scholarly journals IZQUIERDO-SANS, C.; MARTÍNEZ-CAPDEVILA, C.; NOGUEIRA-GUASTAVINO, M. (Eds.), Fundamental Rights Challenges. Horizontal Effectiveness, Rule of Law and Margin of National Appreciation, Springer, 2021, 298 páginas.

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (42) ◽  
Author(s):  
Luis González Alonso
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Fundamental Rights

scholarly journals Rights and Powers in the European Union: Towards a Charter that is Fully Applicable to the Member States?

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Aida TORRES PÉREZ
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Rights Protection ◽  
Scope Of Application ◽  
Judicial Protection ◽  
Eu Fundamental Rights ◽  
The Eu

Abstract This contribution will tackle a central question for the architecture of fundamental rights protection in the EU: can we envision a Charter that fully applies to the Member States, even beyond the limits of its scope of application? To improve our understanding of the boundaries of the Charter and the potential for further expansion, I will examine the legal avenues through which the CJEU has extended the scope of application of EU fundamental rights in fields of state powers. While the latent pull of citizenship towards a more expansive application of the Charter has not been fully realized, the principle of effective judicial protection (Article 19(1) TEU) has recently shown potential for protection under EU law beyond the boundaries of the Charter. As will be argued, effective judicial protection may well become a doorway for full application of the Charter to the Member States. While such an outcome might currently seem politically unsound, I contend that a progressive case-by-case expansion of the applicability of the Charter to the Member States would be welcome from the standpoint of a robust notion of the rule of law in the EU.

Judicial independence as a precondition for mutual trust? The CJEU in Minister for Justice and Equality v. LM

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 353-365 ◽  
Author(s):  
Petra Bárd ◽  
Wouter van Ballegooij
Keyword(s):  
Member State ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Mutual Recognition ◽  
Judicial Independence ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Judicial Cooperation ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
State Compliance ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Eu

This article discusses the relationship between judicial independence and intra-European Union (EU) cooperation in criminal matters based on the principle of mutual recognition. It focuses on the recent judgment by the Court of Justice of the EU in Case C-216/18 PPU Minister for Justice and Equality v. LM. In our view, a lack of judicial independence needs to be addressed primarily as a rule of law problem. This implies that executing judicial authorities should freeze judicial cooperation in the event should doubts arise as to respect for the rule of law in the issuing Member State. Such a measure should stay in place until the matter is resolved in accordance with the procedure provided for in Article 7 TEU or a permanent mechanism for monitoring and addressing Member State compliance with democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights. The Court, however, constructed the case as a possible violation of the right to a fair trial, the essence of which includes the requirement that tribunals are independent and impartial. This latter aspect could be seen as a positive step forward in the sense that the judicial test developed in the Aranyosi case now includes rule of law considerations with regard to judicial independence. However, the practical hurdles imposed by the Court on the defence in terms of proving such violations and on judicial authorities to accept them in individual cases might amount to two steps back in upholding the rule of law within the EU.

scholarly journals Powers and Limits of State during COVID-19 Pandemic: a Critical Appraisal

Yuridika ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 663
Author(s):  
Iwan Satriawan ◽  
Devi Seviyana
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Critical Appraisal ◽  
Balance Of Power ◽  
The State ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
State Of Emergency ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Power Limits ◽  
The Government

The research aims to analyze the power and limit of the state and whether Indonesia has properly adopted the concept of powers and limits during state emergency of COVID-19 pandemic. The method of the research was normative legal research which used statute and case approach were employed for data analysis. The result shows that a state may apply some types of power in an emergency condition. However, in using its powers, the government must consider principle of limits in a state of emergency. In fact, Indonesia does not properly adopt the balance of power and limit in the state of emergency during COVID-19 pandemic. It is true that the government may take actions to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the State cannot exceed the limitations of using powers in accordance with state emergency principle. There was a tendency to exceed the limits by the State during the pandemic. The State has violated some state of emergency principles during COVID-19 pandemic such as temporary, the rule of law, necessity, proportionally, intangibility, constitutionalism, harmony, and supervision. The research recommends that the Government and the House of Representatives (the DPR) in the future should obey the state of emergency principles, particularly in terms of state power limits to respect constitutional principles and rule of law. In addition, individuals, groups of people, or organizations may submit judicial review of laws or regulations that violate the state of emergency principles in handling pandemic in the light of protecting the fundamental rights of citizens.

scholarly journals Non-Positivist ‘Higher Norms’ and ‘Formal’ Positivism: Interpretation of the Ethiopian Criminal Law

2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-118
Author(s):  
Simeneh Kiros Assefa
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
Common Good ◽  
Legal Theory ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
The Common Good ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Common

The criminal law is adopted as a means of achieving the common good; it is interpreted and applied by the court. The judge chooses the type of legal theory and method to employ in the interpretation and application of the criminal law. Such theories may be acquired from higher norms or from the decision of the Supreme Court. Because such choice of theory and method determines the outcome of the case, the judge is also expected to be guided by the doctrines in criminal law inspired by the values of rule of law and respect for fundamental rights, enshrined in the Constitution. This article examines how courts harmonise the application of the positive criminal law with the non-positivist theories of higher norms. After reviewing various criminal rules and their judicial application, it finds that the court applies the criminal law as it is written in disregard of the non-positivist theories of higher norms, at times in contradiction to the basic doctrines of the criminal law itself.

Pegasus scandal is unlikely to unseat Hungary’s Orban

2021 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Israeli Government ◽  
The Eu

Significance Revelations of hacking into the phones of civic activists, journalists and politicians have caused a major media storm in Hungary, without any clear political ramifications. Hungary’s Fidesz-led government is alone in the EU in being identified, by a former employee of the Pegasus developer, as a client of the firm. Impacts Poor attendance at the July 26 protest suggests the scandal’s lack of political potential. The EU’s response to fundamental rights violations, potentially including use of its new rule-of-law mechanism, will be tested. An Israeli inquiry into spyware exports will set the tone of Fidesz’s relationship with the new Israeli government.

The Rule of Law and Good Governance

2019 ◽  
pp. 75-90
Author(s):  
Henk Addink
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Good Governance ◽  
Common Law ◽  
The State ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Judicial Control ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Government ◽  
Continental Tradition

The concept of the rule of law has different—common law and continental—historical roots and traditional perspectives. The common law tradition is more focused on limiting the powers of the state, whereas the continental tradition focuses on not just to limit but also to empower the government. But both systems have a focus on the rule of law. The rule of law in the classical liberal tradition is based on four elements: legality, division and balance of powers, independent judicial control, and protection of fundamental rights. The differences between rule of law and rechtsstaat are: different concepts of the state, mixed legal systems and different approaches of a constitution, and different perspectives on human rights. There are two levels of development: a model in which law is a way of structuring and restricting the power of the state, the second level is more subjective and has important individual positions. The concept of good governance related to these developments makes clear the need to broaden the concept of the rule of law.

Constitutional Court and Constitutional Review in Albania

ICL Journal ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Brunilda Bara ◽  
Jonad Bara
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Constitutional Review ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Historical Changes ◽  
Division Of Powers ◽  
Fundamental Rights And Freedoms ◽  
Legal Writers

AbstractThis article tends to give an insight on the historical and institutional develop­ment of the Constitutional Court of Albania, on the need of the society and the historical changes that led to its creation.It focuses especially on the role and competences of this Court on the protection of the rule of law, of the constitutional principles, on the balancing and division of powers, on the protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals. Its aim is to provide overall information on the functioning and standards it follows.It is based on the jurisprudence of this Court during the years and is enriched by its deci­sions on particular subjects and compares this Court to other similar ones in Eastern Euro­pean countries.The article is mainly directed to scholars and legal writers whose aim is to compare the organization and functioning of the Constitutional Court of Albania to other similar courts.

scholarly journals El recurso directo: entre protección jurídica y constitucionalidad objetiva = Directation: between legal protection and objetive constitutionality

2014 ◽  
pp. 319
Author(s):  
Otto Pfersmann
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Legal System ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Direct Action ◽  
Legal Protection ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Constitutional Rule ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Constitutional Judicial Review

La posibilidad de que los individuos dispongan de un «recurso directo» para cuestionar normas del sistema jurídico ante el juez de la constitucionalidad no constituye un elemento necesario del Estado constitucional de Derecho. La institución de los «derechos fundamentales», no requiere, en cuanto tal, que la protección de los mismos deba corresponder al juez de la constitucionalidad de las leyes. Lo que permite distinguir los diferentes modelos es el grado en que concentran y distribuyen estas tareas (protección de derechos fundamentales y control de constitucionalidad de la ley, básicamente). Esto depende de varios factores: el grado de exhaustividad del control de la constitucionalidad de las normas, el tipo de supervisión (preventivo o correctivo), el número de órganos encargados del control y el número de componentes del mismo. Se plantea así el problema de la limitación que aqueja al Estado de Derecho, pues cuanto más exhaustiva pretende ser la realización del mismo, menos intensa resulta produciendo un paradójico debilitamiento del derecho fundamental y del principio de exhaustividad. Asistimos, pues, a una mutación del principio «monomicrodicástico» y exhaustivo de jurisdicción constitucional.The possibility for individuals to have a «direct action» to challenge the norms of the legal system before the judge of the constitutionality is not a necessary element of the constitutional Rule of law. The institution «fundamental rights» does not require, as such, that the judge of the constitutionality of the parliamentary statutes should grant their protection. What allows distinguishing the different models is the degree of the concentration and distribution of these basic tasks: protection of the fundamental rights, constitutional judicial review. This depends upon various factors: how exhaust the constitutional judicial review should be, what kind of constitutional supervision may be (preventive or corrective), the number of the organs charged with this task, and the number of its components. The question of the limitation of the Rule of Law is risen, because the more exhaustive its implementation is intended, the less intense, generating a paradoxal weakness of the fundamental right and the completeness principie. A phenomenon appears: the mutation of the «monomicrodicastic» principie and the completeness of the constitutional judicial review.

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