scholarly journals Corporate Governance in China: A Research Agenda for a Corporate Group and Shareholder Control Perspective

2006 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jenny Fu
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Relevant Literature ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Share Ownership ◽  
Corporate Group ◽  
Legal Contexts ◽  
Share Ownership Structure ◽  
And Control

The share ownership structure of listed companies in China lends support to the research findings of the recent “concentrated share ownership” thesis. However, due to its particular economic, political and legal contexts, the Chinese share ownership structure has its own characteristics. Instead of rich families or banks as seen elsewhere, publicly traded corporations in China are typically controlled by their state-owned founder/sponsor enterprises. Based on an examination of the state of ownership and control in listed companies in China and a brief review of the relevant literature, this paper suggests a corporate group contextual-based approach to understand corporate governance in China. For that purpose, some major issues for future research are also outlined.

scholarly journals Editorial: Interdisciplinary approach to corporate governance

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (3, special issue) ◽  
pp. 220-222
Author(s):  
Andrea Rey
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Interdisciplinary Approach ◽  
Research Trend ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Corporate Ownership ◽  
And Gender ◽  
And Control ◽  
A Company

To date, future research trends will certainly concern sustainability and entrepreneurship due to the post-COVID-19 crisis. Studies will focus on the determinants related to corporate governance, such as corporate ownership, or the role of institutional investors, or a company that aims to get public by an IPO as a possible answer to the crisis. A future research trend will surely concern environmental and economic sustainability. Another line of research will concern the protection of biodiversity and gender equality. With the regard to the content of this issue of the Corporate Ownership and Control journal, ownership structure is the most popular issue considered by the authors of the papers.

scholarly journals The board of directors and firm performance: empirical evidence from listed companies

2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 508-551 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alessandro Merendino ◽  
Rob Melville
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Agency Theory ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Board Structure ◽  
Board Size ◽  
Ceo Duality ◽  
Content Type

PurposeThis study aims to reconcile some of the conflicting results in prior studies of the board structure–firm performance relationship and to evaluate the effectiveness and applicability of agency theory in the specific context of Italian corporate governance practice.Design/methodology/approachThis research applies a dynamic generalised method of moments on a sample of Italian listed companies over the period 2003-2015. Proxies for corporate governance mechanisms are the board size, the level of board independence, ownership structure, shareholder agreements and CEO–chairman leadership.FindingsWhile directors elected by minority shareholders are not able to impact performance, independent directors do have a non-linear effect on performance. Board size has a positive effect on firm performance for lower levels of board size. Ownership structure per se and shareholder agreements do not affect firm performance.Research limitations/implicationsThis paper contributes to the literature on agency theory by reconciling some of the conflicting results inherent in the board structure–performance relationship. Firm performance is not necessarily improved by having a high number of independent directors on the board. Ownership structure and composition do not affect firm performance; therefore, greater monitoring provided by concentrated ownership does not necessarily lead to stronger firm performance.Practical implicationsThis paper suggests that Italian corporate governance law should improve the rules and effectiveness of minority directors by analysing whether they are able to impede the main shareholders to expropriate private benefits on the expenses of the minority. The legislator should not impose any restrictive regulations with regard to CEO duality, as the influence of CEO duality on performance may vary with respect to the unique characteristics of each company.Originality/valueThe results enrich the understanding of the applicability of agency theory in listed companies, especially in Italy. Additionally, this paper provides a comprehensive synthesis of research evidence of agency theory studies.

13. Corporate governance

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Derek French
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Shareholder Activism ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Corporate Governance Code ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Legal Controls ◽  
And Control ◽  
Do So

This chapter surveys corporate governance. It identifies the key problem of the separation of ownership and control in companies that are not owner-managed. Shareholders are seen as the owners of the company but directors manage the company and can do so for their own benefit rather than the shareholders’. There is a list of the numerous legal controls on directors, which are studied in other chapters. There is discussion of two ways of looking at directors, either as stewards who must account for their actions to the owners or as entrepreneurs whose wealth-creating work deserves reward. The UK Corporate Governance Code, which applies to premium listed companies, is discussed, as is shareholder activism.

The effect of share ownership structure on ex-dividend day stock price behavior

2019 ◽  
Vol 45 (6) ◽  
pp. 744-759
Author(s):  
Dong H. Kim
Keyword(s):  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Stock Price ◽  
Individual Investors ◽  
Price Behavior ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Share Ownership ◽  
Investor Heterogeneity ◽  
Closing Price ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Share Ownership Structure

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to explore whether share ownership structure plays a role in determining the ex-day pricing of dividends. If share ownership structure, specifically the proportion of the firm’s stock held by individuals vs institutions, has an effect on the ex-dividend day stock price behavior, the ex-day premium is expected to be different for firms with different ownership structures. Design/methodology/approach To investigate whether the ex-day pricing of dividends is affected by the proportion of the firm’s stock held by individuals vs institutions, the author look into the ex-day premium. The ex-day premium is calculated by dividing the difference between the closing price on the cum-dividend day and the closing price on the ex-dividend day by the amount of the dividend. Findings Consistent with both the tax-based theory and the dynamic trading clientele theory, the author find that the ex-day premium decreases with the level of individual ownership. Consistent with the short-term trading theory, the author also find that the ex-day premium increases with the degree of investor heterogeneity, defined as the product of the proportion of the firm’s stock held by individual investors and the proportion held by institutional investors. Originality/value The author believe that this study contributes to the literature by providing useful evidence that share ownership structure affects the ex-day pricing of dividends, and thus this study will be of interest to the readers of managerial finance.

The impact of corporate governance and ownership structure reforms on earnings quality in China

2015 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 169-198 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xu_Dong Ji ◽  
Kamran Ahmed ◽  
Wei Lu
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Earnings Quality ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Ownership Structures ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Impact

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of corporate governance and ownership structures on earnings quality in China both prior and subsequent to two important corporate reforms: the code of corporate governance (CCG) in 2002 and the split share structure reform (SSR) in 2005. Design/methodology/approach – This study utilises informativeness of earnings (earnings response coefficient), conditional accounting conservatism and managerial discretionary accruals to assess earnings quality using 12,267 firm-year observations over 11 years from 2000 to 2010. Further, two dummy variables for measuring the changes of CCG and SSR are employed to estimate the effects of CCG and SSR reforms on earnings quality via OLS regression. Findings – This study finds that the promulgation of the CCG in 2002 has had a positive impact, but the SSR reform in 2005 has had little effect on listed firms’ earnings quality in China. These results hold good after controlling for a number of ownership, governance and other variables and estimating models with multiple measures of earnings’ quality. Research limitations/implications – Future research could focus on how western style corporate governance mechanisms have been constrained by the old management systems and governmental dominated ownership structures in Chinese listed firms. The conclusion is that simply coping Western corporate governance model is not suitable for every country. Practical implications – The results will assist Chinese regulators in improving reporting quality, ownership structure and governance mechanisms in China. The results will help international investors better understand quality of financial information in China. Originality/value – This is the first to our knowledge that addresses the effects of major governance and ownership reforms together on accounting earnings quality and, thus, makes a significant contribution on understanding the effect of regulatory reforms on improving earnings quality. In doing so, it also indirectly assesses the effectiveness of western-style corporate governance mechanisms introduced in China.

The implications of the revised code of corporate governance on firm performance

2015 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 350-380 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abdifatah Ahmed Haji ◽  
Sanni Mubaraq
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Market Performance ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Data Sets ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The One

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of corporate governance and ownership structure attributes on firm performance following the revised code on corporate governance in Malaysia. The study presents a longitudinal assessment of the compliance and implications of the revised code on firm performance. Design/methodology/approach – Two data sets consisting of before (2006) and after (2008-2010) the revised code are examined. Drawing from the largest companies listed on Bursa Malaysia (BM), the first data set contains 92 observations in the year 2006 while the second data set comprises of 282 observations drawn from the largest companies listed on BM over a three-year period, from 2008-2010. Both accounting (return on assets and return on equity) and market performance (Tobin’s Q) measures were used to measure firm performance. Multiple and panel data regression analyses were adopted to analyze the data. Findings – The study shows that there were still cases of non-compliance to the basic requirements of the code such as the one-third independent non-executive director (INDs) requirement even after the revised code. While the regression models indicate marginal significance of board size and independent directors before the revised code, the results indicate all corporate governance variables have a significant negative relationship with at least one of the measures of corporate performance. Independent chairperson, however, showed a consistent positive impact on firm performance both before and after the revised code. In addition, ownership structure elements were found to have a negative relationship with either accounting or market performance measures, with institutional ownership showing a consistent negative impact on firm performance. Firm size and leverage, as control variables, were significant in determining corporate performance. Research limitations/implications – One limitation is the use of separate measures of corporate governance attributes, as opposed to a corporate governance index (CGI). As a result, the study constructs a CGI based on the recommendations of the revised code and proposes for future research use. Practical implications – Some of the largest companies did not even comply with basic requirements such as the “one-third INDs” mandatory requirement. Hence, the regulators may want to reinforce the requirements of the code and also detail examples of good governance practices. The results, which show a consistent positive relationship between the presence of an independent chairperson and firm performance in both data sets, suggest listed companies to consider appointing an independent chairperson in the corporate leadership. The regulatory authorities may also wish to note this phenomenon when drafting any future corporate governance codes. Originality/value – This study offers new insights of the implications of regulatory changes on the relationship between corporate governance attributes and firm performance from the perspective of a developing country. The development of a CGI for future research is a novel approach of this study.

scholarly journals Institutional investors and cost of capital: The moderating effect of ownership structure

PLoS ONE ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. e0249963
Author(s):  
Xiaoping Huo ◽  
Hongying Lin ◽  
Yanan Meng ◽  
Peter Woods
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Capital Market ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Cost Of Capital ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Moderating Effect ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
The Cost ◽  
The Relationship

Guiding institutional investors to actively participate in corporate governance is a hot issue to improve the internal governance of China’s listed companies. This study seeks to provide a comprehensive understanding of the mechanism that underlies the governance effects of the heterogeneity of institutional investors on the cost of capital, and the influence of ownership structure on the relationship between them. Using an unbalanced panel data on A-share listed companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen in China’s capital market during the 2014–2019 period, this study reveals how institutional investors with longer holding period and higher shareholding ratio are negatively associated with the cost of capital in China’s capital market. Furthermore, this study successfully confirms the moderating effect of ownership structure in the relationship between institutional investors and the cost of capital. China’s state-owned enterprises are more likely to introduce improvements at the corporate governance level, and ownership concentration weakens the negative influence of institutional investors on the cost of capital. The research contributes to a deeper understanding of the impacts of institutional investor’s heterogeneity and ownership structure on the cost of capital in China. In the process, the study yields useful implications for the theory and practice of corporate governance.

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