The Origins and Purposes of Alcohol Industry Social Aspects Organizations: Insights From the Tobacco Industry Documents

Abstract Background The alcohol industry has taken a page from the tobacco industry play book in an attempt to resist regulation through delay, self-regulation and effective lobbying. The global alcohol industry is constantly seeking to increase sales of harmful products through widespread marketing, the targeting of young people, and resisting regulatory action. Methods An assessment of the number of lobbyists engaged in one form of another to influence members of Parliament in Australia is being conducted to provide an insight into the attempts to influence alcohol policy. This follows a scan of the lobbyists' register by Daube et al in 2018 that found the while the tobacco industry had 20 direct lobbyists and 14 indirect, the junk food industry 33 direct and 13 indirect, the most dominant was the alcohol industry with 43 direct and 23 indirect. A careful re-examination of the register in 2020 is expected to reveal an increase in these numbers. There will also be an examination of the State and Territory registers in an attempt to understand the overall numbers of people specifically attempting to influence governments. Discussion This particular examination is focussed on the Australian Parliament/s. However, the message will be similar world-wide. Companies such as Diageo have a significant share of the world market with net sales, for example, being 25% of scotch, 16% of beer and 11% of vodka. Their “Drinkiq” website claims “Diageo is committed to preventing and reducing alcohol abuse around the world”. However, other business websites illustrate that their prime objective is to sell more alcohol. Presentation The presentation will focus on the importance of countering the efforts of industry in increasing availability of alcohol. It will also provide a series of steps that public health advocates can take in order to persuade governments of the importance of protecting community health through appropriate regulation of the marketing and sales of alcohol. Key messages The alcohol industry seeks to increase sales while arguing it is protecting health. Public health advocates do have the tools to counter approaches by alcohol companies.

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Management of Conflicts of Interest in WHO’s Consultative Processes on Global Alcohol Policy

International Journal of Health Policy and Management ◽

10.34172/ijhpm.2021.139 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

June YY Leung ◽

Sally Casswell

Keyword(s):

Policy Development ◽

Tobacco Industry ◽

Conflicts Of Interest ◽

Action Plan ◽

Global Strategy ◽

Alcohol Policy ◽

World Health ◽

Web Based ◽

Alcohol Industry ◽

State Actors

Background The World Health Organization (WHO) has engaged in consultations with the alcohol industry in global alcohol policy development, including currently a draft action plan to strengthen implementation of the Global strategy to reduce the harmful use of alcohol. WHO’s Framework for Engagement with Non-State Actors (FENSA) is an organization-wide policy that aims to manage potential conflicts of interest in WHO’s interactions with private sector entities, non-governmental institutions, philanthropic foundations and academic institutions. Methods We analysed the alignment of WHO’s consultative processes with non-state actors on "the way forward" for alcohol policy and a global alcohol action plan with FENSA. We referred to publicly accessible WHO documents, including the Alcohol, Drugs and Addictive Behaviours Unit website, records of relevant meetings, and other documents relevant to FENSA. We documented submissions to two web-based consultations held in 2019 and 2020 by type of organization and links to the alcohol industry. Results WHO’s processes to conduct due diligence, risk assessment and risk management as required by FENSA appeared to be inadequate. Limited information was published on nonstate actors, primarily the alcohol industry, that participated in the consultations, including their potential conflicts of interest. No minutes were published for WHO’s virtual meeting with the alcohol industry, suggesting a lack of transparency. Organizations with known links to the tobacco industry participated in both web-based consultations, despite FENSA’s principle of non-engagement with tobacco industry actors. Conclusion WHO’s consultative processes have not been adequate to address conflicts of interest in relation to the alcohol industry, violating the principles of FENSA. Member states must ensure that WHO has the resources to implement and is held accountable for appropriate and consistent safeguards against industry interference in the development of global alcohol policy.

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