scholarly journals Dismantling obstacles impeding better governance in companies: Affirming the expansion of the interpretation of "shareholder and director" under section 163 of the 2008 Act

2021 ◽  
Vol 25 ◽  
pp. 1-34
Author(s):  
Simphiwe S Bidie
Keyword(s):  
Company Law ◽  
Contextual Approach ◽  
Corporate Accountability ◽  
Stakeholder Interests ◽  
Locus Standi ◽  
Company Directors

Impediments to corporate accountability have over the recent years manifested in diverse forms. What took place in Peel v Hamon J&C Engineering (Pty) Ltd is a case in point. The aim of this article is in two forms. First, from the commentaries and cases consulted, it is clear that the character of who must qualify in terms of the section 163 criterion is not settled. Moreover, this can be gleaned from the criticisms against Moshidi J's judgment in Peel for having extended/expanded the section 163 remedy to afford relief to shareholders and directors whom the legislature may not have contemplated to cover under the relief. The aim here is to argue in support of this expansion as promoting accountability. Secondly, it is to make some comments on the criterion that it is only a shareholder and a director who are accorded locus standi to invoke the remedy. From the discussion, the paper makes numerous commendable observations. First, the complaint raised in Peel was not an abuse of process; it was a genuine complaint/application seeking to address genuine and novel issues which often arise between the parties in company law. Second, Moshidi J's judgment demonstrates evolution/progress for its contextual approach to the section 163 remedy's interpretation. The judgment heralds/foreshadows colossal principles/practices within company law aimed at balancing stakeholder interests. Third, the judgment potently disentangles hurdles which normally impede accountability by company directors. Lastly, the paper recommends that other stakeholders be considered for relief under the remedy.

The Role of the Directors

2021 ◽  
pp. 125-194
Author(s):  
Eva Micheler
Keyword(s):  
Public Interest ◽  
Company Law ◽  
Economic Interests ◽  
Financial Reports ◽  
The Public ◽  
Company Directors ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Uk

This chapter describes the role of the directors. The duties of the directors are owed to the company and while the shareholders are the primary indirect beneficiaries of those duties, the law integrates the interests of creditors and also of wider society. The law is primarily focused on ensuring compliance with the Companies Act and the constitution rather than with the enhancement of economic interests. The Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 serves as a mechanism through which the public interest is integrated into company law, while the UK Corporate Governance Code adds a further procedural dimension to the operation of the board of directors. The chapter then looks at how the idea of designing remuneration in a way that guides the directors to act either for the benefit of the shareholder or for the benefit of the company is flawed and has served as a motor justifying increasing rewards without bringing about commensurate increases in performance. It also analyses the duties of the directors to keep accounting records and to produce financial reports.

Company Law Concentrate

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lee Roach
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Company Law ◽  
Capital Maintenance ◽  
Essential Information ◽  
Company Directors ◽  
Royal Dutch Shell ◽  
Business Structures ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Corporate Rescue

Each Concentrate revision guide is packed with essential information, key cases, revision tips, exam Q&As, and more. Concentrates show you what to expect in a law exam, what examiners are looking for, and how to achieve extra marks. Company Law Concentrate helps readers to consolidate knowledge in this area of law. This fifth edition includes coverage of the government’s corporate governance review, proposed updates to the UK Corporate Governance Code and the UK Stewardship Code, developments regarding unlisted companies and corporate governance, and notable case law developments, such as His Royal Highness Okpabi v Royal Dutch Shell plc [2018] and Re Sherlock Holmes International Society Ltd [2016]. Chapters examine business structures, incorporation, the constitution of the company, directors, members, corporate governance, capital and capital maintenance issues, members’ remedies, and corporate rescue and liquidation.

UK company law and precarious employment contracts

2017 ◽  
Vol 59 (4) ◽  
pp. 571-583
Author(s):  
Ernestine Ndzi
Keyword(s):  
Company Law ◽  
Employment Contracts ◽  
Precarious Employment ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Advantages And Disadvantages ◽  
Potential Abuse ◽  
Company Directors ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Employment Rights ◽  
The Impact

PurposeThis paper aim to examine the implication of section 172(1)(b) on employment rights, particularly on workers on precarious employment contracts. The aim of the paper is to analyse whether company directors have any liability for potential abuse of worker on precarious employment contracts. The paper examine the advantage of companies recruiting staff on precarious employment contracts and the effect of such contract on the worker. Design/methodology/approachThe paper reviews case law, statutory provisions and academic opinions on precarious employment contracts and its advantages and disadvantages to the company and the worker. The paper critically reviews the impact of Section 172(1)(b) of the Companies Act 2006 on precarious employment contract workers. FindingsThe paper argues that companies benefit more from precarious employment contracts than workers do. The Companies Act 2006 is silent on whether directors should factor the interest of precarious employment worker when making company decision, thereby leaving these workers in a vulnerable position and at the mercy of the employers. Originality/valueThe paper offers a different argument about why the use of precarious employment contracts is on the rise in the UK. It highlights the silence of the Companies Act 2006 as a driver for the increase in the use of precarious employment contracts in the UK.

scholarly journals A builder's duty of care - When should it apply to the directors and employees of companies involved in the creation of defective buildings?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Grant Brittain
Keyword(s):  
Complex Structure ◽  
Economic Loss ◽  
Company Law ◽  
Duty Of Care ◽  
Minor Parties ◽  
Financial Interest ◽  
Building Set ◽  
Company Directors ◽  
The Creation ◽  
Summary Judgment

<p>This thesis considers the issue of when a tortious duty of care to prevent economic loss should be imposed on the company directors and employees who stand behind the complex structure of companies and contracts involved in the creation of a defective building. Set against the background of the leaky building crisis, and what are (it is argued) unfair litigation outcomes, the thesis traverses the emergence and development of the principles that underpin liability for negligence and negligent misstatement in respect of defective buildings. A review of the cases confirms that the concepts of control and general reliance are the basis of New Zealand law in this area. There follows a discussion of the difficult relationship between company law principles and negligence principles, and the role of assumption of responsibility in the law of negligence and negligent misstatement, including a discussion of developments in the leaky building litigation. The thesis advanced is that, in respect of the creation of defective buildings, the approach to the issue of whether to impose a duty of care on company directors and employees would benefit from placing significant weight on the factor of de facto control of the inputs that dictate the outcome of a building project, and on the lower level factor of a direct or indirect financial interest in the outcome of the project.  It is argued that the approach to imposing a duty of care should be the same for directors and employees and in respect of statements and actions. In cases where the evidence establishes that the financial interest factor is not present, this should give rise to an inference that the company director or employee does not have control of the inputs that dictate the outcome of the project, so that no duty of care arises. This would enable a director or employee to exit litigation by way of an application for summary judgment. This is intended to discourage the practice of joining minor parties to litigation for the purpose of extracting a precautionary settlement. If control of the inputs that dictate the outcome of a project can be established by inference from the existence of the financial interest factor, or by the other evidence, then the two stage approach to the imposition of a duty of care would require a consideration of other factors that might negate the duty, such as the contractual matrix.</p>

scholarly journals Are Corporate Governance Code Disclosure and Engagement Principles Effective Vehicles for Corporate Accountability? The United Kingdom as a Case Study

2018 ◽  
Vol 23 ◽  
pp. 177-208 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gill North
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
United Kingdom ◽  
Public Discourse ◽  
Company Law ◽  
Public Communication ◽  
Corporate Accountability ◽  
Corporate Governance Code ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
Private And Public

Disclosure and engagement principles are included in every corporate governance code, reflecting a critical emphasis on communication as a vehicle for corporate accountability. These communication principles have been a focus of reform worldwide, prompted by shifts in financial market and social expectations of corporations. The article examines the disclosure and engagement provisions in the Corporate Governance Code in the United Kingdom (and the proposed reforms to these provisions) as a case study. The proposed initiatives seek to strengthen the voice of employees and enhance disclosure around environmental and social concerns. However, this article contends that the gains achieved from these reforms may be marginal due to structural deficiencies. The incremental disclosure and engagement obligations are expected to be flexible and loosely phrased, with a negligible probability of significant market consequences or regulatory intervention. Moreover, most substantive corporate communication will continue to occur at private forums between directors and selected institutional investors. In financial markets with these regulatory settings, effective governance mechanisms to ensure broad and independent accountability of corporations are lacking or weak. Indeed, these legal structures encourage and legitimise carefully differentiated private and public communication channels, with the public discourse used to present a sparkling company image. Policy makers need to re-consider their reliance on private forums to improve governance standards and ensure that public communication frameworks are inclusive, responsive, probative and enforced. In this way, company law will start to meet the growing calls for corporates to act as responsible citizens.

10. Company law II: directors, finance, and capital

2019 ◽  
pp. 143-159
Author(s):  
James Marson ◽  
Katy Ferris
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Company Law ◽  
Public Companies ◽  
Essential Information ◽  
Minority Protection ◽  
Company Directors ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
A Company

Each Concentrate revision guide is packed with essential information, key cases, revision tips, exam Q&As, and more. Concentrates show you what to expect in a law exam, what examiners are looking for, and how to achieve extra marks. This chapter discusses the law governing company directors and shareholders. The common law duties on directors have been codified and expanded through the Companies Act (CA) 2006. Directors are responsible to the company itself, not to individual shareholders. Minority protection (of shareholders) is provided through the CA 2006 to restrict directors’ acts that may unfairly disadvantage them. Public companies must have a company secretary and they must satisfy statutory requirements in relation to their qualifications. Shareholders have no automatic right of management in the company although, through attendance and the rights to vote at shareholder meetings, they may have influence over the business conducted.

Company Law Concentrate

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lee Roach
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Company Law ◽  
Capital Maintenance ◽  
Essential Information ◽  
Sixth Edition ◽  
Company Directors ◽  
Business Structures ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Corporate Rescue

Each Concentrate revision guide is packed with essential information, key cases, revision tips, exam Q&As, and more. Concentrates show you what to expect in a law exam, what examiners are looking for, and how to achieve extra marks. Company Law Concentrate helps readers to consolidate knowledge in this area of law. This sixth edition has been fully updated and includes coverage of the 2018 UK Corporate Governance Code, the Wates Corporate Governance Principles, the UK Stewardship Code 2020, the Companies (Miscellaneous Reporting) Regulations 2018, and the reforms proposed following the consultation on insolvency and corporate governance. Case law updates include BAT Industries plc v Sequana SA [2019], Burnden Holdings (UK) Ltd v Fielding [2019], Popely v Popely [2019], and Vedanta Resources plc v Lungowe [2019]. Chapters examine business structures, incorporation, the constitution of the company, directors, members, corporate governance, capital and capital maintenance issues, members’ remedies, and corporate rescue and liquidation.

scholarly journals Company Directors’ Duties and Conflicts of Interest

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rosemary Teele Langford
Keyword(s):  
Conflicts Of Interest ◽  
Careful Analysis ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Company Law ◽  
General Law ◽  
Company Directors ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Statutory Regulation

This book contains the most detailed multi-jurisdictional analysis of directors’ conflicts available drawing together relevant case law, codes and statutory regulation from the law applying to directors of companies incorporated under the UK Companies Acts, with extensive reference to the law in Australia, Canada, Hong Kong and New Zealand. The book provides comprehensive analysis of the conflicts faced by directors and includes the important areas of conflicts of interest, conflicts of duties, unauthorised profits, corporate opportunities, multiple directorships, nominee directorships, and conflicts involving stakeholders’ interests. Difficult aspects of these topics are analysed with reference to the laws of a range of common law jurisdictions. The extensive multi-jurisdictional analysis allows solutions to be presented in relation to difficult legal issues and enables clarification of the legal approach. In addition to detailed coverage and analysis of general law duties, the specific statutory duties are outlined and analysed including those concerning related party transactions. The UK Corporate Governance Code, and Guidance on Board Effectiveness, issued by the FRC in July 2018 are covered extensively. The book provides detail on fiduciary theory, the reach of the term ‘director’, consequences of a breach, remedies, authorisation and the role of disclosure. It also contains a detailed table of key cases concerning corporate opportunities which includes the pertinent facts, whether there was a breach of directors’ duties, and a summary of the important factors in the decision made. The cases are featured in order from instances representing clear breach to those in which no breach was found. The book is significant in its thorough coverage of general law and statutory duties relating to conflicts, and its clarification of the scope and application of currently complex and uncertain duties. It provides clear guidance to academics, practitioners, directors and regulators in each of the jurisdictions on the regulation of conflicts of interest and the implementation of good regulatory practice. This is a key reference work on this important and dynamic area of company law which provides careful analysis of the law set in a practical context.

scholarly journals A builder's duty of care - When should it apply to the directors and employees of companies involved in the creation of defective buildings?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Grant Brittain
Keyword(s):  
Complex Structure ◽  
Economic Loss ◽  
Company Law ◽  
Duty Of Care ◽  
Minor Parties ◽  
Financial Interest ◽  
Building Set ◽  
Company Directors ◽  
The Creation ◽  
Summary Judgment

<p>This thesis considers the issue of when a tortious duty of care to prevent economic loss should be imposed on the company directors and employees who stand behind the complex structure of companies and contracts involved in the creation of a defective building. Set against the background of the leaky building crisis, and what are (it is argued) unfair litigation outcomes, the thesis traverses the emergence and development of the principles that underpin liability for negligence and negligent misstatement in respect of defective buildings. A review of the cases confirms that the concepts of control and general reliance are the basis of New Zealand law in this area. There follows a discussion of the difficult relationship between company law principles and negligence principles, and the role of assumption of responsibility in the law of negligence and negligent misstatement, including a discussion of developments in the leaky building litigation. The thesis advanced is that, in respect of the creation of defective buildings, the approach to the issue of whether to impose a duty of care on company directors and employees would benefit from placing significant weight on the factor of de facto control of the inputs that dictate the outcome of a building project, and on the lower level factor of a direct or indirect financial interest in the outcome of the project.  It is argued that the approach to imposing a duty of care should be the same for directors and employees and in respect of statements and actions. In cases where the evidence establishes that the financial interest factor is not present, this should give rise to an inference that the company director or employee does not have control of the inputs that dictate the outcome of the project, so that no duty of care arises. This would enable a director or employee to exit litigation by way of an application for summary judgment. This is intended to discourage the practice of joining minor parties to litigation for the purpose of extracting a precautionary settlement. If control of the inputs that dictate the outcome of a project can be established by inference from the existence of the financial interest factor, or by the other evidence, then the two stage approach to the imposition of a duty of care would require a consideration of other factors that might negate the duty, such as the contractual matrix.</p>

BEST INTERESTS: MULTIFACETED BUT NOT UNBOUNDED

2016 ◽  
Vol 75 (3) ◽  
pp. 505-527 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rosemary Teele Langford
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Fiduciary Duty ◽  
Best Interests ◽  
Stakeholder Interests ◽  
Company Directors

ABSTRACTThe best interests rule – the central fiduciary duty of company directors in a number of common law jurisdictions – encapsulates loyalty between director and company. Its multifaceted nature means that it is employed to impose a number of requirements, as demonstrated in the multi-jurisdictional analysis in this article. Contemporary commentary and cases (such as Moulin Global Eyecare Holdings Ltd. v Mei (2014) 17 HKCFAR 466, recently analysed in this Journal) have, however, doubted the fiduciary classification of the rule. This article defends the rule's fiduciary classification. After examining key facets of the rule, it demonstrates that, although flexible, the rule cannot be stretched to protect stakeholder interests independently of corporate benefit.

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