The status of customary international law under the Nigerian legal system

2019 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 115-156
Author(s):  
Muyiwa Adigun
Author(s):  
Bradley Curtis A

This chapter considers the status in the U.S. legal system of customary international law, which was historically referred to as part of the “law of nations.” After considering what the text of the Constitution suggests about this issue, the chapter discusses how courts historically applied customary international law in cases in which it was relevant and how courts referred to it (in cases such as The Paquete Habana) as “part of our law.” The chapter also recounts the modern debates and uncertainties about the current domestic legal status of customary international law. In particular, the chapter explores the possibility that customary international law might have the status of post-Erie “federal common law” and what such a status might mean for questions of jurisdiction, preemption of state law, and limitations on congressional and executive authority. It also discusses various ways in which customary international law can be important in the U.S. legal system even if it is not applied directly by the courts, such as through the Charming Betsy canon of construction. The chapter concludes by discussing controversies concerning the Supreme Court’s consideration of foreign and international law materials when interpreting the U.S. Constitution.


Author(s):  
Martin S. Flaherty

Foreign relations under the US Constitution starts with the paradox, also seen in domestic matters, of relatively scant text providing guidance for the exercise of vast power. Founding understandings, structural inference, and ongoing constitutional custom and precedent have filled in much, though hardly all, of the framework over the course of two hundred years. As a result, two basic questions frame the relationship between the Constitution and US foreign policy: (1) which parts of the US government, alone or in combination, properly exercise authority in the making of foreign policy; and (2) once made, what is the status of the nation’s international legal obligations in the US domestic legal system. The making of American foreign policy is framed by the Constitution’s commitment to separation of powers. Congress, the president, and the courts are all allocated discrete yet significant foreign affairs authority. Determining the exact borders and overlaps in areas such as the use of military force, emergency measures, and treaty termination continues to generate controversy. The status of international law in the US legal system in the first instance turns on whether resulting obligations derive from agreements or custom. The United States enters into international agreements in three ways: treaties, congressional-executive agreements, and sole executive agreements. Complex doctrine deals with the domestic applicability of treaties in particular. US courts primarily apply customary international law in two basic ways. They can exercise a version of their common lawmaking authority to fashion rules of decision based on international custom. They also apply customary international law when incorporated into domestic law by statute.


Author(s):  
Bradley Curtis A

This chapter considers the status in the U.S. legal system of customary international law. After considering what the text of the Constitution suggests about this issue, the chapter discusses how courts historically applied customary international law in cases in which it was relevant and how courts referred to it as “part of our law.” The chapter also explores the possibility that customary international law might have the status of modern “federal common law” and what such a status might mean for questions of jurisdiction, preemption of state law, and limitations on congressional and executive authority. It also discusses ways in which customary international law can be applied indirectly in the U.S. legal system, such as through application of the Charming Betsy canon of construction. The chapter concludes by discussing recent debates over the Supreme Court’s consideration of foreign and international law materials when interpreting the U.S. Constitution.


2012 ◽  
Vol 106 (3) ◽  
pp. 531-546 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlos M. Vázquez

Much of the recent debate about the status of customary international law in the U.S. legal system has revolved around the alien tort provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789, currently section 1350 of Title 28. In Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, the decision that launched modern human rights litigation in the United States, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit relied on the view that customary international law has the status of federal common law in upholding section 1350’s grant of federal jurisdiction over a suit between aliens. The court’s position that customary international law was federal law was the prevailing view at the time—a view that has subsequently been dubbed the “modern position.” It was the view set forth in the black letter of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law. Filártiga triggered a revisionist challenge to the modern position, with revisionists arguing that customary international law has the status of federal law only if given that status through statute or treaty, or perhaps through sole executive action; in the absence of such incorporation, customary international law has, at best, the status of State law in our legal system.


2008 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 129-148 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Lefkowitz

As traditionally conceived, the creation of a new rule of customary international law requires that states believe the law to already require the conduct specified in the rule. Distinguishing the process whereby a customary rule comes to exist from the process whereby that customary rule becomes law dissolves this chronological paradox. Creation of a customary rule requires only that states come to believe that there exists a normative standard to which they ought to adhere, not that this standard is law. What makes the customary rule law is adherence by officials in the international legal system to a rule of recognition that treats custom as a source of valid law. Confusion over this distinction arises because in the international legal system the same agents whose beliefs give rise to a customary rule are the legal officials whose adherence to the rule of recognition leads them to deem that rule legally valid. The proposed solution to the chronological paradox employs H.L.A. Hart’s analysis of the concepts of law and a legal system, and in particular, the idea of a rule of recognition. Yet Hart famously denies the existence of a rule of recognition for international law. Hart’s denial rests on a failure to distinguish between the ontological and authoritative resolution functions of a rule of recognition, however. Once such a distinction is drawn, it can be argued that customary international law rests on a rule of recognition that serves the ontological function of making customary norms legal, though not the authoritative resolution function of settling disputes over the alleged legality of particular norms.


1990 ◽  
Vol 24 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 451-484 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruth Lapidoth

Since the establishment of the State and up to the present day, Israeli law has had to deal with a great number of various problems in the field of international law, e.g. whether the State of Israel is a successor to the obligations of the Mandatory government; the jurisdiction of the Israeli courts with regard to offences committed in demilitarized zones or beyond the State's boundaries (on the high seas or abroad); the immunity of foreign states and their representatives from the jurisdiction of Israeli courts and from measures of execution; the status of international organizations and of their employees; the effect and implications of official acts performed within the territory of a state which is at war with Israel; the effect of international treaties in Israel; the question whether the Eastern neighbourhoods of Jerusalem are part of Israel; various issues concerning extradition, and of course, many questions regarding the laws of war: the powers of the military governor, and in particular his power to expropriate land in the territories under Israeli control and to expel residents from the territories, the extent of his legislative powers, etc.


Author(s):  
Aryeh Neier

This chapter focuses on the two sources of international law: custom and treaties. Customary international law is the term used to describe rules that are so widely accepted and so deeply held that they help to define what it means to belong to a civilized society. The question of whether customary international law is binding on the United States came before the U.S. Supreme Court as long ago as 1900 in a case called Paquete Habana. Whereas treaty law often covers the same ground as customary international law. Torture is forbidden by customary international law, for example, and prohibitions against torture are also set forth in several multilateral treaties. The effect is to reinforce recognition that a particular norm set forth in a treaty has the status of customary law.


Author(s):  
Aryeh Neier

This chapter discusses custom and treaties as the two sources of international law. It explains the customary international law as the term used to describe rules that are widely accepted and deeply held and are used to define what it means to belong to a civilized society. It also recounts the case called “Paquete Habana” in the U.S. Supreme Court that addresses the question of whether customary international law is binding on the United States. The chapter talks about the treaty law or conventional law as the source of multilateral conventions that often covers the same ground as customary international law. It analyzes the prohibitions against “torture” that are set forth in several multilateral treaties and reinforce recognition that a particular norm set forth in a treaty has the status of customary law.


1994 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 113-137
Author(s):  
Bart Driessen

AbstractThis study argues that customary international law obliges the Baltic states to accept the Slav populations as an integral part of the Baltic peoples. The history and collapse of the Soviet Union has produced large groups of Slav immigrants to remain in the Baltic states. They are not automatically granted citizenship rights in Estonia and Latvia, as they have to prove to qualify for naturalisation. People descending from the inter-War citizenry do ipso facto qualify for citizenship. First the nature of the coming-to-independence of the Baltic states is analysed, after which the law on self-determination is investigated. The de facto recognition of the Soviet annexation by most of the international community is seen as the watershed as far as the status of the Baltic states is concerned; from then on they were for all practical purposes part of the Soviet Union. Following an analysis of the applicable norms of customary international law, a scrutiny of relevant Baltic legislation is presented.


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