Jenseits der Face-to-Face-Organisation / Jenseits der Face-to-Face-Organisation

2002 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefan Kühl
Keyword(s):  

ZusammenfassungUnternehmen der New Economy galten über mehrere Jahre als das Organisationsmodell für das 21. Jahrhundert. Besonders Internetunternehmen schienen typische Organisationsprobleme der Old Economy (lange Entscheidungswege, ungenügende Kooperation zwischen Abteilungen und geringe Motivation der Mitarbeiter) in den Griff zu bekommen. Dieser Artikel argumentiert, dass die aus der Old Economy bekannten Organisationsprobleme in den Internetunternehmen deshalb nicht auftraten, weil es sich in der Anfangszeit um gruppenförmig strukturierte Face-to-Face-Organisationen handelte. Mit dem besonders durch Risikokapitalgeber geforderten Wachstum sahen sich die Unternehmen jedoch gezwungen, Organisationsstrukturen auszudifferenzieren. Weil die Unternehmen versuchten, möglichst lange an einer gruppenförmigen Organisationsstruktur festzuhalten, entstanden Organisationsprobleme wie die Zentralisierung von Entscheidungen an der Spitze, begrenzte Regelbefolgung und die Taylorisierung über EDV-gestützte Workflow-Konzepte. Diese spezifischen Organisationsprobleme von New-Economy-Firmen blieben so lange latent, wie der permanente Kapitalnachfluss sichergestellt war. Mit dem Einbruch an den Technologiebörsen und dem Rückzug vieler Risikokapitalgeber wurden die Organisationsprobleme der New-Economy-Unternehmen jedoch virulent.

2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 51-63 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hugh Grove ◽  
Mac Clouse ◽  
Laura Georg Schaffner

For improved corporate governance in this age of digitalization, the Board of Directors could investigate key operating performance indicators or KPIs for competitive advantages with Digitalization Dashboards. There are over 30 such digital metrics in the Digitalization Dashboard example in this paper. A starting point for developing such key metrics could be the digital values indicated by the “efficient stock market” with the market to book ratio calculation. The ten “new economy” companies had an average market to book ratio of 10.85 while the ten “old economy” companies had an average market to book ratio of 2.64. Why are sophisticated investors indicating that the equity market value or market capitalization of “new economy” companies is almost eleven times larger on average than their equity book value? Why is the average market to book ratio of “new economy” companies over four times larger than for “old economy” companies? What key digitalization metrics and competitive advantages are in play here? Digital dashboards are recommended here to answer such questions. While the awareness on boards regarding risks originating from disruptive innovation, cyber threats and privacy risks has been increasing, board members must equally be able to challenge executives and identify opportunities and threats for their companies. This shift for companies is not only about digital technology but also cultural. How can people be managed when digital, virtual ways of working are increasing? What do robotics and “big data” analysis mean for managing people? One way to accelerate the digital learning process has been advocated: the use of digital apprentices for boards. For example, Board Apprentice, a non-profit organization, has already placed digital apprentices on boards for a year-long period (which helps to educate both apprentices and boards) in five different countries.


2004 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-92 ◽  
Author(s):  
Konstantinos Stathopoulos ◽  
Susanne Espenlaub ◽  
Martin Walker

This paper examines the executive compensation practices of listed U.K. retailing companies. We compare “New Economy” retailers (e-commerce/dot-coms) to more traditional retailers operating in the “Old Economy.” We also discriminate between recently floated retailers and their more seasoned counterparts. Using a sample of remuneration contracts for 549 directors in 72 listed U.K. companies in the New and Old Economies, we investigate the structure and level of executive (and nonexecutive) compensation defined as the sum of salary, annual bonus, and the values of executive stock options and long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). We investigate the extent to which the contract features are determined by firm characteristics, economic sector, and governance/ownership factors. In contrast to the U.S., where almost all executive stock options are issued at the money, there is a greater variety of practice in the U.K. with some options being granted substantially in the money. We therefore pay special attention to this U.K. institutional feature by producing a model designed to explain the crosssectional variation in the moneyness of stock options at the date of issue. We also examine the determinants of a number of other contract features. These are: the time to maturity of the executive stock options, the leverage of the compensation package, the ratio of long-term pay relative to short-term pay, and pay performance sensitivity. We find that differences in compensation arrangements can be explained to a significant extent by differences in firm size, growth/growth opportunities, firm financial policy, ownership characteristics, and governance arrangements. We also find some systematic differences between the compensation arrangements of CEOs and other executives.


Author(s):  
George (Yiorgos) Allayannis ◽  
William Burton

Dick Mayo, one of the most celebrated value investors in America was puzzled by the New Economy's continuous bias toward growth investment strategies. He examines the basics of his philosophy versus that of a growth orientation by evaluating the long-term expected returns of several value and growth stocks. This case can be used to pursue several objectives: (1) to define value and growth investing-where the differences lie and whether one approach is superior to the other or whether both have merit; and (2) to discuss issues related to consistency of one's investment philosophy. Should one stay true to one's philosophy even when the market seems to run counter to it for a prolonged period of time? Can value investing deliver value in this New Economy or is it only an Old Economy concept? The students are instructed to perform basic valuations of Cisco Systems (a growth company), CVS, R.R. Donnelley, and Manor Care (value companies) and compute their long-term expected returns. The case comes with an Excel spreadsheet containing the data and relevant valuation ratios for the above firms. The valuations are straightforward, but they tell an interesting story: the expected returns of glamorous stocks in reality may not be so glamorous.


2004 ◽  
pp. 331-358 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy Bresnahan ◽  
Alfonso Gambardella
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Zhen Wang ◽  
Chu Zhang

Abstract We propose an explanation for why corporate investment used to be sensitive to cash flow and why the sensitivity declined over time. The sensitivity stems from the informational role of cash flow in inferring the productivity of tangible capital in the old economy. Over time, however, more new-economy firms enter the market. These firms have reduced tangible capital productivity and reduced cash-flow predictability, which drives the decline in the average investment–cash flow sensitivity. Theoretical and empirical analyses support this explanation.


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