The Ontology of Many-Worlds

Author(s):  
Daisuke Kachi

There are two types of theories regarding many worlds: one is modal, while the other is temporal. The former regards reality as consisting of many possible worlds, while the latter holds that reality consists of many momentary worlds, which are usually called moments. I compare these two theories, paying close attention to the concept of transworld identity and compare trans-possible world identity with trans-momentary world identity (or transmoment identity). I characterize time from the point of many-worlds view, believing this to be one of the best ways of grasping the reality of time. First, I show that there is reason to adopt the many-worlds view because transworld identity is meaningful for both of them, while it is not for space. Second, I argue that transmoment identity is different from transpossible world identity concerning reality. The former is a realistic relation, while the latter is not. Thus, I find that the reality of time is in the relation of transmoment identity. Such a view, I contend, has merit on the basis that it recognizes the reality of time in a sense that is not true of space.

Problemos ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 99 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pranciškus Gricius

In this article, the problem of transworld identity – that is the question, if and how it is possible to ground the intuition that the same individual exists in more than one possible world – is solved by arguing that individuals have essences. First of all, it is claimed that the concept of transworld identity is desirable since it betters both global pan-essentialism and counterpart theory. Then, necessary terminology for successful understanding of the transworld identity problem is introduced. Afterwards, it is contended that the well-known Chisholm’s paradox for transworld identity can be resolved by appealing to individual essences. It is argued that if extreme haecceitism is true, then essences of individuals are non-qualitative and hence haecceitist switches are ontologically grounded. On the other hand, if reductionism is true, then essences of individuals are qualitative and hence haecceitist switches are impossible. Finally, it is shown that by referring to individual essences across possible worlds it is possible to solve the problem of cross-world identification.


Phronesis ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 109-139 ◽  
Author(s):  

AbstractTwo readings of the much-discussed περιτρoπη argument of Theaetetus 170c-171c have dominated the literature. One I call "the relativity reading". On this reading, the argument fails by ignoratio elenchi because it "carelessly" omits "the qualifications 'true for so-and-so' which [Protagoras'] theory insists on" (Bostock 1988: 90). The other reading I call "the many-worlds interpretation". On this view, Plato's argument succeeds in showing that "Protagoras' position becomes utterly self-contradictory" because "he claims that everyone lives in his own relativistic world, yet at the same time he is forced by that very claim to admit that no one does" (Burnyeat 1976b: 48). I discuss and criticise both readings, and present a third, according to which the point of the argument is, very roughly, that Protagoras is committed to equating truth and truth-for, and so, further, to their intersubstitutability. This further commitment proves fatal to his argument.


Author(s):  
Alastair Wilson

Contingency is everywhere, but what is it? This book defends a radical new theory of contingency as a physical phenomenon. Drawing on the many-worlds approach to quantum theory and on cutting-edge metaphysics and philosophy of science, it argues that quantum theories are best understood as telling us about the space of genuine possibilities rather than as telling us solely about actuality. When quantum physics is taken seriously in the way first proposed by Hugh Everett III, it provides the resources for a new systematic metaphysical framework encompassing possibility, necessity, actuality, chance, counterfactuals, and a host of related modal notions. The framework is a modal realist one, in the tradition of David Lewis: all genuine possibilities are on a par, and the actual world is simply the one that we ourselves inhabit. It departs from Lewisian modal realism in that quantum possible worlds are not philosophical posits but scientific discoveries. Contingency and other modal notions have often been seen as beyond the limits of science. Rationalist metaphysicians argue that the metaphysics of modality is strictly prior to any scientific investigation: metaphysics establishes which worlds are possible, and physics merely checks which of these worlds is actual. Naturalistic metaphysicians respond that science may discover new possibilities and new impossibilities. This book’s quantum theory of contingency takes naturalistic metaphysics one step further, allowing that science may discover what it is to be possible. As electromagnetism revealed the nature of light, as acoustics revealed the nature of sound, as statistical mechanics revealed the nature of heat, so quantum physics reveals the nature of contingency.


Author(s):  
Bruce S. Bennett ◽  
Moletlanyi Tshipa

AbstractThe Many-Worlds Interpretation (MWI) is a theory in physics which proposes that, rather than quantum-level events being resolved randomly as according to the Copenhagen Interpretation, the universe constantly divides into different versions or worlds. All physically possible worlds occur, though some outcomes are more likely than others, and therefore all possible histories exist. This paper explores some implications of this for history, especially concerning causation. Unlike counterfactuals, which concern different starting conditions, MWI concerns different outcomes of the same starting conditions. It is argued that analysis of causation needs to take into account the divergence of outcomes and the possibility that we inhabit a less probable world. Another implication of MWI is convergent history: for any given world there will be similar worlds which are the result of different pasts which are, however, more or less probable. MWI can assist in thinking about historical causation and indicates the importance of probabilistic causation.


2012 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 305-322 ◽  
Author(s):  
JOSEPH Y. HALPERN

AbstractGalles & Pearl (l998) claimed that “for recursive models, the causal model framework does not add any restrictions to counterfactuals, beyond those imposed by Lewis’s [possible-worlds] framework.” This claim is examined carefully, with the goal of clarifying the exact relationship between causal models and Lewis’s framework. Recursive models are shown to correspond precisely to a subclass of (possible-world) counterfactual structures. On the other hand, a slight generalization of recursive models, models where all equations have unique solutions, is shown to be incomparable in expressive power to counterfactual structures, despite the fact that the Galles and Pearl arguments should apply to them as well. The problem with the Galles and Pearl argument is identified: an axiom that they viewed as irrelevant, because it involved disjunction (which was not in their language), is not irrelevant at all.


Imbizo ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 40-54
Author(s):  
Oyeh O. Otu

This article examines how female conditioning and sexual repression affect the woman’s sense of self, womanhood, identity and her place in society. It argues that the woman’s body is at the core of the many sites of gender struggles/ politics. Accordingly, the woman’s body must be decolonised for her to attain true emancipation. On the one hand, this study identifies the grave consequences of sexual repression, how it robs women of their freedom to choose whom to love or marry, the freedom to seek legal redress against sexual abuse and terror, and how it hinders their quest for self-determination. On the other hand, it underscores the need to give women sexual freedom that must be respected and enforced by law for the overall good of society.


BMC Zoology ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ansa E. Cobham ◽  
Christen K. Mirth

Abstract Background Organisms show an incredibly diverse array of body and organ shapes that are both unique to their taxon and important for adapting to their environment. Achieving these specific shapes involves coordinating the many processes that transform single cells into complex organs, and regulating their growth so that they can function within a fully-formed body. Main text Conceptually, body and organ shape can be separated in two categories, although in practice these categories need not be mutually exclusive. Body shape results from the extent to which organs, or parts of organs, grow relative to each other. The patterns of relative organ size are characterized using allometry. Organ shape, on the other hand, is defined as the geometric features of an organ’s component parts excluding its size. Characterization of organ shape is frequently described by the relative position of homologous features, known as landmarks, distributed throughout the organ. These descriptions fall into the domain of geometric morphometrics. Conclusion In this review, we discuss the methods of characterizing body and organ shape, the developmental programs thought to underlie each, highlight when and how the mechanisms regulating body and organ shape might overlap, and provide our perspective on future avenues of research.


2018 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 179-190 ◽  
Author(s):  
T.M. Wong

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to identify the teaching innovations that have been implemented in higher education institutions in Asia and the perspectives of educators on them. Design/methodology/approach Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 28 educators who were affiliated with 23 higher education institutions in ten Asian countries/regions. The interviews covered information about the teaching innovations of the participants’ institutions, the characteristics of the innovative practices and the participants’ views on them. The relationships between the characteristics of institutions and their teaching innovations were also examined. Findings The results showed that the teaching innovations included two main categories, namely, those which involved the use of advanced technologies and those which did not. The innovations that involved the use of advanced technologies were mainly from larger institutions, while the other category was mainly from smaller ones and had been practised for less than 1.5 years. Differences were also identified between the two categories in terms of the aims and importance of innovations, innovative features, the evaluation of innovations and improvements needed for them. Originality/value The results highlighted that technology is only one of the many aspects of teaching innovations, which is different from the view prevailing in the literature. They also suggested that differences in the scale of institutions (in terms of number of students) possibly influences the kind of teaching innovations adopted.


2000 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 261-264 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tricia S. Clement ◽  
Thomas R. Zentall

We tested the hypothesis that pigeons could use a cognitively efficient coding strategy by training them on a conditional discrimination (delayed symbolic matching) in which one alternative was correct following the presentation of one sample (one-to-one), whereas the other alternative was correct following the presentation of any one of four other samples (many-to-one). When retention intervals of different durations were inserted between the offset of the sample and the onset of the choice stimuli, divergent retention functions were found. With increasing retention interval, matching accuracy on trials involving any of the many-to-one samples was increasingly better than matching accuracy on trials involving the one-to-one sample. Furthermore, following this test, pigeons treated a novel sample as if it had been one of the many-to-one samples. The data suggest that rather than learning each of the five sample-comparison associations independently, the pigeons developed a cognitively efficient single-code/default coding strategy.


Dialogue ◽  
1989 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 289-304 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard M. Gale

David Lewis has shocked the philosophical community with his original version of extreme modal realism according to which “every way that a world could possibly be is a way that some world is”. Logical Space is a plenitude of isolated physical worlds, each being the actualization of some way in which a world could be, that bear neither spatiotemporal nor causal relations to each other. Lewis has given independent, converging arguments for this. One is the argument from the indexicality of actuality, the other an elaborate cost-benefit argument of the inference-to-the-best explanation sort to the effect that a systematic analysis of a number of concepts, including modality, causality, propositions and properties, fares better under his theory than under any rival one that takes a possible world to be either a linguistic entity or an ersatz abstract entity such as a maximal compossible set of properties, propositions or states of affairs. Lewis' legion of critics have confined themselves mostly to attempts at a reductio ad absurdum of his theory or to objections to his various analyses. The indexical argument, on the other hand, has not been subject to careful critical scrutiny. It is the purpose of this paper to show that this argument cannot withstand such scrutiny. Its demise, however, leaves untouched his argument from the explanatory superiority for his extreme modal realism.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document