IDB Group and Climate Action

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  

As one of the leading development partners for Latin American and the Caribbean (LAC), the Inter-American Development Bank Group (IDB Group) is fully committed to lead by example on climate change action. Since the signing of the Paris Agreement, the IDB Group has provided over $20 billion in Climate Finance, amounting to about 60% of all Climate Finance to the region from Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs).

2021 ◽  
Vol 26 (5) ◽  
pp. 23-40
Author(s):  
Oscar Rosario Gugliotta

Abstract In all matters regarding climate change, the modern world presents complex challenges which highlight how investments in infrastructure have as of yet been inconclusive. The emission percentages calculated by relevant studies demonstrate the need for long-term investments in infrastructures, to ultimately reduce the impact on the environment and our health. To this end, in alignment with the principles expressed in the Paris Agreement – reducing global warming and incentivising a zero-emission transportation system – and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), these new infrastructures will require a structural change that can be guaranteed by multilateral development banks (MDBs), given their nature, especially within developing countries. MDBs play an important role in supporting local governments, on the one hand creating a prosperous environment for sustainable infrastructures and, on the other, providing innovative financial instruments that could increase the financial sector’s participation. In this paper, aft er a brief excursus on the Paris Agreement’s role in the global climatic crisis, there will be an evaluation of the relations between MDBs and climate finance, with a focus on green bonds.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Onil Banerjee ◽  
Martin Cicowiez ◽  
Ana Rios ◽  
Cicero De Lima

In this paper, we assess the economy-wide impact of Climate Change (CC) on agriculture and food security in 20 Latin American and the Caribbean (LAC) countries. Specifically, we focus on the following three channels through which CC may affect agricultural and non-agricultural production: (i) agricultural yields; (ii) labor productivity in agriculture, and; (iii) economy-wide labor productivity. We implement the analysis using the Integrated Economic-Environmental Model (IEEM) and databases for 20 LAC available through the OPEN IEEM Platform. Our analysis identifies those countries most affected according to key indicators including Gross Domestic Product (GDP), international commerce, sectoral output, poverty, and emissions. Most countries experience negative impacts on GDP, with the exception of the major soybean producing countries, namely, Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay. We find that CC-induced crop productivity and labor productivity changes affect countries differently. The combined impact, however, indicates that Belize, Nicaragua, Guatemala and Paraguay would fare the worst. Early identification of these hardest hit countries can enable policy makers pre-empting these effects and beginning the design of adaptation strategies early on. In terms of greenhouse gas emissions, only Argentina, Chile and Uruguay would experience small increases in emissions.


Author(s):  
Lichtenstein Natalie

Chapter 5, Membership, lays out the framework that was agreed for AIIB membership. AIIB membership is open to any member of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) or Asian Development Bank (AsDB). All of the Prospective Founding Members that signed the AIIB Charter can become members (almost all have already joined). New members are approved by AIIB’s Board of Governors; more than twenty new members were approved in 2017. This Chapter describes the benefits for Founding Members, and the differences for regional and non-regional members. AIIB’s regional members are located in Asia, under a United Nations definition. Regional members are expected to represent 75% of AIIB’s shareholding, and the President must be a national of a regional member. AIIB also has provisions for withdrawal and suspension of membership, very close to the provisions for other multilateral development banks. Tables compare IBRD, AsDB and AIIB membership (regional and non-regional, and new AIIB approvals).


2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 136-160
Author(s):  
Charlotte Streck ◽  
Moritz von Unger ◽  
Sandra Greiner

The 25th session of the Conference of the Parties (cop-25) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (unfccc) became the longest cop on record – but yielded few results. It appears that four years after the adoption of the Paris Agreement, enthusiasm has waned and political bargaining and bean-counting have taken over. Countries, for even the slightest chance to keep temperatures ‘well below’ 2 degrees Celsius, must do much more than they have previously committed to and accelerate the shift towards a zero-carbon economy. However, the conference largely failed to heed the rallying cry of the Chilean presidency. The flagship decisions (grouped under the banner “Chile-Madrid Time for Action”) neither produced new commitments – enhancing ambition or finance for developing countries – nor new rules that would nudge countries closer to the climate action targets needed. The leftover pieces from last year’s negotiations of the “Paris Rulebook” were also not resolved, in particular the unfinished decisions on Article 6 on market- and non-market mechanisms. The procrastination shows that the new architecture of the Paris Agreement, while addressing several of the shortcomings of the Kyoto Protocol, suffers from its own weaknesses. The meager results of Madrid give reason to pause and reflect on the conditions that may hold countries back from fully embracing the Paris Agreement, but also to consider the future and nature of carbon markets and what is making the issue so difficult to resolve.


2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-28
Author(s):  
Charlotte Streck

The 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change abandons the Kyoto Protocol’s paradigm of binding emissions targets and relies instead on countries’ voluntary contributions. However, the Paris Agreement encourages not only governments but also sub-national governments, corporations and civil society to contribute to reaching ambitious climate goals. In a transition from the regulated architecture of the Kyoto Protocol to the open system of the Paris Agreement, the Agreement seeks to integrate non-state actors into the treaty-based climate regime. In 2014 the secretariat of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Peru and France created the Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action (and launched the Global Climate Action portal). In December 2019, this portal recorded more than twenty thousand climate-commitments of private and public non-state entities, making the non-state venues of international climate meetings decisively more exciting than the formal negotiation space. This level engagement and governments’ response to it raises a flurry of questions in relation to the evolving nature of the climate regime and climate change governance, including the role of private actors as standard setters and the lack of accountability mechanisms for non-state actions. This paper takes these developments as occasion to discuss the changing role of private actors in the climate regime.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (01) ◽  
pp. 2050002
Author(s):  
MARÍA VICTORIA ROMÁN ◽  
IÑAKI ARTO ◽  
ALBERTO ANSUATEGI ◽  
IBON GALARRAGA

The Paris Agreement states that from 2020 developed countries will mobilize at least USD 100 billion per year to support climate action in developing countries. The attainment of this objective involves decisions by donor countries about the channel and destination of climate finance disbursements. This paper explores how the spending conditions associated to different disbursement options can affect the opportunities for donors to expand their exports. In particular, using a Multiregional Input-Output Model, it finds that donors have an economic incentive for choosing bilateral channels that enable to tie aid to the detriment of multilateral ones, such as the Green Climate Fund. On the other hand, local content requirements imposed by recipient countries do not substantially affect donors’ exports, since they do not reduce intermediate exports, which represent a relevant share of the total exports generated by the mitigation and adaptation actions analysed.


Forests ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (10) ◽  
pp. 621 ◽  
Author(s):  
Augusto Castro-Nunez

Linking climate action with sustainable development goals (SDGs) might incentivize social and political support to forest conservation. However, further examination of the conceptual entry points for linking efforts for reducing forest-based emissions with those for delivering SDGs is required. This review paper aims to contribute to fulfilling this research need. It provides insights into the links between conserving forests for climate change mitigation and peacebuilding. Specifically, the paper examines opportunities to harness climate finance for conserving forests and achieving long-lasting peace and sustainable food. It does so via a literature review and the examination of the Orinoquia region of Colombia. The findings from the literature review suggest that harnessing climate finance for conserving forests and peacebuilding is, in theory, viable if the activities are designed in accordance with social, institutional, and economic factors. Meanwhile, the Orinoquia region provides evidence that these two seemingly intractable problems are proposed to be solved together. At a time when efforts for reducing forest-based emissions are being designed and targeted at (post-) conflict areas in Colombia and elsewhere, the paper’s findings might demonstrate the compatibility of programs aimed at reducing forest-based emissions with efforts relating to peacebuilding and sustainable food to both environmental and non-environmental government agencies.


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