On the Nash equilibrium in the inspector problem
Keyword(s):
Inspector problem represents an economic duel of inspector and law violator and is formulated as a bimatrix game. In general, bimatrix game is NP-complete problem. The inspector problem is a special case where the equilibrium can be found in polynomial time. In this paper, a generalized version of the Inspector Problem is described with the aim to represent broader family of applied problems, including the optimization of security systems. The explicit solution is provided and the Modified Strategy Elimination algorithm is introduced.
2008 ◽
Vol 17
(03)
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pp. 349-371
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Keyword(s):
2010 ◽
Vol Vol. 12 no. 1
(Graph and Algorithms)
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Keyword(s):
2015 ◽
Vol 9
(2)
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pp. 357-366
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Keyword(s):
2015 ◽
Vol 25
(04)
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pp. 283-298
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2020 ◽
Vol 40
(4)
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pp. 1008-1019
2000 ◽
Vol 11
(03)
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pp. 405-421
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Keyword(s):
2011 ◽
Vol 328-330
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pp. 1729-1733