises. Impacts The ECB’s Single Supervisory Mechanism will continue to focus on ‘risk reduction’ measures, including the disposal of non-performing loans. The EU is unlikely to give Italian budget concessions perceived as acceptable by Rome, possibly hardening the position of Italy’s populists. If Manfred Weber’s candidacy to become European Commission president fails, Berlin will likely insist that it gets the ECB president post. The rise of migration flows in the Mediterranean and the lack of EU resolution on burden-sharing will worsen north-south relations.

scholarly journals The impact of the European Banking Union’s Single Supervisory Mechanism on corporate governance practices in European banks

2018 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 164-177 ◽  
Author(s):  
Udo Braendle
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Banking System ◽  
Banking Union ◽  
Single Supervisory Mechanism ◽  
European Banking Union ◽  
Regulatory Changes ◽  
Governance Practices ◽  
European Banking ◽  
European Banks ◽  
The Impact

Weak corporate governance in financial institutions has been a contributing factor of the financial crisis. The topic has, therefore, become the key priorities of banking supervision, because one of the takeaways was that. The article gives an overview about the newly established European Banking Union and about its structure focusing on the first pillar, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). In a second step, the focus is laid on the recent regulatory changes regarding corporate governance, the related supervisory practice and implications for European banks. Overall, the conducted changes in the regulatory framework, especially regarding corporate governance, seem to meet the objective of ensuring safety and soundness of the European banking system. Room for improvement is found regarding proportionality and transparency of the supervisory practices as well as its influence on banks’ profitability.

4 European Banking Union

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kleftouri Nikoletta
Keyword(s):  
Euro Area ◽  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
Spillover Effects ◽  
Banking Union ◽  
Bank Supervision ◽  
European Banking Union ◽  
Cross Border ◽  
European Bank ◽  
Bank Resolution ◽  
European Banking

Having a multiplicity of financial regulators, supervisors, and resolution authorities in Europe can weaken supervision, heighten legal uncertainty, and impede effective resolution. European officials recently agreed that further steps are needed to tackle the specific risks in particular within the euro area, where pooled monetary responsibilities had increased the possibility of cross-border spillover effects in the event of bank crises. As a result, they created a union aimed to centralize bank supervision, deposit insurance, and bank resolution. This chapter sets out two components of the European banking union: single supervision, and single deposit insurance. Single resolution is separately discussed in Chapter 8, where international and European bank resolution frameworks are examined. The chapter concludes that deeper reforms are needed, in conjunction with effective cooperation arrangements.

scholarly journals The Economic Crisis of 2008 and the Financial System Supervision: Towards an European Banking Union

2018 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 45-56
Author(s):  
Evaggelia Kolovou ◽  
Grigorios Gikas ◽  
Kostantinos Kyritsis
Keyword(s):  
Banking System ◽  
Capital Requirements ◽  
Regulatory Framework ◽  
Banking Union ◽  
International Banking ◽  
Risk Capital ◽  
Prudential Supervision ◽  
European Banking Union ◽  
European Banking ◽  
The Impact

The significant repercussions of the recent crisis in the financial sector and the real economy have led to the development of policies aimed at strengthening the stability of the international banking system. Banking regulatory reforms (Basel III) improve micro-prudential supervision and involve macro-prudential supervision to avoid systemic risk. Capital requirements are tightening up and the quality of core capital is upgraded in order to provide greater coverage of losses and better risk management. In addition, a new framework for liquidity risk is introduced, as well as a complementary tool for limiting leverage. Recently, an agreement was reached in the EU to establish a Banking Union in the Eurozone, based on uniform regulation, supervision, bank clearing and deposit protection mechanisms. This framework includes a common banking capital for bank consolidation, which aims to reduce the impact on savers. This study aims to analyse the banking sector's activities and the constituent elements of the existing regulatory framework, particularly those involved in the causes of the financial crisis. It also aims to present the dimensions of the new regulatory framework for joint supervision leading to the European Banking Union and to analyse the pillars that form it, even though they are still in progress. The analysis will also build on the experiences from the recent crisis, in order to reach clear conclusions about the necessity and role of the Banking Union.

Discretionary Accruals in Italian Private Firms and Non-Linear Bank Loan Granting

2017 ◽  
pp. 83-99
Author(s):  
Elisabetta Mafrolla ◽  
Viola Nobili
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Banking System ◽  
Regulatory System ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Bank Loans ◽  
Bank Loan ◽  
Banking Union ◽  
Private Firms ◽  
European Banking Union

This paper investigates whether and at what extent private firms reduce the quality of their accruals in order to signal a better portrait to the bank and obtain new or larger bank loans. We measure earnings discretionary accruals of a sample of Italian private firms, testing whether new and larger bank loans are associated with a higher (lower) quality of earnings in borrowers' financial reporting. We study bank loan levels and changes and how they impact discretionary accruals and found that, surprisingly, private firms' discretionary accruals are systematically positively affected by an increase in bank loans, although they are negatively affected by the credit worthiness rating assigned to the borrowers. We find that the monitoring role of the banking system with regard to the adoption of discretionary accruals is effective only when the loan is very large. This paper may have implications for policy-makers as it contributes to the understanding of the shortcomings of the banking regulatory system. This is an extremely relevant issue since the excessive amount of non-performing loans held by Italian banks recently threatened the stability of the European Banking Union as a whole.

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