Aristotle’s Viewpoint

Aristotle’s view, as understood in Chapters 1–6, is summarized and then distinguished from several more recent theories of psychological phenomena, such as various versions of functionalism and non-reductionist materialism. His hylomorphic theory of natural objects is also differentiated from various forms of neo-Aristotelian hylomorphism. Aristotle, it is argued, is attempting to account for the causal role of form, its being definitionally prior to matter, and its role in grounding the unity of natural objects in a way different from that suggested in these contemporary theories. The ontological nature of Aristotle’s forms is further discussed. The aim of this chapter is to emphasize the distinctness of Aristotle’s account from several recent theories, not to argue for its superiority.

The Emotions

In De Anima A.1, Aristotle developed an account of certain ‘affections of the soul’ such as anger which is his model for other ‘affections and actions common to body and soul’ such as desire and sense perception. His remarks about anger can be understood in two different ways. According to one account, which I call ‘the Pure Form Interpretation’, anger is essentially a compound made up of two definitionally distinct features, one purely psychological (a desire for revenge: its form) and the other physical (the boiling of the blood: its matter), where the latter in some way ‘underlies’ the former. In the other, described as ‘the Impure Form Interpretation’, the type of desire for revenge referred to in the definition of anger (its form) is inseparable in definition from (and not abstractable from) physical features such as, for example, the boiling blood. The type of desire which defines anger is itself defined as a boiling-of-the-blood-(or hot-) desire for revenge. Aristotle’s comments in De Anima A.1 are, it is argued, best understood in line with the Impure Form Interpretation, as defining anger as an inextricably psycho-physical type of desire for revenge, not decomposable into two definitionally separate features, one purely psychological, one purely physical.

Enmattered Form

Aristotle acceptance of [A] and [B], as set out in the Introduction, reflects his general hylomorphic theory of natural objects. That theory, as developed in the Physics and Metaphysics, is best understood in terms of the Impure Form and not the Pure Form Interpretation. More specifically, it is argued that he held that [A] The forms of natural objects are inextricably enmattered, inseparable in definition from material features or material activities, and that [B] The matter of natural objects is inextricable in definition from such forms. Further, it is suggested that he held [A] because he believed that [C] The forms of natural objects have to be inextricably enmattered to play the causal roles required of them. Aristotle’s discussion of forms was, it seems, partly motivated by the role of forms as causes of materal change. This way of interpreting Aristotle’s version of the hylomorphic structure of natural objects is contrasted with several other interpretations. Several problems are raised for the Impure Form Interpretation which will be addressed in subsequent chapters.

Introduction

Aristotle developed a way of understanding psychological phenomena, such as the emotions, desire, and perception, that differs in important ways from those favoured by nearly all post-Cartesian philosophersIn his view [A] these psychological phenomena are defined as inextricably psycho-physical activities, not definable by decomposition into two definitionally separate types of activity or feature, one purely psychological, the other purely physical, and [B] the relevant specific type of physical activity cannot be defined without explicit reference in its definition to some psycho-physical activity. It too is an inextricably psycho-physical activity, not to be defined in terms of two definitionally separate components. Aristotle did not accept the assumptions that we make in setting up the mind–body problem we have inherited from Descartes. From Aristotle’s perspective, our problem is badly formulated.

Perception, Desire, and Action

Aristotle, it is argued, applied the style of account he developed for perception of sounds, colours, and tastes to the perception of objects, their size and movement, and to imagination and practical thought. His discussion of these topics is best understood, in line with the Impure Form Interpretation, as presenting them as, in the way explained, inextricably psycho-physical. It constitutes his attempt to develop an integrated picture of how perception leads to desire and to bodily action in unified, essentially and inextricably embodied human subjects. This discussion provides the basis for an understanding of his account of the distinctively human soul and its characteristic activities.

Hearing, Seeing, and Hylomorphism

Aristotle, it is argued, defined visual perception and hearing as inextricably psycho-physical, not definable in terms of a purely psychological component and a purely physical one. The relevant capacities, like those involved in tasting, smelling and touching, are defined as essentially goal-directed enmattered capacities. They have to be inextricably psycho-physical in this way to be causes and effects of material processes. If this is correct, Aristotle did not accept that these types of perceiving are to be defined in terms of purely psychological phenomena realized in purely physical states or events. His account of all these types of perception follows the pattern set by his discussion of the emotions and desire and is best understood in terms of the Impure Form Interpretation, as developed in Chapters 1 and 2. It is not a version of the two component account proposed by some interpreters. It is further suggested that his account of visual perception is consistent with a version of direct realism, once his ontology of processes and activities is properly understood.

Taste and Smell

It is argued in this chapter that Aristotle developed an account of tasting, smelling, and touching as inextricably psycho-physical phenomena. In his theory, they have to be defined as inextricably psycho-physical (and possessed of forms of this type) to be causally produced in the way they are by flavours, smells, and the impact of hot or heavy objects. This interpretation is supported by a discussion of the details of his account and by consideration of the type of activity essentially involved in perceiving. Several alternative, two component, interpretations are considered and critically assessed.

Aristotle’s Undivided Self

Several arguments are examined which, if convincing, would justify the rejection of Aristotle’s contention that psychological phenomena are, in the sense explained, inextricably psycho-physical. The arguments considered are designed to support the claim that desire, perception, and the emotions have to be defined in terms of two definitionally separate components, one purely psychological, the other purely physical. Several of these arguments were developed by Descartes and subsequent philosophers to set up the mind–body problem that we confront today. These arguments, I suggest, do not compel the rejection of Aristotle’s position, as they rest on assumptions that he would, with good reason, not accept. Indeed, if we are entitled to adopt his position as our starting point, we can effectively undermine the arguments ranged against it. Aristotle, so understood, offers a way to dissolve the mind–body problem we have inherited by challenging the very terms in which it has been formulated. Nor does his approach require us, as some have suggested, to adopt a radically alien, ‘pan psychic’, account of matter. His views constitute an alternative to basic elements of our conventional thinking about psychological phenomena and their place in a material world. They offer, in effect, the resources to dissolve, rather than solve, the mind–body problem we have inherited. Properly understood, they point to a new, and potentially more fruitful, way to study a wide range of psychological phenomena.

Desire and Action

Aristotle held, it is argued, that desire, like anger, is to be defined as inextricably psycho-physical process (or activity), a specific type of bodily change. It is the realization of a goal-directed essentially material capacity. This is the type of capacity required if desire is to be the efficient cause of bodily movements, their origin and controller. Its form, if constituted by this capacity, needs to be, in its own nature, an enmattered form to be their cause. This account of desire is an instance of the Impure Form Interpretation developed in Chapters 1 and 2. It is argued that this interpretation best capatures Aristotle’s own positive theory and his critical remarks on alternatives, such as the ‘harmony theory’. Attempts to understand his account of desire in terms of two definitionally distinct components, one purely psychological, one purely physical, are rejected as inadequate because they cannot properly accommodate the efficient causal role he attributed to its form.