scholarly journals Freedom of Speech and Expression versus the glorification of acts of terrorism: Defining limits in the Indian context

2021 ◽  
pp. 54-78
Author(s):  
Vaibhav Chadha

Freedom of speech and expression is one of the essential rights for humans; however, some people in the guise of right to freedom of speech and expression glorify the acts of terrorism. In India, there are several laws making certain speeches punishable, but these laws fail to take into consideration speeches that glorify terrorists or acts of terrorism. The objective of this article is to examine the scope of provisions or laws that may be introduced to prohibit speech glorifying acts of terrorism in India while maintaining a balance with the right to freedom of speech and expression granted under the Constitution of India, 1950. This article attempts to assess United Nation Security Council Resolution 1624 and laws enacted in the wake of terrorist attacks in European countries such as the United Kingdom and France, and how they deal with speech that glorifies terrorism. This article also discusses case laws on glorification of terrorism of the European Court of Human Rights.

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 342-362
Author(s):  
Ergul Celiksoy

In November 2018, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights delivered its judgment in the case of Beuze v Belgium. Relying on Ibrahim and Others v the United Kingdom, the Grand Chamber held that the Salduz principles require a two-stage test of analysis, and hence, ruled out that systematic statutory restriction of a general and mandatory nature would in itself constitute an automatic violation of Article 6 § 3(c) of the European Convention on Human Rights. However, the Beuze judgment appears to be very controversial, since the Grand Chamber failed to put forward any convincing reason why it departed from previous case law, particularly Dayanan v Turkey and other judgments against Turkey. In their separate opinion, the concurring Judges in Beuze were concerned that the Beuze judgment overruled ‘ Salduz itself and all other cases that have applied the Salduz test’, and thus, ‘actually distorts and changes the Salduz principle and devalues the right that the Court established previously’. This article analyses the Beuze judgment in the light of the Court’s recent jurisprudence in order to examine whether it contradicts and dilutes the principles previously set out. Further, it discusses the implications of the new standards established in Ibrahim and Others and in subsequent cases, particularly Beuze. Particular attention is paid to the questions of how ‘fair’ is the application of overall fairness assessment in every case, how may the Court’s changing direction of approach concerning the right to access to a lawyer affect the increasing trend of recognition thereof, as a rule, by the contracting states, and finally, to what extent the new principles, especially those established in Beuze, comply with Directive 2013/48/EU on the right of access to a lawyer.


2012 ◽  
Vol 106 (1) ◽  
pp. 131-137 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miša Zgonec-Rožej

In Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, decided on July 7, 2011, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg (the Court) found that the human rights obligations of the United Kingdom applied to its actions in Iraq and that the United Kingdom had violated Article 2 (right to life) of the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Convention or ECHR) by failing to investigate the circumstances of the deaths of the relatives of five of the six applicants. The case deals with the extraterritorial application in Iraq of the Convention, which is part of UK domestic law by virtue of the Human Rights Act, 1998, and involves the concepts of jurisdiction, effective control, and the scope of the right to life.


2021 ◽  
pp. 092405192110334
Author(s):  
Katie Pentney

Undercover police operations have emerged from the shadows and into the spotlight in the United Kingdom as a result of a public inquiry into undercover policing and the enactment of the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Act. The inquiry has revealed troubling details about the ways intelligence and police services have wielded their powers to infiltrate and undermine political groups and social movements over the course of five decades. The problem is not exclusive to the United Kingdom, but is seen the world over. Yet despite the widescale nature of the problem, the legality of agents provocateurs – undercover officers who infiltrate social and political movements to manipulate their messaging, instigate violent tactics and undermine public perception – has received scant attention in legal scholarship or the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. This article capitalises on the current spotlight to suggest that agents provocateurs can and should be conceived of as (potential) violations of the right to freedom of expression under the European Convention on Human Rights. A purposive approach is required to ensure protection for not only the means of expression – the exchange of information and ideas – but also the ends – vibrant democratic discourse and meaningful public debate.


Author(s):  
Dzhuzha О. M. ◽  
◽  
Melnychenko І. P. ◽  

The article provides a legal analysis of the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in such cases like “Vinter and Others v. The United Kingdom”, “Hutchinson v. The United Kingdom”. The European Court of Human Rights has established key standards for those sentenced to life imprisonment, compliance with which will ensure that this type of punishment meets the requirements of the Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Such standards are: 1) sentencing of life imprisonment is not prohibited and does not conflict with the Article 3 or any other article of the Convention. The imposition of “non-reducible” life imprisonment may raise questions of compliance with the requirements of the Article 3 of the Convention; 2) in decision making whether life imprisonment can be considered as “non-reducible”, it is necessary to establish whether the person convicted to life imprisonment had any prospect of release. If national law provides for the possibility of reviewing life imprisonment regarding its mitigating, reducing, terminating or releasing, this is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of th Article 3 of the Convention; 3) for the purposes of the Article 3 of the Convention it is sufficient that life imprisonment is reducible de jure and de facto; 4) European penitentiary policy is currently focusing on the correctional purpose of imprisonment, in particular until the end of long prison sentences; 5) at the very beginning of the sentence a person convicted to life imprisonment has the right to know what he must do to consider the possibility of his release and under what conditions the sentence will be reviewed or also in what order a request to this may be made; 6) if domestic law does not provide for any mechanism or possibility to review life imprisonment, then the non-compliance with the requirements of the Article 3 of the Convention occurs at the time of imposition of life imprisonment and not at a later stage. The importance of such standards separating of the European Court of Human Rights for the national theory and practice of life imprisonment is that these provisions are effective guidelines for determining the prospects of releasing from sentencing in the form life imprisonment. Key words: European Court of Human Rights, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, case law, convict, life imprisonment.


2021 ◽  
Vol 59 (3) ◽  
pp. 95-122
Author(s):  
Faruk H. Avdić ◽  

The so-called Salduz doctrine that concerns the right to a fair trial and the right to the defense attorney emerged from the case of Salduz v. Turkey, decided on the part of the European Court of Human Rights where the Grand Chamber found the violation of Article 6, paragraph 3(c) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. In this connection, the aim of this paper is twofold. In the first place, the paper aims to demonstrate how the European Court of Human Rights has overturned the two main tenents of the so-called Salduz doctrine derived from its landmark case of Salduz v. Turkey in its later Judgments delivered in the case of Ibrahim and Others v. the United Kingdom and the case of Beuze v. Belgium. The two tenets derived from the Salduz doctrine being examined in the paper are the right to access to the defense attorney as a rule during pre-trial proceedings and the absolute exclusionary rule. In the second place, the paper aims to offer a critique of the standard of compelling reasons employed in the Ibrahim Judgment. In order to achieve its aim, this paper primarily analyses the jurisprudence of the European Human Court of Human Rights in the cases of Salduz v. Turkey, Ibrahim and Others v. the United Kingdom, and Beuze v. Belgium. Besides, the paper also touches upon other judgments of the European Court of Human Rights related to its subject. The paper in question, therefore, primarily relies on the case-law method in achieving its aims. The paper concludes that in overturning the Salduz doctrine in relation to aspects examined in the paper, the European Court of Human Rights has exacerbated the legal standing of the person against whom criminal proceedings are being conducted.


Author(s):  
Н. А. Зелінська

В статье рассматриваются актуальные вопросы защиты права на свободу вероиспо­ведания в контексте постсекулярной парадигмы либеральной политической философии. Исследуется эволюция практики Европейского суда по правам человека в этой сфере. Особое внимание уделено решениям по делам Lautsi and others v. Italy и Eweida and others v. the United Kingdom.   The current issues of protection of the right to the freedom of religion in the context of post-secular paradigm of liberal political philosophy are approached in the article. The author studies the evolution of the European Court of Human Rights practice in this field. Particular attention is paid to the decisions in the cases Lautsi and others v. Italy and Eweida and others v. the United Kingdom.


Author(s):  
Dolores Morondo Taramundi

This chapter analyses arguments regarding conflicts of rights in the field of antidiscrimination law, which is a troublesome and less studied area of the growing literature on conflicts of rights. Through discussion of Ladele and McFarlane v. The United Kingdom, a case before the European Court of Human Rights, the chapter examines how the construction of this kind of controversy in terms of ‘competing rights’ or ‘conflicts of rights’ seems to produce paradoxical results. Assessment of these apparent difficulties leads the discussion in two different directions. On the one hand, some troubles come to light regarding the use of the conflict of rights frame itself in the field of antidiscrimination law, particularly in relation to the main technique (‘balancing of rights’) to solve them. On the other hand, some serious consequences of the conflict of rights frame on the development of the antidiscrimination theory of the ECtHR are unearthed.


2000 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 621-642 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne Looijestijn-Clearie

InCentros Ltd and Erhvers-og Selskabsstyrelesen (hereinafter Centros),1 the European Court of Justice ruled that it is contrary to Article 52 (now Article 432) and Article 58 (now Article 48) of the EC Treaty for the authorities of a member State (in casu Denmark) to refuse to register a branch of a company formed under the law of another member State (in casu the United Kingdom) in which it has its registered office, even if the company concerned has never conducted any business in the latter State and intends to carry out its entire business in the State in which the branch is to be set up. By avoiding the need to form a company there it would thus evade the application of the rules governing the provision for and the paying-up of a minimum share capital in force in that State. According to the Court, this does not, however, prevent the authorities of the member State in which the branch is to be set up from adopting appropriate measures for preventing or penalising fraud, either with regard to the company itself, if need be in co-operation with the member State in which it was formed, or with regard to its members, where it has been determined that they are in fact attempting, by means of the formation of a company, to evade their obligations towards creditors established in the territory of the member State of the branch.


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