scholarly journals Corporate innovation behavior and internal governance mechanism

2010 ◽  
Vol 09 (07) ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (7) ◽  
pp. 114
Author(s):  
Xinyuan Zhang ◽  
Zhixiu Guo ◽  
Xiaorui Feng ◽  
Yan He

The equity structure is the basis for corporate governance, and the decisive factor for performance of listed companies. Considering the return on equity as the measure index of company performance, the paper has collected 2014-2016 data related to index of equity structure from 32 listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen, made descriptive statistical analysis and correlation analysis on it with spass20.0 statistical software, and discussed the relation between equity structure and performance of listed companies. The research finds that: Chinese listed companies for building industry still have relatively high equity concentration, imperfect internal governance mechanism and poor equity restriction. The effect of “bargaining” is difficultly developed to promote the growth of performance. China shall further strengthen the efforts to control, spur listed companies to reinforce the internal management, and optimize the equity structure to ensure the effective balance, with the purpose of accelerating the healthy and sustainable development of listed companies and safeguarding the interests of medium-small investors.


2014 ◽  
Vol 998-999 ◽  
pp. 1634-1637
Author(s):  
Xu Bei Zhang

This paper proceeds as follows. Corporate governance, broadly speaking, is a science which studies enterprise power arrangement. In the narrow sense, it belongs to the ownership of enterprises; it is a science which researches how to empower professional managers and to use regulatory authority to their performance of duties. The improvement of the efficiency of the state-controlled corporate governance depends on the choice of corporate governance mechanism. Constrained by the institutional environment, the corporate governance is also affected by the internal governance structure. State-owned enterprises still face great difficulties when they manager to make a clear boundary between the central enterprises and government, separate ownership and management completely, achieve a sound governance structure. Temasek has a high quality management mode. The company special board composition and the control method of the layered progressive and effective restraint mechanism play a key role. State-owned enterprises can learn from Temasek’s experience of corporate governance, and promote the reform of the governance structure, to stimulate the vitality of enterprises.


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ci Zhang ◽  
Yilin Hu ◽  
Leping Huang ◽  
Yajie Huang

This paper examines the effects of the pandemics-related uncertainty on corporate innovation in Chinese firms. For this purpose, the recent uncertainty measure of pandemics, the Pandemics Discussion Index (PDI), is used. The findings from the fixed-effects estimations show the negative impact of the PDI on corporate innovation. Government subsidies, operation profits, and total exports also positively affect corporate innovation. In addition, firms' management efficiency promotes corporate innovation. These results hold when the Blundell-Bond estimations are utilized to address potential endogeneity. Various robustness analyses, such as considering the lagged PDI and the lagged controls, are also conducted. Consequently, the main results remain robust. Thus, this paper provides novel and robust evidence on the negative impact of pandemics on Chinese firms' corporate innovation behavior.


Author(s):  
Maizatul Akmal Musa ◽  
Shahril Eashak Ismail

Objective - The aim of this paper is to study the effectiveness of institutional shareholder activism in controlling corporate behaviours in Malaysia. Methodology/Technique - this study is investigated by critical reviewing previously published articles. Findings - Earlier researchers have viewed poor corporate governance as one of the main contributing factors to a major corporate disaster. The best practice of corporate governance suggests that shareholders should actively be engaged and involved with the investee companies to provide check and balance to the governance mechanism. This is particularly crucial for companies with suspicions of poor internal governance. The engagements from shareholders, especially the institutional shareholders in critical areas will give impacts to the governance structures and practices of the companies involved. Institutional shareholders usually have the capability to perform interventions throughout the year, not only limited to annual general meetings. Novelty - This study proved that corporate governance provides a structure to facilitate performance and also to enhance corporate sustainability. Type of Paper - Conceptual Keywords: Shareholder activism; institutional shareholders; corporate governance; Emerging Market; Agency problems.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 53-64
Author(s):  
Wan Nailah Abdullah ◽  
Roshima Said ◽  
Kiymet Caliyurt

This empirical study proposes to examine one of the main areas in corporate governance i.e., the internal governance factors and their relationship with corporate financial crime and to find out whether their effectiveness as a corporate governance mechanism is still relevant in the prevention of corporate financial crime. The internal governance factors tested in the study are audit diligence, audit size, employee shares option scheme, managerial ownership and stand-alone risk management committee. The research was carried out by using a web-based data collection for corporate financial crime cases. The findings indicate a significant relationship between the existences of a stand-alone risk committee with corporate financial crime incidences. The result of the study serves as an empirical indicator for a firm’s consideration in deciding on the implementation of a stand-alone risk committee from its audit committee. Both the descriptive and correlation analyses produced by this paper provide new insights into the extent of corporate financial crime, as well as the empirical evidence of the effectiveness of having a stand-alone risk committee.


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