scholarly journals THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM(S) IN DESCARTES’ “MEDITATIONS” AND HUSSERL’S “CRISIS” (Part 2)

2020 ◽  
Vol - (5) ◽  
pp. 117-128
Author(s):  
Andrii Leonov
Keyword(s):  
Body Problem ◽  
Transcendental Phenomenology ◽  
Natural Sciences ◽  
The Other ◽  
Husserlian Phenomenology ◽  
Conceptual Level ◽  
Mind And Body ◽  
Magnum Opus ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The Mind

The main topic of this paper is the mind-body problem. The author analyzes it in the context of Husserlian phenomenology. The key texts for the analysis and interpretation are Descartes’ magnum opus “Meditations on the First Philosophy” and Husserl’ last work “The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology”. The author claims that already in Descartes’ text instead of one mind-body problem, one can find two: the ontological mind-body problem (mind-brain relation) and conceptual one (“mind” and “body” as concepts). In Descartes’ “Meditations”, the ontological level is explicit, while the conceptual level is implicit. In Husserl’s “Crisis”, on the other hand, the situation is different: the conceptual level of the problem (as the opposition between transcendental phenomenology and natural sciences) is explicit, while the ontological level is implicit. Nevertheless, it seems that Husserl has answers to both the “traditional” as well as the “conceptual” mind-body problems.

scholarly journals The mind-body problem(s) in Descartes’ “meditations” and Husserl’s “crisis” (Part1)

2020 ◽  
Vol - (4) ◽  
pp. 91-100
Author(s):  
Andrii Leonov
Keyword(s):  
Body Problem ◽  
Transcendental Phenomenology ◽  
Natural Sciences ◽  
The Other ◽  
Main Topic ◽  
Conceptual Level ◽  
Mind And Body ◽  
Magnum Opus ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The Mind

The main topic of this paper is the mind-body problem. The author analyzes it in the context of Hus- serlian phenomenology. The key texts for the analysis and interpretation are Descartes’ magnum opus “Meditations on the First Philosophy” and Husserl’ last work “The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology”. The author claims that already in Descartes’ text instead of one mind-body problem, one can find two: the ontological mind-body problem (mind-brain relation) and conceptual one (“mind” and “body” as concepts). In Descartes’ “Meditations”, the ontological level is explicit, while the conceptual level is implicit. In Husserl’s “Crisis”, on the other hand, the situation is different: the conceptual level of the problem (as the opposition between transcendental phenom- enology and natural sciences) is explicit, while the ontological level is implicit. Nevertheless, it seems that Husserl has answers to both the “traditional” as well as the “conceptual” mind-body problems.

scholarly journals Placebo: Feeling Better, Getting Better, and the Problems of Mind and Body

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
John F. Kihlstrom
Keyword(s):  
Medical Practice ◽  
Body Problem ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Scientific Basis ◽  
The Other ◽  
Placebo Effects ◽  
Physical Conditions ◽  
Mind And Body ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The Mind

Over its history, medicine has vacillated between acknowledging placebo effects as important and trying to overcome them. Placebos are controversial, in part, because they appear to challenge a biocentric view of the scientific basis of medical practice. At the very least, research should distinguish between the effects of placebos on subjective and objective endpoints. Theoretically, placebos are of interest because they underscore the other side of the mind-body problem: how mental states can affect physical conditions.

Introduction

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
David Charles
Keyword(s):  
Physical Activity ◽  
Body Problem ◽  
Physical Activities ◽  
The Other ◽  
Psychological Phenomena ◽  
Explicit Reference ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The Mind

Aristotle developed a way of understanding psychological phenomena, such as the emotions, desire, and perception, that differs in important ways from those favoured by nearly all post-Cartesian philosophersIn his view [A] these psychological phenomena are defined as inextricably psycho-physical activities, not definable by decomposition into two definitionally separate types of activity or feature, one purely psychological, the other purely physical, and [B] the relevant specific type of physical activity cannot be defined without explicit reference in its definition to some psycho-physical activity. It too is an inextricably psycho-physical activity, not to be defined in terms of two definitionally separate components. Aristotle did not accept the assumptions that we make in setting up the mind–body problem we have inherited from Descartes. From Aristotle’s perspective, our problem is badly formulated.

Neurophenomenology and the Spontaneity of Consciousness

2003 ◽  
Vol 29 ◽  
pp. 133-162 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Hanna ◽  
Evan Thompson
Keyword(s):  
Body Problem ◽  
Spatiotemporal Pattern ◽  
Mind And Body ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
Dynamic Patterns ◽  
To Come ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain

Consciousness is what makes the mind-body problem really intractable (Nagel1980, p. 150). My reading of the situation is that our inability to come up with an intelligible conception of the relation between mind and body is a sign of the inadequacy of our present concepts, and that some development is needed (Nagel1998, p. 338). Mind itself is a spatiotemporal pattern that molds the metastable dynamic patterns of the brain (Kelso 1995, p. 288).

Functionalism, Sensations, and Materialism

1977 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 255-274
Author(s):  
Larry J. Eshelman
Keyword(s):  
Body Problem ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Adequate Account ◽  
Mind And Body ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Functionalist Approach

I wish to defend a functionalist approach to the mind-body problem. I use the word ‘functionalist’ with some reluctance, however; for although it has become the conventional label for the sort of approach taken by such philosophers as H. Putnam and D. C. Dennett, I believe it is somewhat misleading. The functionalist, as I understand him, tries to show how there can be machine analogues of mental states and then argues that just as we are not inclined to postulate an ontological dualism between simulated mental states and the machine's physical states, we need not postulate a dualism between mind and body. The functionalist also argues, however, that it is wrong to identify the mental states or simulated mental states with the physical states.Recently functionalism has come under attack, first for not being a coherent alternative, and secondly for not being able to provide an adequate account of sensations. I believe that the first objection is misguided and shall deal with it in section I. However, I agree that functionalists have not provided an adequate account of sensations, but I shall try to help remedy this in section II.

Bruteness and Supervenience

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Levine
Keyword(s):  
Body Problem ◽  
The Other ◽  
Robust Realism ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The One ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Way

This chapter first presents a framework, one that the author has defended elsewhere (Levine 2001), for understanding the notion of bruteness, its relation to modality, and the way this framework applies to the mind–body problem. Second, the chapter then turns to a problem in meta-ethics and attempts to address this problem within the framework already established. The problem is how to reconcile two views that many philosophers, including the author, are inclined to hold: on the one hand, “robust realism” or “non-naturalism” about the ethical and, on the other, the supervenience of the ethical on the non-ethical. The chapter speculates about how one might reasonably reconcile these two views.

Mind and Body

1988 ◽  
Vol 24 ◽  
pp. 69-83
Author(s):  
K. V. Wilkes
Keyword(s):  
Body Problem ◽  
Mind And Body ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Canonical Status

I expect every reader knows the hackneyed old joke: ‘What is matter? Never mind. What is mind? No matter.’ Antique as this joke is, it none the less points to an interesting question. For the so-called mind–body dichotomy, which has been raised to almost canonical status in post-Cartesian philosophy, is not in fact at all easy to draw or to defend. This of course means that ‘the mind–body problem’ is difficult both to describe and to solve—or rather, as I would prefer, to dissolve.

Where Lies The Physics of Mind?

1989 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roger Penrose ◽  
Martin Gardner
Keyword(s):  
Control System ◽  
Body Problem ◽  
Selective Advantage ◽  
The Other ◽  
Material Object ◽  
Scientific Question ◽  
Object A ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The One ◽  
The Mind

In discussions of the mind-body problem, there are two separate issues on which attention is commonly focused: ‘How is it that a material object (a brain) can actually evoke consciousness?’; and, conversely; ‘How is it that a consciousness, by the action of its will, can actually influence the (apparently physically determined) motion of material objects?’ These are the passive and active aspects of the mind-body problem. It appears that we have, in ‘mind’ (or, rather, in ‘consciousness’), a non-material ‘thing’ that is, on the one hand, evoked by the material world and, on the other, can influence it. However, I shall prefer, in my preliminary discussions in this last chapter, to consider a somewhat different and perhaps more scientific question - which has relevance to both the active and passive problems - in the hope that our attempts at an answer may move us a little way towards an improved understanding of these age-old fundamental conundrums of philosophy. My question is: ‘What selective advantage does a consciousness confer on those who actually possess it?’ There are several implicit assumptions involved in phrasing the question in this way. First, there is the belief that consciousness is actually a scientifically describable ‘thing’. There is the assumption that this ‘thing’ actually ‘does something’ - and, moreover, that what it does is helpful to the creature possessing it, so that an otherwise equivalent creature, but without consciousness, would behave in some less effective way. On the other hand, one might believe that consciousness is merely a passive concomitant of the possession of a sufficiently elaborate control system and does not, in itself, actually ‘do’ anything. (This last would presumably be the view of the strong-AI supporters, for example.) Alternatively, perhaps there is some divine or mysterious purpose for the phenomenon of consciousness - possibly a teleological one not yet revealed to us - and any discussion of this phenomenon in terms merely of the ideas of natural selection would miss this ‘purpose’ completely.

Finite Subjects in the Ethics

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ursula Renz
Keyword(s):  
Body Problem ◽  
Thomas Aquinas ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
The Body ◽  
Mind And Body ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
New Interpretation ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Finite Minds

This chapter suggests a new interpretation of Spinoza’s concept of mind claiming that the goal of the equation of the human mind with the idea of the body is not to solve the mind-body problem, but rather to show how we can, within the framework of Spinoza’s rationalism, conceive of finite minds as irreducibly distinguishable individuals. To support this view, the chapter discusses the passage from E2p11 to E2p13 against the background of three preliminaries, i.e. the notion of a union between mind and body as it appears in Thomas Aquinas’ refutation of Averroism, Spinoza’s views on knowledge of actually existing things in E2p8c, and the phenomenological character of E2a2-4. It argues that while this view on the human mind does not undermine radical rationalism, it does require its amendment by some irreducibly empirical concessions.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document