scholarly journals The Position of Customary International Law in the Polish Legal System in the Light of Article 9 of the Constitution of 1997

2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 244-248
Author(s):  
Krzysztof Wójtowicz
2008 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 129-148 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Lefkowitz

As traditionally conceived, the creation of a new rule of customary international law requires that states believe the law to already require the conduct specified in the rule. Distinguishing the process whereby a customary rule comes to exist from the process whereby that customary rule becomes law dissolves this chronological paradox. Creation of a customary rule requires only that states come to believe that there exists a normative standard to which they ought to adhere, not that this standard is law. What makes the customary rule law is adherence by officials in the international legal system to a rule of recognition that treats custom as a source of valid law. Confusion over this distinction arises because in the international legal system the same agents whose beliefs give rise to a customary rule are the legal officials whose adherence to the rule of recognition leads them to deem that rule legally valid. The proposed solution to the chronological paradox employs H.L.A. Hart’s analysis of the concepts of law and a legal system, and in particular, the idea of a rule of recognition. Yet Hart famously denies the existence of a rule of recognition for international law. Hart’s denial rests on a failure to distinguish between the ontological and authoritative resolution functions of a rule of recognition, however. Once such a distinction is drawn, it can be argued that customary international law rests on a rule of recognition that serves the ontological function of making customary norms legal, though not the authoritative resolution function of settling disputes over the alleged legality of particular norms.


2017 ◽  
Vol 50 (3) ◽  
pp. 299-330 ◽  
Author(s):  
Omri Sender ◽  
Michael Wood

Offering a current reflection on Raphael Walden's 1977 article, ‘The Subjective Element in the Formation of Customary International Law’, this contribution seeks to illustrate that considerable clarity has been achieved over the decades with regard to several long-standing questions associated with customary international law, not least those surroundingopinio juris. Accumulated practice and constructive scholarship have supplied insights into, and indeed answers to several of the controversies that have bedevilled the theory of this central source of international law. While it may inherently defy exact formulations, and some theoretical questions remain, customary international law is thus today not only as present in the international legal system as it has always been but is also better understood.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-46
Author(s):  
Victor Kattan

Abstract This article explores the meaning of the Jerusalem clause in Article 9(2) of the Israel–Jordan Peace Treaty. It begins by considering the drafting of the clause, before analysing subsequent agreements between Israel, Palestine, and Jordan. The article then turns to history to explore the origins of Jordan’s special role, which amounted to a particular rule of customary international law, from 1967, when Israel recognised that special role after it occupied East Jerusalem, until 1994, when it was codified in the Peace Treaty. The article concludes by explaining that Jordan’s special role is comprised of its custodianship of the Muslim holy shrines in Jerusalem, with its attendant duties of maintaining, protecting, and regulating access to the shrines and that Israel is obligated to give due regard to Jordan’s primary role in the exercise of these duties within the spaces of these shrines.


Author(s):  
Bradley Curtis A

This chapter considers the status in the U.S. legal system of customary international law, which was historically referred to as part of the “law of nations.” After considering what the text of the Constitution suggests about this issue, the chapter discusses how courts historically applied customary international law in cases in which it was relevant and how courts referred to it (in cases such as The Paquete Habana) as “part of our law.” The chapter also recounts the modern debates and uncertainties about the current domestic legal status of customary international law. In particular, the chapter explores the possibility that customary international law might have the status of post-Erie “federal common law” and what such a status might mean for questions of jurisdiction, preemption of state law, and limitations on congressional and executive authority. It also discusses various ways in which customary international law can be important in the U.S. legal system even if it is not applied directly by the courts, such as through the Charming Betsy canon of construction. The chapter concludes by discussing controversies concerning the Supreme Court’s consideration of foreign and international law materials when interpreting the U.S. Constitution.


Author(s):  
Martin S. Flaherty

Foreign relations under the US Constitution starts with the paradox, also seen in domestic matters, of relatively scant text providing guidance for the exercise of vast power. Founding understandings, structural inference, and ongoing constitutional custom and precedent have filled in much, though hardly all, of the framework over the course of two hundred years. As a result, two basic questions frame the relationship between the Constitution and US foreign policy: (1) which parts of the US government, alone or in combination, properly exercise authority in the making of foreign policy; and (2) once made, what is the status of the nation’s international legal obligations in the US domestic legal system. The making of American foreign policy is framed by the Constitution’s commitment to separation of powers. Congress, the president, and the courts are all allocated discrete yet significant foreign affairs authority. Determining the exact borders and overlaps in areas such as the use of military force, emergency measures, and treaty termination continues to generate controversy. The status of international law in the US legal system in the first instance turns on whether resulting obligations derive from agreements or custom. The United States enters into international agreements in three ways: treaties, congressional-executive agreements, and sole executive agreements. Complex doctrine deals with the domestic applicability of treaties in particular. US courts primarily apply customary international law in two basic ways. They can exercise a version of their common lawmaking authority to fashion rules of decision based on international custom. They also apply customary international law when incorporated into domestic law by statute.


2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 307-324
Author(s):  
Michael Wood

Abstract This article looks beyond customary international law and asks whether the source of international law listed in Article 38, paragraph 1(c) of the ICJ Statute (‘the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations’) might join the dance. Is there a risk that general principles of law may be too easily invoked where no applicable treaty or rule of customary international law can be identified? In emphasizing the distinction between customary international law and general principles of law, the article first recalls relevant recent work of the International Law Commission. It then addresses the term ‘general international law’ and certain problems related to it, and raises questions concerning the relationship between customary international law and general principles of law. Before drawing some conclusions, reference is also made to the place of general principles of law within the international legal system.


Laws ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 18
Author(s):  
Nehaluddin Ahmad

Under Article 9 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a receiving state may “at any time and without having to explain its decision” declare any member of a diplomatic staff persona non grata. A person so declared is considered unacceptable and is usually recalled to his or her home nation. If not recalled, the receiving state “may refuse to recognize the person concerned as a member of the mission.” However, despite the codification of the above rules, which is largely based on pre-existing customary international law, the opportunity for diplomatic protection is not free of issues and controversies. In recent times, unfortunately, there has been a growing tendency amongst diplomats to abuse their diplomatic status, in order to commit acts prohibited by law and claim immunity from the legal process. This paper addresses the problem of abuse of immunities and privileges and its adverse implications on the balance between immunities and the duty to respect the local laws and regulations. We analyze several past cases of declaration of persona non grata involving various countries.


2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-45
Author(s):  
Daniel H. JOYNER

AbstractThere has been a recent proliferation of scholarship on the development, identification, and determination of customary international law [CIL]. Much of this has focused on explication of the theoretical and practical problems inherent in the modern use of CIL as a source of international law. However, there are influential voices who argue that CIL nevertheless continues to play a necessary role in the international legal system, and that many of the problems that have been identified are exaggerated. This paper maintains that the problems which have been identified in the processes of identification and determination of CIL are of such a serious and institutionalized nature as to produce a presumptive distrust of any statement about what is or is not CIL. It argues that the process of identifying and authoritatively determining CIL must evolve to more objectively evidence the positive assent of states to the making of customary rules.


Author(s):  
Bradley Curtis A

This chapter considers the status in the U.S. legal system of customary international law. After considering what the text of the Constitution suggests about this issue, the chapter discusses how courts historically applied customary international law in cases in which it was relevant and how courts referred to it as “part of our law.” The chapter also explores the possibility that customary international law might have the status of modern “federal common law” and what such a status might mean for questions of jurisdiction, preemption of state law, and limitations on congressional and executive authority. It also discusses ways in which customary international law can be applied indirectly in the U.S. legal system, such as through application of the Charming Betsy canon of construction. The chapter concludes by discussing recent debates over the Supreme Court’s consideration of foreign and international law materials when interpreting the U.S. Constitution.


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