scholarly journals Climate Finance, Carbon Market Mechanisms and Finance “Blending” as Instruments to Support NDC Achievement under the Paris Agreement

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jon Strand
2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jin-Young Moon ◽  
Jione Jung ◽  
Jihei Song ◽  
Sung Hee Lee

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  

As one of the leading development partners for Latin American and the Caribbean (LAC), the Inter-American Development Bank Group (IDB Group) is fully committed to lead by example on climate change action. Since the signing of the Paris Agreement, the IDB Group has provided over $20 billion in Climate Finance, amounting to about 60% of all Climate Finance to the region from Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs).


2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 136-160
Author(s):  
Charlotte Streck ◽  
Moritz von Unger ◽  
Sandra Greiner

The 25th session of the Conference of the Parties (cop-25) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (unfccc) became the longest cop on record – but yielded few results. It appears that four years after the adoption of the Paris Agreement, enthusiasm has waned and political bargaining and bean-counting have taken over. Countries, for even the slightest chance to keep temperatures ‘well below’ 2 degrees Celsius, must do much more than they have previously committed to and accelerate the shift towards a zero-carbon economy. However, the conference largely failed to heed the rallying cry of the Chilean presidency. The flagship decisions (grouped under the banner “Chile-Madrid Time for Action”) neither produced new commitments – enhancing ambition or finance for developing countries – nor new rules that would nudge countries closer to the climate action targets needed. The leftover pieces from last year’s negotiations of the “Paris Rulebook” were also not resolved, in particular the unfinished decisions on Article 6 on market- and non-market mechanisms. The procrastination shows that the new architecture of the Paris Agreement, while addressing several of the shortcomings of the Kyoto Protocol, suffers from its own weaknesses. The meager results of Madrid give reason to pause and reflect on the conditions that may hold countries back from fully embracing the Paris Agreement, but also to consider the future and nature of carbon markets and what is making the issue so difficult to resolve.


Climate Law ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 21-39 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hao Zhang

This article examines the substantive and procedural rules on climate finance adopted as part of the Paris Rulebook. It finds that the Rulebook has occasioned some important progress, less on substance than on procedure facilitating greater transparency. On substance, the Rulebook recognizes the existing goal by developed-country parties to the unfccc to raise $100 billion of climate finance per year by 2020 and it provides for a process to be initiated in 2020 to determine a new collective goal that will be no less than the existing one. On procedure, the Rulebook establishes extensive reporting obligations for improved understanding of climate-finance flows. By examining the implementation challenges and gaps, this article discusses whether the climate-finance provisions of the Paris Agreement as developed through its Rulebook will be able to remain consistent with the applicable principles of international law on climate finance and thus drive a comprehensive shift in finance flows.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (01) ◽  
pp. 2050002
Author(s):  
MARÍA VICTORIA ROMÁN ◽  
IÑAKI ARTO ◽  
ALBERTO ANSUATEGI ◽  
IBON GALARRAGA

The Paris Agreement states that from 2020 developed countries will mobilize at least USD 100 billion per year to support climate action in developing countries. The attainment of this objective involves decisions by donor countries about the channel and destination of climate finance disbursements. This paper explores how the spending conditions associated to different disbursement options can affect the opportunities for donors to expand their exports. In particular, using a Multiregional Input-Output Model, it finds that donors have an economic incentive for choosing bilateral channels that enable to tie aid to the detriment of multilateral ones, such as the Green Climate Fund. On the other hand, local content requirements imposed by recipient countries do not substantially affect donors’ exports, since they do not reduce intermediate exports, which represent a relevant share of the total exports generated by the mitigation and adaptation actions analysed.


Energy Policy ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 129 ◽  
pp. 397-409 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thais Diniz Oliveira ◽  
Angelo Costa Gurgel ◽  
Steve Tonry

2021 ◽  
Vol 26 (5) ◽  
pp. 23-40
Author(s):  
Oscar Rosario Gugliotta

Abstract In all matters regarding climate change, the modern world presents complex challenges which highlight how investments in infrastructure have as of yet been inconclusive. The emission percentages calculated by relevant studies demonstrate the need for long-term investments in infrastructures, to ultimately reduce the impact on the environment and our health. To this end, in alignment with the principles expressed in the Paris Agreement – reducing global warming and incentivising a zero-emission transportation system – and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), these new infrastructures will require a structural change that can be guaranteed by multilateral development banks (MDBs), given their nature, especially within developing countries. MDBs play an important role in supporting local governments, on the one hand creating a prosperous environment for sustainable infrastructures and, on the other, providing innovative financial instruments that could increase the financial sector’s participation. In this paper, aft er a brief excursus on the Paris Agreement’s role in the global climatic crisis, there will be an evaluation of the relations between MDBs and climate finance, with a focus on green bonds.


Subject Green Climate Fund. Significance The Green Climate Fund (GCF) held its first replenishment conference in late October, seeing 9.78 billion dollars pledged for the next four years of operations. That amount exceeds the initial capital pledged in 2014, relieving fears that the impending US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement in 2020 might drag down confidence in the Fund. This public source of climate finance is politically important in catalysing action in developing countries. However, overall global climate finance is still falling far short of the amounts required to meet the Paris Agreement goals. Impacts ‘Gold standard’ requirements for GCF project approval will push institutions to raise standards in areas such as 'gender mainstreaming'. Civil society groups are beginning to assess more systematically the effectiveness of different climate finance approaches. Deeper private sector engagement will be a major GCF future focus area, with co-financing leveraging additional investment.


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