Vested interests in addiction research and policy. Why do we not see the corporate interests of the alcohol industry as clearly as we see those of the tobacco industry?

AbstractIndustries that mine, manufacture and sell asbestos or asbestos-containing products have a long tradition of promoting the use of asbestos, while placing the burden of economic and health costs on workers and society. This has been successfully done in recent years and decades in spite of the overwhelming evidence that all asbestos types are carcinogenic and cause asbestosis. In doing so, the asbestos industry has undermined the WHO campaign to reach a worldwide ban of asbestos and to eliminate asbestos-related diseases. Even worse, in recent years they succeeded in continuing asbestos mining and consuming in the range of about 1.3 million tons annually. Nowadays, production takes place predominantly in Russia, Kazakhstan and China. Chrysotile is the only asbestos type still sold and represents 95% of asbestos traded over the last century.The asbestos industry, especially its PR agency, the International Chrysotile Association, ICA, financed by asbestos mining companies in Russia, Kazakhstan and Zimbabwe and asbestos industrialists in India and Mexico, continues to be extremely active by using slogans such as chrysotile can be used safely.Another approach of the asbestos industry and of some of its insurance agencies is to broadly defeat liability claims of asbestos victims.In doing so they systematically use inappropriate science produced by their own and/or by industry-affiliated researchers. Some of the latter were also engaged in producing defense material for other industries including the tobacco industry. Frequent examples of distributing such disinformation include questioning or denying established scientific knowledge about adverse health effects of asbestos. False evidence continues to be published in scientific journals and books.The persisting strong influence of vested asbestos-related interests in workers and public health issues including regulations and compensation necessitate ongoing alertness, corrections and appropriate reactions in scientific as well as public media and policy advisory bodies.

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Exposing the tactics of alcohol companies

European Journal of Public Health ◽

10.1093/eurpub/ckaa165.216 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 30 (Supplement_5) ◽

Author(s):

M Moore AM

Keyword(s):

Public Health ◽

Tobacco Industry ◽

Self Regulation ◽

World Market ◽

Alcohol Policy ◽

Alcohol Industry ◽

Members Of Parliament ◽

The World ◽

Prime Objective ◽

Insight Into

Abstract Background The alcohol industry has taken a page from the tobacco industry play book in an attempt to resist regulation through delay, self-regulation and effective lobbying. The global alcohol industry is constantly seeking to increase sales of harmful products through widespread marketing, the targeting of young people, and resisting regulatory action. Methods An assessment of the number of lobbyists engaged in one form of another to influence members of Parliament in Australia is being conducted to provide an insight into the attempts to influence alcohol policy. This follows a scan of the lobbyists' register by Daube et al in 2018 that found the while the tobacco industry had 20 direct lobbyists and 14 indirect, the junk food industry 33 direct and 13 indirect, the most dominant was the alcohol industry with 43 direct and 23 indirect. A careful re-examination of the register in 2020 is expected to reveal an increase in these numbers. There will also be an examination of the State and Territory registers in an attempt to understand the overall numbers of people specifically attempting to influence governments. Discussion This particular examination is focussed on the Australian Parliament/s. However, the message will be similar world-wide. Companies such as Diageo have a significant share of the world market with net sales, for example, being 25% of scotch, 16% of beer and 11% of vodka. Their “Drinkiq” website claims “Diageo is committed to preventing and reducing alcohol abuse around the world”. However, other business websites illustrate that their prime objective is to sell more alcohol. Presentation The presentation will focus on the importance of countering the efforts of industry in increasing availability of alcohol. It will also provide a series of steps that public health advocates can take in order to persuade governments of the importance of protecting community health through appropriate regulation of the marketing and sales of alcohol. Key messages The alcohol industry seeks to increase sales while arguing it is protecting health. Public health advocates do have the tools to counter approaches by alcohol companies.

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Management of Conflicts of Interest in WHO’s Consultative Processes on Global Alcohol Policy

International Journal of Health Policy and Management ◽

10.34172/ijhpm.2021.139 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

June YY Leung ◽

Sally Casswell

Keyword(s):

Policy Development ◽

Tobacco Industry ◽

Conflicts Of Interest ◽

Action Plan ◽

Global Strategy ◽

Alcohol Policy ◽

World Health ◽

Web Based ◽

Alcohol Industry ◽

State Actors

Background The World Health Organization (WHO) has engaged in consultations with the alcohol industry in global alcohol policy development, including currently a draft action plan to strengthen implementation of the Global strategy to reduce the harmful use of alcohol. WHO’s Framework for Engagement with Non-State Actors (FENSA) is an organization-wide policy that aims to manage potential conflicts of interest in WHO’s interactions with private sector entities, non-governmental institutions, philanthropic foundations and academic institutions. Methods We analysed the alignment of WHO’s consultative processes with non-state actors on "the way forward" for alcohol policy and a global alcohol action plan with FENSA. We referred to publicly accessible WHO documents, including the Alcohol, Drugs and Addictive Behaviours Unit website, records of relevant meetings, and other documents relevant to FENSA. We documented submissions to two web-based consultations held in 2019 and 2020 by type of organization and links to the alcohol industry. Results WHO’s processes to conduct due diligence, risk assessment and risk management as required by FENSA appeared to be inadequate. Limited information was published on nonstate actors, primarily the alcohol industry, that participated in the consultations, including their potential conflicts of interest. No minutes were published for WHO’s virtual meeting with the alcohol industry, suggesting a lack of transparency. Organizations with known links to the tobacco industry participated in both web-based consultations, despite FENSA’s principle of non-engagement with tobacco industry actors. Conclusion WHO’s consultative processes have not been adequate to address conflicts of interest in relation to the alcohol industry, violating the principles of FENSA. Member states must ensure that WHO has the resources to implement and is held accountable for appropriate and consistent safeguards against industry interference in the development of global alcohol policy.

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